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degradation) is based on a simple idea: pay developing countries 
to reduce CO2 emissions from the forest sector. Nevertheless, 
design and implementation of a REDD system raise many hard 
questions: How are emissions reductions monitored, reported 
and veri ed? How should REDD be  nanced? Should payments 
be directed to countries, projects, or both? How should reference 
levels be set? How are non-permanence and leakage accounted? 
How to achieve REDD co-bene ts and avoid doing harm?
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their implications on the 3E criteria – E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Emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries 
constitute some 20 percent of the total global emission of greenhouse gases 
annually. These large emissions are not included today under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or its Kyoto 
Protocol. 
If we are to be serious in our efforts to combat climate change and limit the 
rise in global temperature to no more than 2°C, reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) in developing countries must be 
included in the next global climate regime. 
REDD has the potential to generate substantial benefits in addition to the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. These include positive impacts on 
biodiversity and on sustainable development, including poverty reduction and 
strengthening indigenous peoples’ rights. Thus, if designed properly, REDD 
may produce a triple dividend – gains for the climate, for biodiversity and for 
sustainable development. 
At the Thirteenth Session of the Conference of Parties in Bali in December 
2007, Norway launched its International Climate and Forest Initiative. 
Through this initiative, Norway is prepared to allocate up to NOK 3 billion 
a year to REDD efforts in developing countries over the next 5 years. The 
contributions from Norway and other donor countries, as well as multilateral 
agencies, must be seen as demonstrations of sincere interest and commitment 
to contribute towards reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries.
It will, however, be possible to achieve large-scale and sustainable reductions 
in greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in 
developing countries only if these emissions are included in a global post-2012 
climate regime. 
Preface
vWhile the underlying idea of REDD is simple, there are complex issues to 
be solved, such as measurement, scale, funding, permanence, liability, leakage 
and reference levels. Norway has supported the production of this book with 
the aim to facilitate progress of the UNFCCC negotiations on these complex 
issues by clarifying options associated with each issue – and especially their 
implications for effectiveness, efficiency and equity. 
With strong political will from all parties, it is our hope and ambition that 
REDD can be included in the next climate agreement in a way that yields the 
triple dividend.
Erik Solheim 
Minister of Environment and International Development 
Norway
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Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) is 
based on a core idea: reward individuals, communities, projects and countries 
that reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from forests. REDD has the 
potential to deliver large cuts in emissions at a low cost within a short time 
frame and, at the same time, contribute to reducing poverty and sustainable 
development.
This sounds too good to be true. REDD is based on a simple and appealing 
idea, but turning the idea into action is much more complex. We must address 
many difficult questions before we can create mechanisms that fully exploit the 
potential of REDD: How can we measure reductions in emissions when data 
are poor or do not exist? How can we raise the billions of dollars needed to put 
a REDD mechanism in place? How can we make sure that any reductions in 
deforestation and degradation are real (additional), and that they do not lead 
to more trees being chopped down in other forest areas (leakage) or next year 
(permanence)? How can we make sure that the poor benefit?
This book discusses these questions. They are highly relevant to the design of 
the global REDD architecture in the post-2012 climate regime that is currently 
being negotiated under the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). Each chapter deals with a key issue, presents the options 
and assesses the implications according to the ‘3E’ criteria: carbon effectiveness, 
cost efficiency, and equity and co-benefits. While there are technical solutions 
to all the problems, there are sometimes tradeoffs between the 3Es. Moreover, 
there are few purely technical issues; most options have political implications, 
for example, on the distribution of REDD funds across countries.
REDD will require unprecedented levels of funding to achieve emissions 
reductions of, say, 50 percent. Public funding, including development aid, 
is needed for capacity building (readiness), demonstration activities, policy 
reforms and for activities in high-risk regions with weak governance. Tapping 
into carbon markets, however, has the potential to raise even larger amounts 
of funds. This funding might be generated by selling REDD credits directly 
in compliance markets, or from funds generated by auctioning of emission 
allowances or from a tax on carbon trade.
Summary 
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Some fear the risk of ‘market flooding’ and ‘crowding out’ of other mitigation 
efforts if (cheap) REDD credits are made fungible (interchangeable) with other 
types of carbon credits. These fears may be overstated and there are options to 
minimise the risks. In particular, if REDD is included in a global agreement 
overall GHG emission targets could be more ambitious without raising overall 
costs. This means the UNFCCC negotiations must not separate decisions 
about overall targets from decisions on how to include REDD.
The impact of integrating REDD credits into the carbon market also depends 
on the supply of credits. This, in turn, is influenced by emissions crediting 
baselines (reference levels). Among the issues being debated in REDD, the 
argument about reference levels is among the most contentious. Reference 
levels have huge implications for both the effectiveness of REDD and equity 
across countries. Negotiators face a dilemma. They have to balance the risk 
of ‘tropical hot air’ and diluted incentives if baselines are too generous; and 
low participation and rejection by developing countries if baselines are set too 
tight.
For a REDD mechanism to be effective, emissions reductions must be additional, 
that is, emissions reference levels must not be set above the business-as-usual 
scenario. Further, the emission reductions must be permanent. Assigning 
liability in the case of non-permanence is necessary if REDD credits are to be 
made fungible (interchangeable) with carbon credits from other sectors. 
While non-permanence is a form of temporal leakage, spatial leakage occurs 
if reducing deforestation and degradation in one geographical area leads to 
higher emissions in another. Domestic leakage can be monitored and possibly 
also reduced by redesigning interventions, neutralising activities, or moving up 
to a higher geographical scale of accounting and crediting.
There are three main approaches for the geographical scale of REDD accounting 
and international crediting: the subnational, the national, or a combination 
of the two in a nested approach. A national approach accounts for domestic 
leakage, and stimulates countries to make broad-based (and sometimes cheap) 
policy reforms that can lead to deeper and more permanent reductions in 
emissions. The subnational approaches, such as projects, are attractive to private 
investors because outputs are more tangible, and can work in countries that are 
not institutionally ready to implement a national approach. A nested approach 
allows countries to start with a subnational approach and to scale up to a 
national approach over time, or to simultaneously account and receive credits 
at both the subnational and national levels. The nested approach, therefore, is 
more flexible and allows more countries to take part in REDD.
The capacity to monitor, report and verify (MRV) emissions, vary considerably 
across countries. A global REDD scheme must be flexible enough to avoid 
discriminating against countries with low MRV capacity. The guidelines of 
xthe International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) allow for a soft entry, for 
example, permitting countries to use global default values for carbon stocks 
per hectare in emission accounting. This kind of flexibility would allow poor 
countries with high levels of degradation to be included. But, the uncertainties 
inherent in these simpler approaches mean that credits would need to be 
‘discounted’. This creates a direct incentive for countries to upgrade their 
measuring and monitoring methods so that they can get full credits.
REDD has the potential to achieve significant co-benefits, including alleviating 
poverty, improving governance, and conserving biodiversity and providing 
other environmental services. While co-benefits are largely determined by 
national REDD strategies and the way countries implement them (which are 
beyond the scope of this book), the global REDD architecture should provide 
– and not foreclose on– opportunities for developing countries to implement 
REDD in ways that deliver co-benefits without doing harm. REDD financial 
flows and national implementation need to be harmonised with pre-existing 
international commitments and emerging norms, especially procedural 
safeguards, to minimise the risk of unintended negative consequences for 
vulnerable communities.
This book highlights the fact that countries differ widely in terms of their 
MRV infrastructure, institutional capacity to implement REDD policies and 
measures, drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, and so on. This 
heterogeneity needs to be reflected in the global REDD architecture. The 
mechanisms must be flexible enough to ensure broad country participation 
from the beginning. At the same time, they should also include incentives ‘to 
move on’, for example, to improve MRV and to graduate from a subnational 
(project) approach to a national approach. Flexibility is also needed for another 
reason: REDD is a large-scale experiment and we need to leave room for mid-
course corrections as we learn what works and what does not.
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What is this book about? 
Arild Angelsen and Stibniati Atmadja
Chapter 1
1.1  REDD: Simple, yet complex
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries (REDD) has moved to centre stage in the international climate 
debate over the past three years. It is commonly seen as a significant, cheap, 
quick and win-win way to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; significant 
because one-fifth of global GHG emissions come from deforestation and forest 
degradation (DD); cheap because much of the DD is only marginally profitable, 
so, reducing GHG emissions from forests would be cheaper than most other 
mitigation measures; quick because large reductions in GHG emissions can be 
achieved with ‘stroke of the pen’ reforms and other measures not dependent on 
technological innovations; and win-win because the potentially large financial 
transfers and better governance can benefit the poor in developing countries 
and provide other environmental gains on top of the climate-related benefits.
While the details of these claims can be contested and are discussed in several 
chapters of this book, most observers agree that REDD is a key mechanism in 
global efforts to limit climate change. We need to move ahead with REDD.
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In the international climate negotiations, REDD refers to a broad set of 
approaches and actions to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation. At the core of REDD is, however, a scheme whereby the global 
community will create mechanisms to reward those who reduce emissions 
from DD. This will tap into the potential for ‘significant, quick, cheap and 
win-win’ GHG emission reductions from reducing deforestation and forest 
degradation.
REDD is, therefore, based around a simple idea: pay those that reduce DD. But, 
as with all simple ideas, turning it into action is much more complex. Alongside 
the enthusiasm, uneasiness is gradually growing concerning the feasibility and 
potentially negative implications of REDD. Many difficult questions must 
be addressed if we are to create an effective mechanism: How are emissions 
reductions to be monitored, reported and verified (MRV) if forest data are 
poor or do not exist? How should REDD be financed, given that a 50% cut in 
emissions may cost USD 20-30 billion per year? Should projects or countries, 
or both, be rewarded? How can we ensure that any emissions reductions are 
permanent – that trees saved this year will not be felled next year? How do we 
avoid leakage – that trees saved within a country or project area do not lead 
to more trees being chopped down elsewhere? How can we ensure that any 
credited emission reductions are real, that is, additional to what would happen 
without REDD? How can we ensure that REDD payments are distributed in 
an equitable manner and benefit the poor? These and other questions need to 
be addressed if we are to move ahead with REDD and agree on how REDD is 
to be included in a post-2012 global climate regime.
1.2  Moving ahead with REDD
This book follows a simple recipe: we lay out the key problems, present the 
options on how to deal with them, and then assess the options based on the 
‘3E’ criteria: Effectiveness: can the mechanism bring significant emission 
reductions? Efficiency: are these reductions achieved at the minimum cost? and 
Equity: are benefits and costs distributed fairly among and within countries?
The working title of the book was ‘REDD – Global Architecture in the New 
Climate Regime’. This indicates our intention, which is to examine the design 
options for including REDD in the post-2012 global climate agreement 
currently being discussed by the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). We discuss the design and implementation of 
national and local REDD schemes only to the extent that they are relevant to 
the global REDD architecture. This does not imply that national and local 
issues are less important in REDD; rather, that they are so comprehensive and 
complex that they warrant another book!
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A major objective of the book is to point out that, for all the important issues, 
there are technical options, although there are sometimes trade offs among the 
3Es. But, it is not only the technical issues in REDD that are complex. Some 
REDD options may, for example, have strong implications for the distribution 
of benefits and costs across countries. The issue of baselines (reference levels) is 
a case in point. Baselines have a technical element, namely a realistic prediction 
of future DD in a business-as-usual scenario. But they also determine the 
level at which a country should start being credited for emissions reductions, 
based on the interpretation of principles such as ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ and ‘relevant national circumstances’. The reference levels will 
have a big impact on benefits and thus be a political issue.
News articles, reports and statements about REDD are published almost every 
day. Why write a new book on the topic? First, this book comprehensively 
covers all the major issues and options on the table in the UNFCCC 
negotiations. As far as we know, no other book dealing with these is currently 
available. Second, there has been a proliferation of advocates for particular 
REDD models, both among the UNFCCC parties (countries) as well as 
among environmental NGOs, research organisations and think tanks. Our 
modest aim is to complement such offerings and to provide, as far as possible, 
an objective assessment of the different options.
1.3  What this book is about
This book discusses the design options for REDD in a global climate regime. 
Each chapter looks at a question that UNFCCC negotiators and others 
involved in the global REDD debate must address.
What are the key design issues for REDD and the criteria for assessing 
options? Chapter 2 points to three important design issues. First, how should 
REDD fit in the overall UNFCCC architecture? Should it be part of a broad 
post-2012 climate agreement or dealt with under a separate agreement? This, 
the authors argue, largely depends on another question, namely how REDD 
should be financed, and – as part of that question – how it should be integrated 
with carbon markets. If, for example, REDD funding comes from compliance 
markets (to offset commitments of Annex I countries), then it makes better 
sense to include REDD in a broad post-2012 agreement.
Second, should REDD be included in an overall framework for the forest sector, 
and, if so, should forestry also be included in an overall accounting framework 
for agriculture, forestry and other land uses (AFOLU)? A key issue is whether 
afforestation and reforestation (A/R), currently part of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol, should be merged with REDD 
in a comprehensive forest sector accounting framework.
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Third, what performance measures should be used? Should the policies and 
measures (PAMs) that reduce emissions be counted (the input approach) or 
should we measure the outcomes (the output approach)? If the latter is chosen, 
should incentives be linked to the absolute levels of forest carbon stocks or to 
the changes in these stocks (equating to emissions, either positive or negative)? 
The emissions-based approach is in line with the current focus and accounting 
architecture of the UNFCCC, and is also the main proposal in current REDD 
negotiations. The rest of the book, therefore, focuses on this approach.
What are the costs and potentials of REDD? Chapter 3 addresses three key 
questions in the REDD debate. How much will REDD cost? How will REDD 
affect the overall strategy for reducing GHG emissions? How will REDD affect 
the carbon price and efforts to reduce emissions in other sectors? The author 
argues that REDD offers an immediate opportunity to mitigate a significant 
source of emissions at a relatively low cost. The cost estimates vary, from USD 7 
to 28 billion per year for halving deforestation, but even the high end estimates 
compare favourably with the cost of most other mitigation options. Because 
it is low cost and has the potential to quickly reduce emissions, exploiting 
the REDD potential would lead to a larger global emission reduction at the 
same overall cost. One study finds that including REDD could reduce global 
warming by 0.25o C at no extra cost.
If REDD carbon credits are made fungible (interchangeable) with other carbon 
GHG credits, some fear carbon markets will be flooded with cheap REDD 
credits, suppressing other mitigation activities and long-term development of 
clean energy technologies. While this is a legitimate concern, some reports, 
such as Eliasch (2008), suggest that this fear might be overstated. Moreover, 
there are a number of options that could minimise this risk, including tighter 
overall targets, managed fungibility and ‘banking of credits’.
What is the right scale for REDD? Chapter 4 reviews the three main options 
for international REDD accounting and crediting: (i) at subnational (or 
project) level; (ii) at national level; or (iii) at both levels in a nested approach. 
In a nested approach, countries can start with a subnational approach and scale 
up to a national approach over time. They may also account and receive credits 
at both the subnational and national levels simultaneously.
In a national approach, governments can make broad-based (and sometimes 
cheap) policy reforms, ensure consistency in monitoring reporting, and 
verifying (MRV), and account for any domestic ‘leakage’. This option would 
also encourage better integration with national development policies and 
result in stronger country ownership. This option is favoured by most nations. 
Accounting and crediting at the subnational scale, such as the project level, 
is more attractive to private investors. They may prefer the tangible nature 
and limited scope of forest projects, and their more direct relationship with 
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emissions reductions. REDD projects can be undertaken even when the host 
country is not institutionally ready to implement REDD at the national 
level. The third option; the nested approach, is flexible and allows countries 
to combine different crediting mechanisms and to approach national-
level implementation at different speeds. Nested approaches can, therefore, 
maximise the potential of both subnational and national approaches, although 
a challenge is to harmonise the two levels.
How do we match country needs with financing sources? Chapter 5 outlines 
the needs for REDD funding in three areas: (i) up front investments in 
REDD infrastructure, forest monitoring systems, capacity building and other 
preparatory and demonstration activities (‘readiness’ activities); (ii) ongoing costs 
of implementing national policies and measures (PAM); and (iii) compensation 
payments to forest owners for forgone profits (opportunity costs).
Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other forms of public funding 
could be a source of finance for countries with restricted access to REDD 
global mechanisms. Good examples are rewarding early action and giving 
credit for PAM. Market-linked mechanisms, such as including REDD credits 
in the carbon market, auctioning emission allowances, and/or fees and taxes 
on carbon transactions, are the most promising avenues for raising the overall 
volume of funding needed to exploit the REDD potential. But, financing 
shortfalls are likely in (i) the demonstration period for the international REDD 
mechanism prior to 2012 and (ii) in countries where forest governance is 
weak and, thus, where the investment environment is high risk. Whatever the 
scenario, we need to find ways to make up the shortfall in financing from both 
public and private sources. Above all, a future REDD mechanism should be 
open to flexible and creative financing approaches, so it can adapt to countries’ 
changing needs and experiences.
How do we set the reference level for REDD payments?  Chapter 6 
distinguishes between three meanings of the word ‘baseline’ in the current 
debate. These are: (i) the historical baseline, that is, the rate of deforestation and 
degradation (DD) and the resulting GHG emissions over the past x years; (ii) 
the projected business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, that is, how would emissions 
from DD evolve without the REDD activity, and (iii) the crediting baseline, 
that is, the level at which REDD payments should start. A BAU baseline is the 
benchmark for assessing the impact of REDD measures that were implemented 
(and ensuring additionality), whereas the crediting baseline is the benchmark 
for rewarding the country (or project) if emissions are below that level. While 
BAU baselines can be seen as technical issues, setting crediting baselines is 
largely a political question.
Almost all submissions use historical deforestation as the point of departure, 
and most also recommend that ‘national circumstances’ and ‘rewarding early 
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action’ be taken into account. These principles still have to be put into practice. 
A key dilemma facing negotiators is that, on the one hand, generous baselines, 
based on ‘country-by-country’ assessments that take national circumstances 
into account, may create ‘tropical hot air’, which undermines the environmental 
integrity (overall emissions reductions) and the credibility of REDD. On the 
other hand, too-tight crediting baselines may make an agreement unacceptable. 
In short, the balancing act is between the risk of ‘tropical hot air’ and the 
participation and political acceptance of REDD countries.
How do we deal with leakage? Chapter 7 discusses one of the key concerns 
in the REDD debate. How can we ensure that reduced deforestation and 
degradation (DD) in one geographical area does not lead to more DD and 
higher emissions in another area? This chapter analyses the leakage of three 
forest-climate interactions: afforestation/reforestation, set-aside conservation 
areas and sustainable forest management.
There are a number of ways to deal with leakage or ‘displaced emissions’. These 
include: (i) monitoring what is happening outside the project boundaries; (ii) 
moving to a higher scale of accounting and crediting, which is indeed one of 
the main arguments for a national approach vis-à-vis a subnational approach; 
(iii) discounting credits based on estimates of the extent of the leakage; (iv) 
redesigning interventions to minimise leakage; and (v) neutralising leakage 
with complementary activities, such as ‘alternative livelihoods’ components.
Leakage can therefore be accounted for and incentives can be structured to 
reduce leakage. At the same time, leakage is a natural part of an economy’s 
ability to adapt. It cannot be entirely eradicated and should not be a deal 
breaker. In terms of equity and development, leakage may actually indicate 
a healthy economy, for example if, in response to REDD-induced barriers, 
production factors migrate to new opportunities and keep welfare losses at 
a minimum. Recognising trade-offs between carbon mitigation and broader 
development goals may thus lead us to deliberately accept some leakage and to 
reprioritise mitigation actions.
How do we ensure permanence and assign liability? Chapter 8 discusses 
another major concern in the REDD debate. How can we make sure that a 
forest area saved today will not be destroyed tomorrow? Who should be held 
liable if that happens? How can REDD contracts and financial mechanisms be 
designed to ensure permanence? Once liability for terrestrial carbon stocks has 
been assumed in an area or sector, non-permanence may still be a threat, but 
will have to be compensated for elsewhere. This may be the case in the future 
if developing countries assume emissions targets. Before this happens, we need 
to find interim solutions.
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One aspect of ensuring permanence in projects or countries is managing risks 
of re-emission. Another aspect also needs to be addressed, however, if REDD 
mechanisms are to be credited and used for compliance in voluntary or formal 
(compliance) carbon markets. In this case, some system of commercial liability 
must be in place. This chapter provides a toolbox of the different liability 
mechanisms needed for achieving fungibility of carbon credits from land 
use and other sectors. The most attractive include: (i) project credit buffers 
(temporary banking of credits); (ii) pooling risk among several projects; (iii) 
commercial insurance; and (iv) sharing liability in the form of forest compliance 
partnerships (FCP) between Annex I and non-Annex I countries.
How can we monitor, report, and verify (MRV) carbon emissions from 
forests? Chapter 9 reviews forest monitoring technologies and the trade offs 
between the different methods. There are two main methods for monitoring: 
(i) the stock-difference approach, which measures forest carbon stocks at 
different points in time, and (ii) the gain-loss approach, which estimates the 
net balance of additions and removals from the carbon pool.
There is a trade off between the cost and the accuracy of the methods. In some 
countries, the need for a high level of precision requires the use of fine-resolution 
imagery (e.g. to detect forest degradation or small-scale deforestation), imagery 
repeated over time (e.g. to overcome cloud cover limitations) or imagery that 
requires significant expertise to process (e.g. analysing radar images), all of 
which come at a cost. Similarly, ground measurements, crucial to verify and 
measure carbon stocks, are time consuming and relatively expensive at a large 
scale, such as a national inventory.
Because the capacity of countries to do MRV is highly variable, a global REDD 
scheme must be flexible enough to avoid discriminating against countries with 
poor MRV capacity. A phased approach is recommended to allow for capacity 
building, to let countries gain experience, and to eventually integrate them 
into a performance-based payment mechanism in a future climate regime. 
Incentives should be put in place that encourage more accuracy and efficiency, 
and provide support for capacity building. To overcome national capacity and 
cost constraints, the chapter also explores the option of centralised monitoring 
by an international institution.
  
How do we measure and monitor forest degradation? Chapter 10 deals with 
the most difficult of the two Ds when it comes to measurement, but which is too 
important as a source of GHG emissions to leave out. Forest degradation can be 
defined as a reduction in carbon per hectare of forest (carbon density). When 
data are limited, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests 
that degradation accounting can start at relatively simple levels, monitoring 
changes in the areas of different forest types but using global default values of 
carbon densities. Accuracy can then be gradually increased as more national 
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and subnational data become available. The uncertainties inherent in simpler 
approaches mean that credits would need to be ‘discounted’. This would be 
a direct incentive for countries to upgrade their measuring and monitoring 
methods.
Overcoming the challenges posed by carbon accounting in forest degradation 
by using the IPCC stock-difference and gain-loss methods, and appropriate 
tiers (levels of precision), means that forest degradation could be realistically 
included in a REDD agreement. This would make REDD more effective 
because it would account for a wider range of forest greenhouse gas emissions. 
The international equity of the REDD mechanism would also improve because 
a wider range of countries, many of them in Africa, would be encouraged to 
participate. It is, therefore, important that decisions on the MRV framework 
for degradation allow for a diversity of circumstances.
How do we achieve REDD co-benefits and avoid doing harm? Chapter 11 
discusses one of the reasons why REDD has claimed substantial attention 
in international climate negotiations. REDD has the potential to alleviate 
poverty, protect human rights, improve governance, conserve biodiversity, and 
provide other environmental services (i.e. co-benefits) as well as reduce GHG 
emissions. However, REDD also has the potential to generate unintended 
negative consequences for the poor and powerless if implemented without 
appropriate safeguards.
This chapter links each co-benefit with specific design features at the global 
and national levels so that the co-benefits can be achieved without doing harm. 
The authors suggest that (i) integrating REDD into mainstream economic 
development strategies is important to ensure REDD financing will benefit 
the poor; (ii) performance-based payments, data transparency, financial 
accountability and international scrutiny could exert a positive influence on 
human rights and governance; and (iii) biodiversity benefits can be enhanced 
by geographically targeting vulnerable areas, although outcomes also depend 
on external factors, such as the drivers of deforestation, existing land use 
strategies and policies that encourage, or prohibit certain types of activities.
The challenge for the international community is to ensure that the global 
architecture put in place by the UNFCCC provides – and does not foreclose 
on – opportunities for developing countries to implement REDD in ways that 
deliver co-benefits without doing harm. Benefits are likely to be greatest and 
risks minimised if REDD financial flows and national-level implementation are 
harmonised with other pre-existing international commitments and emerging 
norms – particularly those related to procedural rights – as well as national 
development strategies.
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Several chapters point to the very diverse circumstances of different countries 
in terms of MRV infrastructure, institutional capacity to implement REDD, 
drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, and so on. This diversity is 
reflected in national REDD strategies currently being developed in a number 
of countries. But, the global REDD architecture also needs to reflect this 
heterogeneity. There is no ‘one size fits all’. The mechanisms must be flexible 
enough to ensure broad participation from the beginning. At the same time, 
they should also include incentives ‘to move on’, for example, to improve MRV 
and to graduate from a subnational (project) to a national level approach.
Flexibility is also needed for another reason; we cannot know for sure how 
mechanisms will work in practice. Although this book attempts to make some 
qualified assessments on the implications of various designs, REDD is a large-
scale experiment. And, ‘international negotiation processes are often large-
scale exercises in learning, through which at least some parties modify their 
perceptions of the problem and alternative policy options and perhaps see their 
incentives change as well’ (Underdal 2002: 5). Our aim is to contribute to this 
learning process.

What are the key design issues for 
REDD and the criteria for assessing 
options?
Arild Angelsen and Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff
Chapter 2
2.1  What is REDD?
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in developing 
countries, or REDD for short, is among the recent additions to the climate 
vocabulary. Taken literally, REDD is an objective rather than a clearly 
delimited set of actions or activities. United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) documents refer to REDD as a broad set 
of approaches and actions that will reduce emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation.1
In discussions, however, REDD primarily refers to: (i) developing mechanisms 
to make payments to developing countries for reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (compared with a reference level); and 
(ii) readiness activities which prepare countries to participate in the REDD 
1   Note that the abbreviation ‘REDD’ is used inconsistently in the debate – including UNFCCC 
documents - as regards the explicit inclusion of ‘forest degradation’ in the title. The Thirteenth Conference 
of the Parties (COP 13) in Bali in 2007, for example, refers to it as ‘reducing emissions from deforestation 
in developing countries’ (Decision 2/CP.13), whereas the recent submission of views on the Bali Action Plan 
names REDD as ‘reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries’ 
(FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/18). Yet all explanations share the focus on reducing forest emissions in developing 
countries.
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Figure 2.1. Conceptual model of a multi-level REDD ‘payments for environmental 
services’ (PES) scheme
mechanism. A core issue in REDD is, therefore, to create a multi-level 
(international and national) ‘payments for environmental services (PES)’ 
scheme. This multi-level scheme is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
At the international level service buyers will make payments (e.g. generated 
by voluntary or compliance markets) to the service providers (governments 
or subnational entities in developing countries) for an environmental service 
(reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation), or measures likely 
to deliver this service (e.g. tenure reforms, law enforcement). At the country 
level, national governments or other intermediaries (the service buyers) will 
pay subnational governments or local land owners (the service providers) 
to reduce emissions, or take other measures likely to reduce emissions (e.g. 
reduced impact logging).
Direct payments from international to subnational level are only possible 
where these transactions are approved by a national government agency – for 
example, a Designated National Authority (DNA) – as is the case under the 
current Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation 
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(JI) under the Kyoto Protocol. However, the current REDD debate largely 
considers this subnational approach as only an intermediary step towards a 
national REDD model (Chapter 4).
Importantly, national REDD strategies would – in addition to PES 
– also include a broad set of policies such as tenure reforms, more effective 
management of protected forest areas and policies which reduce the demand 
for forest products and forest land. Indeed, one of the advantages of a national 
approach is that these broad policies can be put in place and credited to the 
extent that they result in reduced emissions. 
This book focuses on the international level – the design options for a global 
REDD agreement under the UNFCCC. This chapter discusses some of 
the overall issues related to design options that are not covered in the other 
chapters. Three such issues are: (i) where to place REDD within the UNFCCC 
architecture; (ii) the scope of REDD; and (iii) performance measurement. 
Finally, we introduce a set of criteria – the triple E criteria (3Es) – to assess 
design options: carbon Effectiveness, cost Efficiency, and Equity and the 
co-benefit implications. These criteria are used throughout the subsequent 
chapters.
2.2  REDD in the UNFCCC architecture
One of the critical issues in the REDD debate is whether REDD should: (i) 
be part of a broader post-2012 regime (cf. submissions by the Coalition for 
Rainforest Nations, September 2007 and Mexico August 2008); or (ii) be dealt 
with in a separate agreement (cf. Brazil, February 2007 and Center for Clean 
Air Policy (CCAP), August 2007). This ‘one basket’ vs. ‘two baskets’ perspective 
may, to some observers, seem like a technical issue, but it relates to several of 
the fundamental questions in the REDD debate. The most important issue is 
how REDD should be financed. If REDD funding is (in part) to come from 
compliance markets, that is if Annex I countries can purchase REDD credits 
(offsets) as part of their own commitments, then it makes better sense to include 
REDD in the broader post-2012 regime. If REDD finance is to be fund-based 
a separate REDD agreement is likely to work better. Hence, the positions in 
this debate essentially reflect diverging views on REDD financing.
Related to question of financing is the debate about REDD being additional to 
reductions in other sectors. On this issue, interestingly, both sides are putting 
forward the same arguments. In general, those arguing in favour of a separate 
REDD agreement believe that it would ensure additionality. A separate REDD 
agreement would avoid cheap REDD credits ‘flooding’ the market and would 
not displace mitigation efforts in other sectors (see Chapters 3, 4 and 6). 
Following this line of argument, the best way to ensure additionality would be 
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to keep the REDD separate from other commitments to reduce greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions.
Those who argue for including REDD in a broader post-2012 regime table two 
major arguments. First, REDD needs to be directly linked to the compliance 
market (i.e. selling REDD credits as offsets). Second, by integrating a low-cost 
mitigation opportunity (read: REDD) into the broader agreement, the overall 
GHG emission target can be set higher at no extra overall cost (Chapter 3). 
This would work best if REDD and the overall GHG targets are negotiated 
simultaneously. Those favouring this approach can refer to the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) experience. The mechanics of the CDM 
were decided in Marrakesh in 2001 (COP 7) after overall targets for reducing 
GHG emissions had been set in Kyoto in 1997 (COP 3). In consequence, one 
reason for excluding avoided deforestation from the CDM was that it would 
not yield any additional reductions in emissions.
The issues of targets and commitments of developing countries are also central 
to the REDD integration debate. Some foresee a future comprehensive cap 
and trade (CAT) system that includes all countries and sectors (e.g. Eliasch 
2008). Others are sceptical to the idea that developing countries should adopt 
binding targets, at least in the short term, and fear that including REDD in a 
comprehensive climate agreement might be a first step towards an all-inclusive 
cap and trade system. The proposal that developing countries also need to 
make cuts, but not commit to binding targets until developed countries have 
led the way by lowering their carbon emissions (Stern 2008), seems a promising 
avenue for global collective action to mitigate climate change.
The question of how REDD would fit in the UNFCCC framework is important 
as it relates to many of the fundamental REDD issues. It will affect the level of 
involvement and commitment of the parties (both on the supply and demand 
side) and how REDD should be financed. The REDD architecture should 
follow from an agreement on these issues. 
2.3  Scope of REDD and creditable mitigation 
activities
The climate debate is about reducing the concentration of greenhouse gases 
(GHG) in the atmosphere. Including all sinks and sources can, however, 
become a daunting task. Instead, the climate negotiations can be seen as a 
stepwise effort, where mitigation is being brought up for discussion bit by bit 
in more and more sectors and activities. One of the key questions regarding 
REDD concerns the scope of creditable mitigation activities, and REDD needs 
to be viewed in relation to two broad accounting framework options: (i) the 
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option to include REDD in an overall framework for the forest sector; and (ii) 
the option to include forestry in an overall framework of agriculture, forestry 
and other land uses (AFOLU). We discuss each of these in turn.
The total forest carbon stock at any time is determined by two factors: the total 
forest area, and the carbon per hectare of forest (carbon density). This means 
changes can be measured by two factors: area and carbon density. Further, 
one can differentiate between activities that reduce negative change, and those 
that enhance positive change. This yields four conceptually different ways of 
boosting forest carbon stocks, as outlined in Table 2.1. These are deforestation, 
afforestation/reforestation (A/R), degradation, and restoration/rehabilitation.
Table 2.1.   Possible scope of creditable activities in a REDD/forestry mechanism.2
The debate on the scope of creditable activities in REDD has evolved significantly 
over the last three years. Initially, the focus was on ‘reducing negative changes’, 
at first only from deforestation (COP-11 in 2005 in Montreal) then also 
from forest degradation (COP-13 in 2007 in Bali). In Bali, the Parties also 
agreed to explore options for ‘enhancement of forest carbon stocks’, that is, to 
possibly also reward the ‘enhanced positive changes’ (Table 2.1) through forest 
restoration/rehabilitation.3 
Enhancing the carbon stock can be viewed as the positive complement of 
forest degradation – the latter reducing, the former increasing carbon densities. 
Similarly, A/R can be seen as the positive complement of deforestation. In both 
cases, the central element is not only to stop negative changes (deforestation, 
forest degradation), but to go further and reward additional positive changes 
(A/R, carbon stock enhancement).
2   Note that even in a system that rewards changes in forest area, one needs to know the carbon densities to 
calculate the overall carbon benefits. The densities might be assumed to be constant over time, or they can 
be monitored and accounted for to determine the overall changes in forest carbon (emissions), as is done in 
CDM A/R and some projects in the voluntary market (see Chapter 10).
3   Par. 11 of Decision 2/CP.13 reads: ‘Notes the further consideration, under decision 1/CP.13, of policy 
approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from  deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries’
Changes in: Reduced negative change Enhanced positive change 
Forest area 
(hectare)
Avoided deforestation Afforestation and 
reforestation (A/R)
Carbon density  
(carbon per 
hectare)
Avoided degradation Forest restoration and 
rehabilitation (carbon stock 
enhancement)
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There is a strong logical argument for including REDD in a coherent forestry 
accounting system that comprises not only reduced negative changes, but 
also enhanced positive changes. Measures taken to stop negative changes can 
lead to a restoration of the forest area, that is, higher carbon densities. Why 
should such positive increases not be rewarded? A similar logic or argument 
can be applied to area increases. Put simply, a CO2 molecule removed from the 
atmosphere and stored in a tree is just as good as one not emitted.
One challenge associated with such a comprehensive forestry accounting 
scheme is that A/R is already part of CDM under the Kyoto Protocol. This 
could be an argument for excluding A/R from the REDD scheme. But, two 
strong counter arguments can be tabled. CDM A/R has, for various reasons, 
been a failure so far; if no major revision is undertaken, excluding A/R from 
a new REDD agreement means that there will be no effective mechanism for 
taking care of positive changes in forest area. Further, excluding A/R from the 
REDD means risking fragmentation of the overall forestry architecture (see 
below).
Another issue related to where REDD fits in the UNFCCC architecture 
concerns to what extent forestry should be part of comprehensive agriculture, 
forestry, and other land uses (AFOLU) terrestrial carbon accounting systems. 
There are arguments in favour of a comprehensive AFOLU approach (Trines 
et al. 2006, Terrestrial Carbon Group 2008). Such an approach would treat 
all parties, and different carbon pools, sectors, and activities, consistently. 
New issues such as bioenergy could also be tackled within a comprehensive 
framework. A separate REDD agreement risks fragmenting the framework 
into separate systems for different land use categories. However, the work 
towards an integrated AFOLU framework is complicated. A promising avenue 
might be to address REDD as one building block that can be easily connected 
to a more comprehensive AFOLU framework in the future.
2.4  Input, emission and stock-based 
approaches
A third key issue in the overall design of REDD relates to the basis for crediting. 
Should payments be made based on the inputs needed to achieve a specific 
outcome, or on the actual outcome? These two approaches are referred to as 
input-based and output-based approaches.
In input-based schemes, payments are conditional on the inputs which are 
assumed to produce a desired outcome, but where the outcome cannot be 
measured directly. Such schemes are also referred to as ‘policies and measures’ 
(PAM). Examples of PAMs for REDD include reforming land tenure and 
enforcing forest law. They also include the adoption of land use practices likely 
to secure a desired outcome, for example, reduced impact logging, e.g. how to.
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In output-based schemes, payments are directly conditional on the outcome. 
Two types of output-based measures are relevant to the REDD debate: 
emissions-based and stock-based. In an emissions-based (or flow-based) 
approach only the net changes in carbon stocks for specific periods are used 
to calculate credits (see Chapter 9). In a stock-based approach, payments are 
based on the total carbon stock in a forest during a specific period, that is, the 
absolute levels, and not the changes (emissions).
From effectiveness and efficiency perspectives, output-based schemes are 
preferable to input-based approaches as they directly connect payments with 
the service delivered. However, for output-based approaches the outcome must 
be measurable – a requirement that is not always feasible. In some situations 
governance and institutions are not yet sufficiently developed to enable output-
based approaches. In other situations, current methodologies might hinder 
output-based approaches, such as in the case of forest degradation (see Chapter 
10).
An emission-based approach was applied in the Kyoto Protocol, making its 
application to REDD a natural step. Indeed, the focus on emission is embedded 
in the REDD acronym. Nevertheless, advocates of a stock-based approach 
argue that it will likely ensure greater carbon effectiveness (Woods Hole 
Research Center (WHRC) and Amazon Institute for Environmental Research 
(IPAM) 2008, Terrestrial Carbon Group 2008) and greater willingness-to-pay 
in the private sector (Centre for International Sustainable Development Law 
(CISDL) and Global Public Policy Institute (GPPI) 2007). The proponents 
also refer to the methodological challenges associated with emissions-based 
approaches (notably reference levels and leakage control, and equity (to 
account for previous country efforts in forest conservation).
Although a stock-based approach might avoid some of the tricky issues of 
an emission-based approach, the emission-based approach has advantages in 
terms of effectiveness. The emerging global carbon markets trade in emission 
reductions. Preserving stock cannot in itself generate emission credits, which 
eliminates the opportunity to tap directly into compliance markets to fund 
REDD activities.4
A general principle of an effective mechanism is to target, as directly as 
possible, the problem at hand. The emission-based approach does this better 
than the stock-based or input-based approaches. A major risk of the stock-
based approach is that large payments could be made to forest areas that are 
not under threat, thus ‘diluting’ the funds available for forest under threat and 
yielding low additionality.
4   Indirect links can, be created, for example, by auctioning GHG emission quotas or taxes in carbon 
markets to finance stock based approaches (see Chapter 5).
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The emission-based approach is in line with the current focus and accounting 
architecture of the UNFCCC, and is also the main proposal on the table in the 
REDD negotiations. The rest of the book therefore deals with the emission-
based approach.
2.5  The 3E criteria for assessing options
A large number of design proposals have been put forward for REDD. How 
can we evaluate them?
A typical REDD proposal seeks to reduce GHG at a minimum cost, while 
also contributing to sustainable development. Proposals can be evaluated 
against this objective on three sets of criteria, the ‘3E criteria’ (Stern 2008): 
Is the mechanism achieving its GHG emission targets (effectiveness)? Is this 
target achieved at the minimum cost (efficiency)? What are the distributional 
implications and co-benefits (equity and co-benefits)?
2.5.1 Effectiveness
Effectiveness refers to the magnitude of the emission reductions achieved, that 
is, the ‘carbon effectiveness’. Effectiveness depends on a number of factors, 
including political feasibility and the degree of commitment from countries 
to participate and implement REDD mechanisms, but -most importantly- 
on the design of the REDD model. For emissions to be reduced as much as 
possible, the REDD model would need both depth (significant reductions) 
and breadth (cover all significant sources and sinks), and the flexibility and 
robustness to cover diverse local conditions. 
Emission reductions are not observed directly, but are defined as the 
difference between the emissions with and without REDD. It requires: (i) the 
measurement of actual emissions with REDD must be accurate and verifiable; 
and (ii) include a realistic assumption of what would happen without REDD 
(additionality). Finally, a REDD activity may have undesirable side effects 
in space (displaced emissions or leakage), in time (permanence), and/or on 
other mitigation efforts. These side effects need to be taken into account when 
assessing the overall effectiveness. Components of the Effectiveness criteria are 
listed in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2.  Components of the Effectiveness criteria
Effectiveness criteria 
Depth and 
additionality
Reduction in absolute or relative emission compared with a 
business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. Additionality is a more specific 
criterion that requires reductions to be additional to what would 
occur in the absence of REDD (BAU).
Breadth/scope Coverage of different sectors and type of forest users, type of 
forest and type of mitigation measures included.
Flexibility and 
robustness
Ability to adapt to meet both diverse local conditions and 
unknown future changes at all scales. Potential trade-offs 
between flexibility and robustness need to be considered.
Verifiability Verifiability depends on (i) the technology used to make accurate 
and complete measurements; and (ii) the capacity to carry out 
such measurements.
Displacement 
of emissions 
(leakage)
Leakage can occur within or across countries, and also among 
land use activities (e.g. between deforestation and degradation 
activities if only one D is included). Generally, the larger the scale 
and the broader the scope of REDD, the lower the risk of leakage.
Permanence and 
liability
Permanence relates to ensuring long-term reductions, i.e. 
avoiding emissions reductions that are simply postponed for 
a short period of time. Liability measures can take effect if 
permanence has not been maintained.
Effect on other 
mitigation 
measures
A real risk is that REDD efforts will come at the expense of other 
climate mitigation measures. Such ‘crowding out’ effects are hard 
to measure.
2.5.2 Efficiency 
Efficiency refers to whether the given emission reduction is achieved at a 
minimum cost. Various costs must be considered when developing a REDD 
scheme. Costs can be categorised into start-up costs (or ‘upfront capacity 
building costs’, see Eliasch 2008) and ongoing emission reduction costs. The 
latter can be further sub-divided into running costs (or forest protection costs, 
see Eliasch 2008) and opportunity costs (see Chapter 5). In addition to the 
landowners’ opportunity costs, their transaction costs for participating in 
the scheme must be taken into account – a sometimes neglected aspect with 
profound implications. Table 2.3 summarises the efficiency criteria.
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Table 2.3.  Efficiency criteria
Table 2.4.  Equity and co-benefits criteria
Efficiency criteria
Start-up (upfront 
capacity-building) costs
Costs of setting up a REDD scheme, including 
establishing technical infrastructure and governance 
structures, and, most importantly, training and capacity 
building.
Running costs (forest 
protection costs)
Operational costs of a REDD regime that, in addition to 
periodic monitoring, include a variety of policies and 
measures, such as forest law enforcement and tenure 
reforms.
Landowners’
opportunity costs
Opportunity costs are the foregone economic benefits 
from the best alternative (non-forest) land uses, e.g., 
the minimum amount a landowner must be paid to be 
willing to stop deforestation and forest degradation/
DD (compensation payment). This will be a key cost 
component of a national PES system.
Landowners’ transaction 
costs
To participate in the REDD scheme, the landowner 
is likely to incur additional costs (e.g. put up fences,  
get certified), which need to be factored into the 
compensation payments.
Equity criteria
Fair distribution 
among countries
One dimension relates to the poverty profile, i.e. (i) poor 
countries’ abilities to participate in a REDD scheme (e.g. 
monitoring, reporting and verifying - MRV) and governance 
requirements); and (ii) preferential treatment of the poorest 
countries (e.g. in setting reference levels).
Another dimension of fairness relates to ‘not penalising 
early action’ and ‘not rewarding bad policies’. And, if basing 
reference levels on past deforestation, one should not 
penalise ‘lack of development’.
2.5.3 Equity and co-benefits
Most REDD proposals include non-climate objectives related to the distribution 
of benefits and costs, livelihoods/poverty reduction, protection of rights, and/or 
biodiversity (Chapter 11). The equity considerations have several dimensions, 
including fair distribution of benefits between and within countries and the 
effects of REDD activities on local and indigenous communities. Criteria for 
assessing co-benefits include economic development and poverty reduction, 
biodiversity, rights and forest governance (Table 2.4).
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Equity criteria  (continued)
Fair distribution 
within countries
This refers to intra-national fairness, i.e. the distribution 
of costs and benefits across administrative levels (local vs. 
national government) and across land use actors.
Effects on local 
and indigenous 
communities
The Bali Action Plan acknowledges the role of local and 
indigenous communities in REDD activities. The practical 
implications are that traditional rights will be recognised 
and that indigenous communities will be included in the 
REDD decision-making process.
Co-benefits criteria
Economic 
development and 
poverty reduction
REDD may enable or constrain economic development 
at the national and subnational levels, and affect those 
economically dependent on forests as well as national 
economies as a whole.
Biodiversity Carbon and biodiversity aims are largely compatible, but 
there could be trade-offs, for example, in the geographical 
targeting of funds (biodiversity and carbon hotspots may 
not overlap).
Rights and forest 
governance
REDD has the potential to improve forest governance and 
rights, e.g. through more transparent forest information 
systems. But, it also entails risks such as when the potentially 
large sums of money generated by REDD triggers 
corruption, mismanagement and elite capture.
Table 2.4.  (continued)
2.6 Concluding remarks
Moving ahead with REDD and developing the global REDD architecture 
will require important decisions on the design. There is an urgent need for 
the UNFCCC to provide direction on some of the key issues. To make an 
informed choice, the trade-offs and implications of the various options must be 
carefully assessed. In essence, for REDD to become an internationally accepted 
mitigation mechanism, it will have to comply with at least three criteria. It will 
need to secure (i) actual emission reductions (be effective) at (ii) minimum 
cost (be efficient), while (iii) reducing undesired social and ecological trade-
offs (be equitable and provide co-benefits). 

What are the costs and potentials of 
REDD?
Ruben N. Lubowski
Chapter 3
3.1  Introduction
Scientific evidence indicates that avoiding dangerous interference with the 
climate system – e.g. warming greater than 2 degrees Celsius by the end of the 
century – requires rapid and large-scale reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions from developed and major-emitting developing countries. Reducing 
emissions from tropical forests offers an immediate opportunity to mitigate 
a significant emissions source at relatively low estimated costs. Reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) efforts could 
also offer an attractive ‘bridge strategy’ of reducing near-term emissions while 
buying time to adapt to a low carbon future.
This chapter looks at some important questions for decisions over the policy 
and architecture of REDD: What will REDD cost? How will REDD affect 
the overall strategy for reducing GHG emissions? How will REDD affect the 
carbon price and efforts to reduce emissions in other sectors? The chapter 
focuses on ways in which different economic models provide answers to these 
questions. 
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3.2  What will REDD cost?
3.2.1 Types of REDD costs
Estimated costs of REDD vary with the data and modelling approach used 
and the types of costs considered. Studies report costs in terms of supplying 
or buying REDD, or both. Most estimates focus on the ‘opportunity costs’ of 
avoiding deforestation from a landowner’s perspective (i.e. foregone economic 
benefits from alternative land uses), without the costs of developing institutional 
capacities and actually implementing and transacting a REDD programme.
Some economic models have estimated ‘supply curves’ (‘marginal cost curves’) 
that indicate a cost spectrum for incremental reductions in forest emissions 
(Figure 3.1). The cost curves slope upwards, showing that for small emissions 
reductions, costs can be kept low by, for example, protecting just the lowest-
cost lands; with greater reductions, the added incremental or ‘marginal’ costs 
rise as protection must extend to higher-cost lands and protection activities.. 
For example, estimates of total opportunity costs more than double in moving 
from 94% to 100% protection of the Brazilian Amazon forest, because of the 
high agriculture potential of just 6% of the lands (Nepstad et al. 2007). 
The costs of implementing REDD policies comprise upfront costs of ‘capacity 
building’; ongoing ‘administrative costs’ of monitoring, enforcement and other 
activities needed to run a REDD programme; and ‘transaction costs’ involved 
in successfully connecting buyers and sellers. Countries will differ in their 
ability to reduce tropical forest emissions, and implementation costs will vary 
with national capacities and strategies. One-time needs for capacity building 
and policy reform for REDD in 40 countries were recently totalled at USD 4 
billion (Eliasch 2008). In addition, the costs of generating valid REDD credits 
will crucially depend on the baseline-setting rules for how REDD efforts shall 
be compensated (see Chapter 6).
$
Rent
Credit 
supply
Credit 
demand
Credit Quantity 
supplied
Cost of supplying
emissions reductions
Price
Figure 3.1.  Supply and demand for REDD ‘credits’
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3.2.2 Modelling approaches 
Most estimates of REDD costs come from ‘bottom-up’ or ‘engineering’ studies 
based on detailed information on particular activities in particular locations, 
at fixed prices. In contrast, ‘top-down’ models are more aggregate and take 
into account commodity market interactions – both demand and supply. Top-
down models have generally yielded higher estimates for the costs of large-
scale REDD, partly because they account for market feedbacks (see Table 3.1). 
Feedbacks occur as reductions in deforestation lower timber harvests and land 
conversion to agriculture. Consequent lower growth in supply of soybeans, 
cattle, and timber will raise their prices, thereby raising the incentives to 
deforest, as long as the unsatisfied demand does not abate completely. Such 
feedbacks will raise the costs of REDD and increase the risk of ‘leakage’, by 
providing incentives to shift deforestation elsewhere.
Bottom-up 
Analysis of eight tropical 
countries (Grieg-Gran in Eliasch 
2008)
Top-down 
Review of three global land use 
models (Kindermann et al. 2008)
Cost of 
halving 
deforestation
USD 7 billion/year USD 17.2-28 billion/year
Time frame Immediate; and annual 
reductions assured over 30 years
By 2050
Costs 
included
Opportunity costs of protecting 
forests (e.g. the costs of 
supplying emissions reductions 
in Figure 3.1); estimated 
administration costs of USD 
233-500 million/year for REDD; 
and estimated USD 50 million 
one-time cost for national forest 
inventories in 25 countries 
plus USD 7-17 million/year to 
administer them
Opportunity cost curves are 
estimated. Total costs above 
include opportunity costs of 
supplying emissions reductions 
plus the ‘rents’ (profits) earned 
by REDD providers in selling 
reductions at a single market 
price (Figure 3.1). This is the 
expenditure for a buyer in a 
competitive market; the seller’s 
‘rents’ are a redistribution of 
resources, not a cost to society as 
a whole. However, the rents affect 
the cost effectiveness or ability of 
a REDD programme to maximise 
reductions for a limited budget.
Comments Commodity prices fixed Market effects incorporated (e.g. 
price rises as supply falls), which 
tends to raise costs
Table 3.1.  Halving global deforestation: comparison between bottom-up and top-down 
models
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Differences in the modelled ‘baseline’ scenario of what deforestation would 
be without REDD policies also affect the estimated costs of REDD. Greater 
forecasted deforestation under the ‘business as usual’ (BAU) scenario would 
bring higher emissions to be potentially reduced, but may also mean greater 
modelled pressures on forests and thus higher costs of forest protection. Other 
differences in data and assumptions contribute to varying estimates of REDD 
costs (Table 3.2).
Select features included in the model Effect on costs
Price feedbacks: lower supplies of timber, crops, etc. raise prices 
and thus opportunity costs of forest protection.
+
Number of deforestation drivers modelled: accounting for more 
drivers, such as timber and agriculture, will raise opportunity 
costs of forest protection. Accounting for new future drivers, such 
as biofuels, rather than extrapolating from past drivers, can also 
increase estimated costs. 
+
Implementation and transaction costs, investment risks. +
Land conversion benefits as opposed to costs: one-time benefits 
from timber harvests upon forest clearance will raise costs of forest 
protection.
+
Greater assumed parameter for the ‘elasticity of transformation’, 
the convertibility of forest land to other uses, raises costs in some 
models.
+
Carbon density/releases: greater emissions avoided per hectare 
protected will lower cost per ton.
–
Timber benefits from protected forests (e.g. sustainable forest 
management).
–
Scope of the REDD model (forestry activities, sectors, countries, 
gases): greater scope implies less leakage and more opportunity 
for low-cost global reductions.
–
Scope of incentives: more complete coverage lowers leakage and 
thus costs.
–
Targeting of incentives: targeting payments at emissions 
reductions lowers transfers to non-emitters and thus costs (to 
buyers), but avoiding ‘leakage’ and ensuring equity must also be 
considered. 
–
Table 3.2. Effects of including different modelling features on the estimated costs of 
REDD
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3.3  How will REDD affect the overall strategy 
for reducing emissions?
Consideration of deforestation and other land-based options for reducing 
emissions within climate models is a relatively new field. Nevertheless, results 
from the Energy Modeling Forum 21 (Rose et al. 2007) and related efforts 
suggest that reducing deforestation, in addition to planting trees (afforestation 
and reforestation, A/R), changes in forest management, and other land-based 
options to mitigate GHGs, may provide important cost savings to reach climate 
stabilisation goals over the next century (Table 3.3, Fischer et al. 2007). 
These cost savings may enable greater global emissions reductions than could 
be achieved without REDD for the same overall cost. Estimated savings of 
USD 2 trillion through global forestry mitigation could finance a 10% stricter 
target or 0.25°C less of warming over the century depending on the modelled 
scenario (see Table 3.3). The potential gains from REDD depend on the target 
GHG concentrations in the atmosphere and the menu of available options 
for reducing emissions. More alternatives bring more potential sources of 
cheap reductions and reduce the reliance on any single option for meeting a 
particular emissions target at least cost. Another critical assumption affecting 
the estimated role of REDD across models is the expected development of 
future biofuel technologies (Table 3.3). In particular, biomass production for 
electricity generation combined with carbon capture and sequestration could, 
in theory, be a powerful competitor for land if it became a feasible means to 
generate energy with negative carbon emissions (e.g. Obersteiner et al. 2001).
Most studies of REDD focus on the economic potential, assuming that 
institutional frameworks and capacities are readily available to immediately 
implement REDD worldwide. However, not all countries will choose to join 
an international climate agreement or be able to effectively reduce deforestation 
emissions in the near term. These institutional and political barriers lower the 
realistic scale of reductions and their effective global impact. Inconsistent 
incentives for REDD and other GHG reductions across countries would 
create the potential for international emissions ‘leakage’ or ‘displacement’, 
with reductions in one country potentially being offset by increases elsewhere. 
For example, Gan and McCarl (2007) estimate international leakage as high 
as 42-95% in the forestry products industry.
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3.4  How will REDD affect the carbon price 
and efforts to reduce emissions in other 
sectors? 
The potential cost advantages of REDD may detract from abatement in 
other sectors, if REDD credits were made fully interchangeable with other 
GHG credits. A perceived risk is that REDD may ‘flood’ the carbon market, 
dampening the price signal to develop and deploy clean energy technologies. 
Model and type Results
WITCH coupled with 
GTM (integrated 
assessment analysis; 
Tavoni et al. 2007)
Including emissions reductions from deforestation, A/R and 
changes in forest management enables an atmospheric 
target of 550 CO2e parts per million by volume (ppmv) for 
the same total cost as a 600 ppmv target without forestry 
mitigation. Global forestry mitigation saves about USD 2 
trillion; this buys the climate an estimated additional 0.25°C 
less warming by the end of the century at no added cost 
(compared with energy sector only reductions). 
GLOCAF coupled 
with GCOMAP 
and IIASA cluster 
model (integrated 
assessment analysis; 
Eliasch 2008)
The costs of reducing global emissions to 50% of 1990 levels 
by 2050 (475 CO2e stabilisation) may be lowered by 25-50% 
in 2030 and 20-40% in 2050 when deforestation reductions 
and A/R are included. The cost savings of almost USD 2 
trillion could finance a 10% lower global emissions target. 
MESSAGE 
(integrated 
assessment analysis; 
e.g. Rao and Riahi 
2006; Riahi et al. 
2006)
Includes a broad set of land-based options: avoided 
deforestation, A/R, agricultural mitigation, and biofuels 
for both liquid fuels and energy with carbon capture and 
sequestration. The biofuel options compete heavily with 
forests; forestry and biofuel options contribute 1-2% and 
6-24%, respectively, over the next 50 years, and 4-8% and 
14-29% over the next century when stabilising at about 650 
CO2e ppmv. Substantial conversion of primary forests to 
managed plantation forests is predicted.
GRAPE (integrated 
assessment analysis; 
Kurosawa 2006)
Includes avoided deforestation, A/R, agricultural mitigation, 
and biofuels for liquid fuels (but not for energy). It estimates 
a large role for forestry activities: 55% and 15% of the 
abatement over the next 50 and 100 years, respectively.
GTEM (‘general 
equilibrium’ model; 
Jakeman and Fisher 
2006)
Includes avoided deforestation, A/R and agricultural 
mitigation; excludes biofuels. For 650 CO2e concentrations 
target, estimated contribution of forestry is 11% of total 
abatement over the next 50 years, with all land-based 
mitigation options saving USD 1.6-7.6 trillion depending on 
the inclusion of non-CO2 mitigation options.
Table 3.3. Estimated potential of REDD to lower costs and buy additional emissions 
reductions: comparison of models
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The effect of REDD on carbon prices and technology incentives depends on 
several factors:
•	 How	much	emissions	from	avoided	deforestation	can	actually	be	achieved	
and credited in practice (the supply of REDD), which depends on the 
total costs of REDD, the countries that participate and the crediting 
conditions.
•	 The	demand	for	REDD,	based	on	the	overall	emissions	reduction	target	
and the availability and costs of other mitigation alternatives. Under 
stricter targets, there will be greater demand for REDD and more expensive 
reductions from other sectors.  
•	 The	 options	 for	 applying	 (‘banking’)	 early	 actions	 to	 reduce	 emissions	
against future obligations, thus potentially raising current demand for 
REDD.
•	 Rules	on	the	‘fungibility’	of	REDD	credits.	Restricting	the	use	of	REDD	
and other mitigation options would tend to raise the carbon price (and the 
total costs). 
Tavoni et al. (2007) estimate that global implementation of REDD plus 
A/R and changes in forest management would delay deployment of some 
technologies and reduce investment in energy research and development by 
about 10%, for a fixed emissions reduction target. Anger and Sathaye (2006) 
find a 40% carbon price reduction from introducing REDD into a market 
that also allows unlimited credits for developing country mitigation through 
the clean development mechanism. Other studies find more muted impacts, 
depending on the policy scenario. 
According to Eliasch (2008), introducing REDD credits along with modest 
quantitative limitations on REDD has a negligible estimated effect on the 
European Union’s carbon price, even if countries can satisfy 50-85% shares of 
their abatement through international credits, depending on the stringency of 
the European Union target. The precise proportional impact of REDD on the 
price depends on the assumptions determining the shape of the cost curves, 
including the costs of the potential alternatives.
Sufficiently ambitious and credible long-term targets anticipated by market 
participants also provide incentives for saving up credits for use under tighter 
future targets. Taking into account such ‘banking,’ Piris-Cabezas and Keohane 
(2008) estimate a global REDD programme would lower the global carbon price 
by 14%, while using all forestry mitigation options would reduce the price by 
31%, for a fixed emissions reductions target. Doubling the estimated supply of 
REDD credits has a relatively small effect on the modelled price, as additional 
credits are ‘banked’ and used gradually over time. If REDD helps build a store 
of relatively low-cost emissions reductions, this ‘bank’ can also dampen price 
volatility by providing a buffer against unexpected price spikes in the future. 
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3.5 Conclusion
The latest science suggests that only a global programme that begins almost 
immediately and achieves large reductions in GHGs by mid-century can 
preserve options to avoid dangerous interference with the climate system. 
Despite different assumptions, a range of economic models indicates that 
REDD can make a significant contribution to cost-effectively stabilising GHG 
concentrations at this scale and speed.   
The cost and timing of REDD are critically important. Estimated cost savings 
from REDD could buy greater and faster global emissions cuts than can be 
achieved for the same global expenditure without REDD.  Stabilising GHG 
concentrations at safe levels requires ambitious efforts to reduce emissions 
quickly from tropical forests as well as other sectors.  Most estimates of 
REDD policy costs focus on ‘opportunity costs’ without considering capacity 
building and transaction costs, which may amount to significant additional 
requirements. However, the long-term estimated costs savings from global 
forestry in most models provide significant scope for covering these additional 
expenses.
The economic impact of REDD depends on the overall climate targets and 
policy architecture, the design and implementation of REDD and its fungibility 
with the rest of the GHG market. The potential risk of REDD supply ‘flooding’ 
the carbon market can be contained by policy designs ranging from strict and 
long-term targets with ‘banking’, to modest limits on the use of REDD and 
other types of credits.
Early emissions reductions also have particular value as a global insurance 
policy for maintaining climatic options in light of scientific uncertainty 
(Fisher et al. 2007). As  tropical forests are disappearing, REDD is also a cost-
effective opportunity for reducing emissions that is available for a limited time 
only. The time-limited and irreversible nature of REDD – once deforestation 
occurs, it cannot be avoided in the future – adds further value to protecting 
tropical forests now rather than foreclosing future options for lowering global 
emissions.
What is the right scale for REDD?
Arild Angelsen, Charlotte Streck, Leo Peskett, Jessica Brown and 
Cecilia Luttrell
Chapter 4
4.1  Introduction
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) is 
a proposed financial mechanism which would provide developing countries 
with incentives to reduce forest sector emissions. REDD could become part 
of the international climate agreement currently being discussed within the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). A 
key question in the debate concerns the geographical level (spatial scale) for 
accounting and provision of incentives for REDD activities should be offered. 
Should REDD accounting be at: (i) subnational (or project) level;  (ii) national 
level, or (iii) both levels (nested approach)? This chapter first describes the 
three approaches to REDD and then assesses the carbon effectiveness, cost 
efficiency and equity (‘3Es’) implications of each.
The differences between subnational, national and nested approaches are 
often blurred. One reason for this is that ‘spatial scale’ means different things 
in different proposals. In this chapter, scale refers to the accounting level of an 
international funding mechanism. The level of accounting would typically be 
closely linked to the level of crediting (payment), although credit-sharing 
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arrangements between national and subnational levels may haze the distinction 
between scales. The level of implementation is of secondary importance: 
implementation at the national level may include both nationally-implemented 
projects and a national REDD strategy that credits projects implemented by 
others. Similarly, a subnational project approach to implementation can be 
backed-up by good national policies that make achieving project objectives 
easier.
4.2  Three options for the scale of REDD 
4.2.1 Subnational approach
Figure 4.1 illustrates the difference between the three options. The subnational 
approach proposes that REDD activities would be implemented in a 
defined geographical area, or as projects by individuals, communities, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), private companies or national or local 
governments. As with all three approaches, crediting REDD activities would 
require internationally agreed rules for monitoring, reporting and verification 
(MRV), a system for crediting (payment), and institutional arrangements at 
both the national level (e.g. a designated national authority or similar entity 
that approves all projects) and the international level (e.g. a supervisory body 
and a centralised project and credit registry).
 
Buyers of REDD 
credits
Subnational 
approachNational approach
Nested approach
Figure 4.1.  The three approaches to REDD accounting and and crediting
Note: Arrows indicate money from the international buyers and information from the 
(sub)national entities.
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The modalities and procedures developed for the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol could serve as a model for 
the institutional set-up. The CDM allows developed (Annex I) countries to 
offset their greenhouse gas emissions by supporting projects in developing 
countries that reduce emissions. In the forestry sector, only afforestation and 
reforestation (A/R) projects are currently eligible and, so far, only one project 
has been approved. The CDM has proved more successful in other sectors, 
particularly in energy. CDM had a primary market value of USD 7.4 billion 
in 2007 (Hamilton et al. 2008). Progress of A/R CDM projects is slow because 
the complex rules, methodologies and registration costs make transaction 
costs very high. Other obstacles are the lack of transferability of the temporary 
credits assigned to projects and the exclusion of temporary credits from the EU 
Emission Trading System (ETS). The ETS is by far the largest carbon market, 
with a volume of USD50 billion in 2007, or 78% of the global carbon trade 
(Hamilton et al. 2008). 
Another example of a subnational approach is the voluntary carbon market in 
projects for preventing deforestation. The transactions in the voluntary carbon 
market reached USD330 million in 2007 (forestry-related projects comprising 
18% of market share), which was less than 5% of the CDM primary market. 
Eighty per cent of the transactions in the voluntary carbon market involved 
private sector buyers (Hamilton et al. 2008).
Given the relative success of CDM in other sectors, its established institutional 
structure and the difficulties some countries may have in taking a national 
approach to REDD, some Parties to the UNFCCC argue that a project-based 
mechanism should be included in the global REDD framework, e.g. the 
recent submission to UNFCCC by Paraguay on behalf of Argentina, Panama, 
Peru, Paraguay and Peru (see Appendix). The post-2012 negotiations under 
the Kyoto Protocol (Article 3.9) also include discussions on REDD in CDM. 
However, the negotiations should recognise that the limited success of A/R 
projects suggests that a project-based REDD approach cannot simply replicate 
the CDM model.
4.2.2 National approach
Most country submissions to UNFCCC advocate a national approach. 
This reflects their previous experiences with leakage and transaction costs in 
project approaches. The national approach also addresses sovereignty issues. It 
acknowledges that combating deforestation entails broad policy changes and 
thus has the potential to achieve larger-scale and more permanent reductions 
than subnational or nested approaches.
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Governments taking a national approach would establish a national system 
for MRV and would be rewarded for emission reductions measured from an 
established reference level (discussed in Chapter 6). Reductions would be 
rewarded by allocation of tradable carbon credits, financial transfers from a 
global fund or other mechanisms. In the national approach, no direct credits 
would be issued internationally for activities that reduce emissions at the 
subnational level.
In order to access international incentives, each participating country, depending 
on its circumstances, would be responsible for implementing policies and 
measures to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation over 
its entire territory. Policies and measures might include a system to provide 
credits (payment for environmental services, or PES) to local communities. 
A major advantage of the national approach is that governments can put in 
place a broad set of policies and actions to reduce deforestation and forest 
degradation. 
4.2.3 Nested approach
Given the diverse national circumstances, a number of UNFCCC submissions 
suggest integrating subnational activities into a national accounting framework 
through a ‘nested’ approach (first presented coherently by Pedroni et al. 
2007). Taking this approach, countries could start REDD activities at any 
level. Those that decide to start at the subnational level could scale up to a 
national approach as they strengthen their capacity and improve governance. 
Transition to a national approach would be mandatory, either within an agreed 
time frame or when an agreed percentage of forest area is covered by REDD 
projects, whichever comes first. 
Although the transition to a national approach would be obligatory, it would 
still be possible to credit individual project activities. The nested approach 
therefore has two unique features: Firstly, the capacity to scale up from a 
subnational to a national approach over time. Secondly, countries have the 
option to account for and receive international credits at subnational and 
national levels simultaneously (see Figure 4.1). Also, different countries could 
use different crediting mechanisms at the same time.
In a nested approach, where accounting and crediting takes place at both 
subnational and national levels, procedures for MRV and setting reference 
levels would need to be harmonised. An arrangement for sharing credits 
between the two levels could be modelled on the Kyoto Protocol Joint 
Implementation (JI) mechanism. At the end of each accounting period, the 
country would have to deduct all credits issued and committed at subnational 
level from national credits for country-wide emission reductions (see Box 4.1). 
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Should the national level fail to deliver carbon benefits, independently validated 
and verified subnational activities would still be credited.
Box 4.1.  How a nested approach might work
A project generates 1000 tonnes of carbon dioxide emission reductions during the 
accounting period. The country’s overall reduction (carbon credits) is 5000 tonnes 
during the period. The 1000 tonnes already credited to the project have to be 
deducted from the national balance. To allow for project-level leakage, monitoring, 
reporting and verification (MRV) costs, and the risk of non-permanence (higher 
emissions in the future), the government may retain a certain share of the carbon 
credits assigned to the project. Thus, the government and the project might make a 
deal that the project keeps 70% of the credits while the government keeps 30%. In 
this scenario, the project would keep 700 credits and the government 4300 credits.
Even under an exclusively national approach, a country could also allocate 
some of the national credits to projects. This would reduce deforestation and 
degradation, and compensate districts, communities and farmers for the cost 
of forest conservation. In other words, a country could establish a national 
system for Payments for Environmental Services (PES) that extends the global 
REDD system to the local level. In a nested approach this would be considered 
part of the international agreement, whereas it would not be in an exclusively 
national model.
4.3  Assessment of the three approaches
The merits of the three approaches can be assessed in relation to the ‘3E’ 
framework, elaborated in Chapter 2: Is the mechanism achieving its greenhouse 
gas emission targets (carbon effectiveness)? Are these targets achieved at the 
minimum cost (cost efficiency)? What are the distributional implications and 
co-benefits (equity and co-benefits)? This section assesses each criterion, and is 
summarized in Table 4.1.
4.3.1 Effectiveness
In terms of carbon effectiveness and emission reduction goals, the differences 
between the three approaches can be assessed in three main dimensions: (i) 
ability to deal with leakage and additionality; (ii) overall level of participation, 
which will influence overall emissions reductions achieved; and (iii) broad 
policy reforms, which will influence the depth, cost and permanence of 
reductions.
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National approaches must set credible national reference levels (credit baselines) 
and address questions of permanence and liability (discussed in Chapter 
8). International negotiations have not yet resolved all the issues associated 
with doing this. There is a real risk that, because so many criteria for setting 
baselines are being discussed (e.g. national circumstances), baselines may be 
REDD model
Criteria
Effectiveness Efficiency Equity and co-benefits
Subnational 
approach
+ Broad short-term 
participation
+ Attractive to private 
funders
– Domestic leakage a 
problem
– Does not trigger 
the required policy 
changes
– Weak involvement of 
host countries
± MRV costs lower 
overall but higher 
per CO2
 equivalent
+ Differentiated 
incentive payment 
possible: lowers 
costs
+ Easier participation 
by poor countries 
and those with 
weak governance
+ Can target poor 
domestic groups 
and create more 
opportunities 
for community 
participation
National 
approach
+ Broader set of 
policies pursued
+ Captures domestic 
leakage
+ Stronger host 
country ownership
– Unsolved issues 
of reference levels 
(additionality)
+ Lower MRV and 
transaction costs 
per CO2 equivalent
+ Low-cost (non-
PES) policies 
available
– Potential for policy 
and governance 
failure
+ Potentially larger 
overall transfers
+ Better alignment 
with national 
development 
strategies
– Favours middle-
income countries
– Risk of high level 
and elite capture 
(‘nationalisation’ of 
carbon rights)
Nested 
approach
+ Combines strengths 
of other two 
approaches
+ Flexibility based 
on national 
circumstances
+ Potential for larger 
overall transfers
- Unsolved issues 
of reference levels 
(additionality)
+ Differentiated 
compensation 
pay and low-cost 
broad policies
 - High MRV 
costs (requires 
disaggregated 
national data)
 - Challenges in 
harmonising 
national and 
subnational
+ Increased country 
participation and 
larger transfers to 
poor countries
+ Possible to target 
poor groups
Table 4.1.   Pros and cons of subnational, national and nested approaches
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inflated, which will generate ‘tropical hot air’ (no additionality) (see Chapter 
6). This would undermine the effectiveness and also the long-term credibility 
of national systems.  
The geographical scope of national and nested approaches is potentially much 
larger than the scope of subnational approaches, thus addressing the problems 
of domestic leakage in accounting and thereby achieving greater effectiveness 
(M-Co Consulting, 2008; see also Chapter 7). 
Currently, most developing countries cannot take a national approach because 
their MRV infrastructure is inadequate. This raises the problem of international 
leakage. The flexibility of the nested approach should permit most countries to 
participate sooner, either taking a (temporary) project approach or a national 
approach, or by pursuing both simultaneously. The choice will depend on their 
capacity for MRV, whether or not they have institutions in place to handle 
REDD funds and the nature of their national REDD strategy. The flexibility 
of the nested approach and the scope for broad participation should result in 
lower emissions compared to the other approaches.
Private investors may be reluctant to buy emission reductions from countries. 
They may prefer to invest in ‘tangible’ forest projects, which are directly 
associated with emissions reductions and other benefits, such as conserving 
biodiversity and reducing poverty. Because they have limited or no control 
over host country risks private investors are also less likely to invest upfront in 
emission reductions at the national level than directly in forest projects. This 
could exacerbate the problems of limited country participation. 
Reforms such as changes to land tenure and improving governance could be 
key elements of a national REDD strategy. However, it would be difficult to 
trace the effects of such reforms to particular geographical areas. Also, these 
kinds of reforms would generally not fall within the scope of a subnational 
or project-based approach. Thus, national approaches are likely to encourage 
broader and more strategic policies compared to subnational approaches, and 
lead to deeper and longer-term emissions cuts.
4.3.2 Efficiency
The cost efficiency of the three approaches to REDD is likely to be affected by: 
(i) the costs of monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV); (ii) the costs of 
implementing policies; and (iii) opportunity cost payments.
A national MRV infrastructure has significant economies of scale. This means 
that the national approach is likely to be more efficient than nested and 
subnational approaches in terms of cost per unit of carbon dioxide emission 
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reduction or area covered. For example, an exclusively national approach 
would not necessarily require disaggregating data to regional or district levels, 
reducing the number of sample plots that need to be monitored. The nested 
approach costs more than the national approach because monitoring and 
accounting must be at both national and subnational levels (disaggregating 
national level data is costly). 
A second element affecting efficiency is the cost of implementing REDD policy. 
Implementing a system to credit subnational units (a national PES system) 
incurs costs such as the cost of registering projects with central institutions, the 
costs of validation and verification, and the costs of administering contracts. 
Economies of scale favour nationwide implementation. However, while a 
national system may have the potential to generate greater emissions reductions 
at lower cost, bureaucracy and corruption could make a national system 
inefficient. A subnational approach may have higher overall transaction costs 
per unit of emission reduction, but may be run more efficiently. Subnational 
approaches would typically take the form of small projects managed by private 
entities that have experience in carbon market mechanisms and that prioritise 
cost efficiency.
National approaches may include broad policy reforms. Many of these will 
be cheaper to implement than payment for environmental services (PES) 
schemes. In some cases reforms might even generate savings, such as by 
removing subsidies that stimulate deforestation and degradation.
The opportunity costs of forest conservation (typically the profits from 
agriculture and timber harvesting that could be generated from the land) vary 
greatly among those who hold rights to use forests. If rights holders could be 
compensated according to the specific opportunity costs they incur, overall 
costs would be substantially lower. In a study from Brazil, Börner and Wunder 
(2008) estimate that perfectly differentiated payments save 45-75% compared 
to uniform compensation. 
Introducing differentiated payments might be more realistic in a subnational 
approach than in a national system where the transaction costs of doing 
so would be higher. However, introducing differentiated payments does 
raise equity issues as some of the poorest rights holders also have the lowest 
opportunity costs. The difficulties experienced in excluding non-additional 
activities (leading to inefficient payments) can be seen in the national PES 
system in Costa Rica (Karousakis 2007). 
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4.3.3 Equity
Equity is an issue that needs to be addressed between countries (international) 
and within countries (intra-national). The latter is to a large extent determined 
by national REDD strategies and policies. Although an international REDD 
agreement is likely to be ‘implementation neutral’, in the sense that it will 
not specify which national policies are to be implemented, the global REDD 
regime will have implications for domestic distribution of benefits and costs.
At the international level, a regime allowing only national approaches to REDD 
could exclude most of the low-income countries on grounds that they have 
inadequate infrastructure for MRV and poor governance. Thus, the international 
flow of money could be skewed towards a few middle-income countries, such 
as Brazil. However, subnational approaches might not necessarily be better in 
this regard, as illustrated by the CDM experience. In 2007, 73% of all CDM 
credits sold were ‘made in China’ (Hamilton et al. 2008). This points to the 
need – irrespective of the approach chosen – to strengthen national capacity 
and institutions and, more generally, to improve governance and accountability 
to ensure participation of the poorest countries.
In terms of intra-national equity, a centralised national approach could limit the 
participation of rural communities in the design and implementation of REDD. 
This could result in inequitable sharing of benefits and the ‘nationalisation’ of 
carbon rights. Large new financial flows may increase the risk of corruption 
and be captured by the state, preventing the benefits from reaching the poor. 
Governments also have decidedly mixed track records in promoting inclusive 
decision-making processes (Foti et al. 2008) and may have little incentive to 
ensure broad local participation in REDD. If processes in national approaches 
are inequitable, they may result in inequitable outcomes. On the other hand, 
a national approach may align with national development strategies and bring 
long-term development benefits.
Smaller scale subnational and nested approaches may be more flexible than 
larger scale national approaches in responding to needs in specific contexts. 
Evidence from some carbon-credit forestry projects suggests that they can 
strengthen local capacities, participatory decision making and community-
based resource management (Corbera 2005). However, private investors and 
conservation NGOs have a mixed track record when it comes to factoring 
community concerns into their projects. Carbon markets are driven primarily 
by global climate protection objectives, rather than local socio-economic 
objectives. Both subnational and national approaches are likely to face 
challenges in this area, but the drivers shaping the level of participation, along 
with the actors and processes involved, will be different.
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4.4 Summary and concluding remarks
Three approaches to the geographical level or scale of REDD accounting 
and incentive mechanisms are under discussion: direct support to projects 
(subnational level), direct support to countries (national level), or a hybrid 
(‘nested’) approach combining the two.
A subnational or project approach allows for early involvement and wide 
participation, and is attractive to private investors. However, this approach may 
suffer from leakage (increased emissions outside project boundaries) and cannot 
address the broader forces driving deforestation and forest degradation.
A national approach allows pursuit of a broad set of policies, addresses 
domestic leakage and creates country ownership. In the short to medium term, 
however, this approach is not feasible for many countries. It is also susceptible 
to governance failures, and may be less likely to mobilise private investment or 
involve local government.
A nested approach is the most flexible. It allows countries to start subnational 
activities and gradually move to a national approach. The nested approach 
allows both approaches to coexist in a system where REDD credits are 
generated by both projects and government, thus maximising the potential of 
both subnational and national approaches. However, a challenge in a nested 
approach is to harmonise the two levels.
How do we match country needs with 
financing sources?
Michael Dutschke and Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff 
With Leo Peskett, Cecilia Luttrell, Charlotte Streck and Jessica Brown
Chapter 5
5.1  The challenge: Effective mechanisms to 
respond to diverse circumstances
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) is 
potentially a low-cost option for mitigating climate change, if acted upon 
today (Stern 2006). If forest carbon credits are included in global emissions 
trading, the estimated cost of halving net global carbon dioxide emissions from 
forests by 2030 is USD 17-33 billion annually (Eliasch 2008). The Thirteenth 
Conference of the Parties (COP 13) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2007 laid the foundations for 
including REDD in developing countries in the post-2012 climate protection 
regime. Developed countries are encouraged to help find ways of financing 
these REDD activities in developing countries.
Developing countries differ in their capacity to reduce forest emissions. This is 
due to differing national circumstances as regards the drivers of deforestation 
and forest degradation, as well as different degrees of institutional capacity to 
monitor, influence and regulate these drivers.
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Multiple sources of REDD finance are already available, or likely to become 
available. The amount and composition depends on the design of the REDD 
mechanism and will change over time. Currently, most REDD financing is 
earmarked for capacity building, or ‘readiness’ activities. Although the nature 
of the REDD mechanism is still under discussion, and the outcome will affect 
the financing needs and financial flows, we present a preliminary exploration 
of the potential financing streams for different country contexts and identify 
possible gaps in financing.
5.2  What are the financing needs?
Regardless of the final design of the REDD mechanism (Eliasch 2008, see 
Table 5.1) there are two basic needs for financing:
•	 Financing upfront capacity-building (readiness): Countries need to fulfil 
minimum readiness requirements, such as putting in place infrastructure for 
monitoring emissions reduction, clarifying land tenure and strengthening 
institutional capacities for law enforcement. One study estimates the costs 
of capacity building for 40 forest nations over a five-year period to be as 
much as USD 4 billion (Hoare et al. 2008). The amount and type of these 
costs will vary significantly between countries.
•	 Financing on-going emission reduction costs: Costs are in two categories: 
forest protection costs and opportunity costs. The first refers to the costs of 
implementing the policies and measures (PAMs) inside and outside the forest 
sector that are needed to reduce forest emissions. Examples include forest 
monitoring, reforming tenure, law enforcement, taxation of forestland, 
restrictions on road building and agricultural zoning. Opportunity costs, 
the second category, arise from foregone profits from deforestation or the 
costs of adopting more sustainable forest use. These costs vary from place 
to place and time to time. Opportunity costs are higher where markets are 
accessible and where expanding forest protection (e.g. REDD) intensifies 
agriculture. Nevertheless, low opportunity costs do not necessarily imply 
that REDD activities will be low cost. REDD activities often take place in 
areas where there are the greatest challenges in forest policy, administration 
and monitoring (Eliasch 2008).
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Table 5.1.  Summary of REDD financing needs
a Hoare et al. 2008; b Eliasch 2008; c Grieg-Gran 2008
5.3  The forest context affects financing 
needs
Pressures on forests vary across countries and regions, and over time. Human 
pressure on forests is shaped by, among other things, market access, the nature 
of forest use and security of tenure. Chomitz et al. (2006) have provided a 
stylised three-part typology of tropical forests: core areas beyond the agricultural 
frontier, forest edges and disputed areas, and forest-agricultural mosaic lands 
(Table 5.2). In essence, these forest types correspond to the three stages of the 
forest transition curve (Figure 5.1).
Upfront capacity building Ongoing emissions reduction
Readiness costs Forest protection costs
Opportunity 
costs
Objectives Upfront investments 
in REDD infrastructure 
(monitoring systems, 
forest and carbon density 
data), and stakeholder 
participation
Cover the cost 
of implementing 
policies and 
measures (PAMs) 
that enable and 
promote REDD 
investments
Compensate for 
forgone profits 
from reducing 
forest emissions
Components •	 Upfront financing
•	 Little direct effect on land 
use emissions
•	 Upfront transaction costs
•	 Upfront financing
•	 Costs and 
benefits depend 
on policy
•	 Recurrent 
transaction costs
•	 Continuous 
financing
•	 Costs vary 
across space 
and time
Examples •	 Set up monitoring system 
(USD 0.5-2 million, in 
India and Brazil)a
•	 Set up forest inventories 
(USD 50 million for 25 
nations)b
•	 Capacity-building (USD 4 
billion for 40 nations over 
5 years)a
•	 Land tenure reform 
(size-dependent, USD$ 
4-20 million over 5 years 
for one country based on 
estimates from Rwanda, 
Ghana and Solomon 
Islands)a
•	 Recurrent costs of 
forest inventories 
(USD 7-17 million 
per year for 25 
countries)b
•	 Monitoring legal 
compliance
•	 Opportunity 
costs of 
halving 
deforestation 
(USD 7 billion 
annually 
over 30 years 
for eight 
countries)c
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Table 5.2.  Three stylised forest types.
Source: Chomitz et al. 2006
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Stage 1:
Little disturbed
forests (beyond 
agricultural 
frontier)
Stage 2:
Forests frontier)
Stage 3:
Forests cover stabilisation 
(forest-agricultural mosaics)
Figure 5.1.  The forest transition curve
Forest cores 
beyond the 
agricultural 
frontier (~49% of 
tropical forests)
Forest edges and 
disputed areas 
(~37% of tropical 
forests)
Mosaic lands (~14% 
of tropical forests)
Features •	 Remote from 
markets; low 
deforestation
•	 Low population, 
but high 
proportion of 
indigenous and 
poor
•	 Rapid agricultural 
expansion and high 
deforestation
•	 Rapidly increasing 
land values 
(frontiers)
•	 Forest use conflicts 
(disputed areas)
•	 Depleted, 
fragmented forests; 
slower deforestation, 
but higher 
degradation
•	 High land values 
and high population 
densities with a 
substantial portion 
of forest dwellers
Policy 
needs
• Protecting 
indigenous rights
• Averting 
disorderly frontier 
expansion 
by equitably 
assigning rights
• Regulated 
infrastructure 
expansion
• Policing and law 
enforcement, e.g. 
to prevent resource 
grabs
• Equitable 
settlement of 
claims
• Control of road 
expansion
• Enforcement of 
property rights over 
natural resources
• Developing markets 
for environmental 
services
• Reforming 
regulations to 
encourage forestry
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Figure 5.2.  Approximate regional distribution of forest types 
Note: Rough proxies were used because it is impossible to map the stylised forest types. 
For the mosaic lands, only data on the forest portion was used.
Source: Chomitz et al. (2006) using global land cover data from 2000 (ECJRC 2003) 
Forest edgesMosaic forests
Fo
re
st
 a
re
a
 [k
m
2
]
Africa Asia
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
Latin America
Forest cores
It is estimated that forest frontiers, where deforestation is concentrated, are 
currently distributed almost evenly across all regions (Figure 5.2). Different 
policies may be needed to address the governance challenges, and associated 
deforestation and degradation, in different forest types. For example, policies 
that will be important for improving forest management in forest mosaic lands 
– where degradation is concentrated – may include enforcing property rights 
and creating new markets for environmental services (Table 5.2).
5.4  Matching needs and finance
Existing and potential sources of finance for REDD activities are both public 
and private (Table 5.3). Different sources suit different needs (Table 5.4). For 
example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) does not classify public spending to acquire carbon credits as overseas 
development assistance (ODA). This is because these credits would count as 
ODA reflows (i.e. would have to be subtracted from ODA flows in the year 
they occur) (Dutschke and Michaelowa 2006). Activities that generate carbon 
credits will, therefore, have to be financed from the private sector and sales of 
REDD credits to Annex I governments for offsetting their national greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions.
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Table 5.3.  Potential sources of finance for REDD
Public finance
Type Description
Traditional 
ODA for 
forestry
•	 Increasing; has risen 47.6% since 2000 and totalled almost USD 2 
billion in 2005-07 (World Bank 2008)
•	 Provides grants, concessional loans, short-term financing for 
specific projects and long-term programme financing or budget 
support
•	 Also interested in co-benefits related to reducing poverty, 
conserving biodiversity and improving governance
New ODA 
for REDD
•	 Recent emergence of new REDD-related financing mechanisms 
that draw all or part of their revenues from international public 
finance sources
•	 Includes finance aimed at ‘pump priming’ the private sector, such 
as the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Fund, and sources 
aimed at building public-sector capacity, such as the Congo Basin 
Fund
Domestic •	 Limited domestic public financing for forestry from taxes and 
royalties.
•	 Typically used for subsidies and other incentives
•	 Sponsors environmental services in forests
Private sector and carbon market finance
(includes Annex I government purchases of REDD credits as offsets in carbon markets)
Existing 
carbon 
market
•	 Two components: voluntary and compliant (current compliance 
market excludes REDD)
•	 Compliance market restricted to afforestation/reforestation 
under the Clean Development Mechanism, which may or may not 
become part of a future REDD mechanism
•	 Voluntary market dominates in forestry, making up 18% of all 
projects globally in 2007 (Hamilton et al. 2007)
Future 
carbon 
markets
•	 Three main avenues under discussion:
i) integrating REDD into a global compliance carbon market;
ii) allocating auction proceeds;
iii) allocating revenues from other fees, fines and taxes
•	 Regional and domestic markets may also consider using REDD 
crediting for compliance: e.g. the European Union emissions 
trading scheme
Foreign 
direct 
investment
•	 May constitute an important source, but investment is 
concentrated in low-risk countries with profitable forest industries
•	 Flows to forest sector have increased by 29% from USD 400 million 
in 2000-02 to USD 516 million in 2005-07 (World Bank 2008)
Domestic •	 Public-private partnerships or microcredit schemes. These are 
unlikely to be significant, especially in least developed countries, 
due to low level of resources, lack of expertise and difficulty in 
raising finance from risk-averse domestic banks
Non-profit •	 Represents growing proportion of international private finance
•	 Typically small, narrowly targeted grants; may not have wide REDD 
applicability
•	 Non-profits are interested in REDD and may be less risk-averse 
than profit-making enterprises
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Table 5.4.  Matching financial sources to forest types
Public and private finance suit different forest types (Table 5.4). Public finance 
is extremely relevant for forests ‘beyond the agricultural frontier’ and in forest 
frontiers that have comparatively weak land tenure systems and governance 
structures. Private-sector finance could play a greater role in forest mosaic lands 
that have comparatively strong land tenure systems and good governance. 
However, forests in mosaic lands currently constitute the smallest share of 
tropical forests.
5.5 Public finance
Upfront public finance is needed to create policy environments that enable the 
delivery of effective REDD outcomes, especially in weak governance contexts. 
ODA finance will be crucial to cover capacity building costs. Few developing 
countries have shown the ability or political will to finance this aspect of 
REDD. Even if REDD were integrated into the global carbon market, an 
additional USD 11-19 billion each year would need to be found from other 
sources – most likely ODA – to halve emissions by 2020 (Eliasch 2008).
Increasing donor interest in REDD has boosted the amount of ODA available 
for carbon forestry. Programmatic or budget support helps strengthen 
government institutions and increases ownership of REDD systems. Where 
carbon returns are guaranteed, financing can be provided through loans. 
Support for capacity building can be channelled through technical assistance 
ODA.
But ODA is arguably a short-term solution; the recent increase in forestry-
related ODA to almost USD 2 billion (2005-07) represents only a tiny 
fraction of the USD 11-19 billion recommended in the Eliasch review. Thus, 
ODA must be deployed strategically to stimulate and complement private 
investment. This means supporting basic readiness requirements and enabling 
Forests beyond 
agricultural frontiers
Forest frontiers Forest mosaic 
lands 
Public finance Significant need for 
international and 
domestic sources
Important for 
enabling REDD 
investments
Need depends 
on governance 
context
Private finance Less likely, as clear 
land tenure required 
for REDD-payments
Likely, if enabling 
environment for 
REDD investments is 
secured
Highly likely, 
if enabling 
environment 
for REDD 
investments is 
secured
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investments. Investments to leverage private investments are particularly 
important in high-risk countries where little private-sector finance is available. 
However, ODA financing for forestry has a tendency to gravitate towards safer 
environments, such as South and Southeast Asia and the Americas, rather than 
to Africa (World Bank 2008).
The likely dependence of REDD on ODA, especially for creating new 
international funds to support REDD, raises some concerns about how such 
efforts should be structured. These include:
•	 Lack of harmonisation among initiatives, which may create added burdens 
for resource-stretched governments
•	 Lack of alignment with government systems and the low absorptive capacity 
of governments to use the funds efficiently
•	 Risk of diverting ODA from other areas, such as health and education
These harmonisation and alignment concerns mirror the concerns across 
the aid sector that led to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 
2005).
5.6  Carbon market finance
Carbon finance can mobilise more and longer-term funding than ODA, 
especially when greenhouse gas offset markets offer the incentive to trade 
carbon credits. Carbon investments are more likely in countries with strong 
governance structures and well-defined tenure systems. National verification 
systems, or certification schemes, may also attract investment. The level of 
private financing depends on several factors, including:
•	 Long-term GHG emissions reduction commitments
•	 Carbon credits from sub-national approaches in the REDD scheme
•	 Early action to generate REDD credits that can be banked towards 
compliance with post-2012 targets
The voluntary carbon market is a useful testing ground for different approaches 
to REDD, but is unlikely to generate sufficient financing for large REDD 
initiatives. Emerging financial mechanisms, such as Forest Backed Bonds 
(tradable financial instruments backed by forest-related assets), could also be 
new sources of capital (Petley 2007).
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International carbon markets are an attractive source of funds for REDD 
because they could potentially mobilize significant amounts of financing in 
the long run. The main options currently being discussed in the REDD debate 
are: (i) integrating REDD into a global carbon market; (ii) allocating auction 
proceeds to a REDD fund; and (iii) allocating revenues from other fees, fines 
and taxes to a REDD fund.
5.6.1  Integrating REDD into global carbon markets 
The largest potential for REDD finance is in carbon market mechanisms that 
convert emissions reductions from REDD initiatives into carbon credits that 
industries and countries can use to comply with emissions commitments.
The amount generated by tradable credits for REDD depends on several factors. 
These include the depth of Annex I emission budgets, fungibility of REDD 
credits in the carbon markets and other details of the REDD architecture. 
Fungibility refers to the type and degree of integration of REDD into existing 
carbon markets. There are fears that full fungibility will flood carbon markets 
with REDD credits, assuming that these credits will be cheaper than credits 
from other mitigation activities. This is not necessarily the case (see Chapter 3 
of this book). On the one hand an oversupply of cheap carbon credits could 
reduce carbon prices and remove incentives for further REDD activities. On 
the other hand, the acceptance of REDD credits as a compliance tool creates 
demand for further REDD activities. One study shows that REDD credits, 
even when unrestricted market access is assumed, would be highly unlikely 
to swamp the carbon market. Allowing all forest credits into the market is 
only likely to bring carbon prices in 2020 down from USD 35 to USD 24 
(Piris Cabezas and Keohane 2008). The Eliasch (2008) review also concludes 
that the fear that markets will be flooded seems exaggerated. Carbon traders, 
several Latin American countries and Indonesia support full fungibility (see 
Table 5.5).
A number of proposals address the risk of flooding the market and thereby 
endangering environmental integrity (Table 5.5). These include adopting 
deeper targets, controlling fungibility of REDD credits in a ‘dual market’ 
(Ogonowski et al. 2007) and creating a new trading unit specific for REDD 
(Hare and Macey 2007).
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Table 5.5.  Proposals for fungibility of REDD credits in carbon markets
Proposal Description Type
Full fungibility 
(country 
proposals incl. 
Belize, Chile, 
Indonesia et al.)
REDD credits are sold as offsets to 
Annex 1 countries. Demand for 
REDD arises from because REDD 
credits are comparatively cheap. 
Capping the amount of credits 
allowed in systems is possible
Fully fungible REDD 
coupled with deeper 
emissions reduction 
targets by Annex B 
countries, resulting in 
higher demand for credits
Dual markets 
(Center for Clean 
Air Policy - CCAP)
Creates a separate REDD trading 
scheme; demand generated by 
transferring a share of Annex I 
commitments to the new market 
(amount depends on overall 
Annex I targets)
Separate, but linked 
market – transfers some 
commitments from 
current market to REDD 
market. Fungibility may 
increase as REDD market 
matures
Tropical 
Deforestation 
Emission 
Reduction 
Mechanism
(TDERM) 
(Greenpeace)
Introduction of a new trading 
‘unit’ (Tropical Deforestation 
Emission Reduction Unit/
TDERU). TDERUs will be used by 
Annex 1 countries to fulfil part 
of their reduction targets. For 
predictability of revenue flows, 
levels of TDERU purchases would 
be set. A maximum would also be 
set to prevent large-scale offsets
Separate, but linked 
market – transfers some 
commitments from 
current market to REDD 
market
5.6.2  Allocation of auction proceeds to a REDD fund
Another way to raise funds is to auction allowances from emission-trading 
schemes, and allocate some of the proceeds to a global REDD fund. The Warner-
Lieberman Bill (US), and EU Climate and Energy Package, foresee diverting 
some of the proceeds from auctioning allowances to support REDD.
The European Commission is considering earmarking 5% of auction proceeds 
from the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme after 2012 for global 
efforts to combat deforestation. This would generate an estimated USD 
2.0-2.7 billion a year by 2020 (EC 2008). Germany recently pledged to invest 
all the money it raises from auctioning EU allowances into domestic and 
international climate activities and policy interventions. These auctions raise 
significant resources. In Germany alone, proceeds of auctions reach more than 
EUR 1 billion annually. Auctioning allowances for international aviation and 
marine emissions could raise an estimated USD 40 billion (Eliasch 2008). 
An auction of all industrialised countries’ emissions could raise at least EUR 
100 billion annually (Dutschke 2008). But, it is uncertain what proportion 
of the proceeds of these auctions would be channelled to REDD, as there will 
be competing claims from other sectors and mechanisms, such as technology 
transfer and adaptation.
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Some UNFCCC proposals (CAN-International, Norway) promote the auction 
of emissions allowances at the international level (i.e. assigned amount units 
(AAU) of the Kyoto protocol system) as an additional way to leverage funds 
for REDD.1 By decoupling REDD from the overall reduction targets these 
proposals reduce the risk of flooding the market. A critical question, however, 
is how to ensure that these auction proceeds will effectively be earmarked for 
REDD purposes.
5.6.3  Allocation of revenues from other fees, fines and 
taxes
A third proposal is to allocate taxes and levies to a REDD funding mechanism. 
These could be linked to carbon markets or come from other markets. Current 
options include:
•	 Imposing a fee on the transfer of assigned amount units (AAUs) for Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol or other activities/sectors;
•	 Paying fines from non-compliant countries into a compliance fund.
Levying a fee on a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or other carbon 
project at the international level is comparable to the 2% levied on CDM 
transactions to support the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund. Such a system could 
also be applied at the national level. China, for example, established a system 
of tiered taxation of CDM projects to redirect finance from large industrial 
CDM projects towards initiatives that have more impact on sustainable 
development (Muller 2007). Other options include a levy on international 
air travel, which could generate revenues of USD 10-15 billion, or a tax on 
wholesale currency transactions (Tobin tax), which could raise about the same 
amount (Eliasch 2008).
These mechanisms could raise substantial amounts of funding, but have their 
drawbacks from efficiency, effectiveness or equity perspectives – notably as 
regards allocating revenues equitably among countries and sectors. Taxes and 
fees affect the supply and demand of emissions reductions activities. On the 
demand side, imposing fees on Annex I countries to purchase AAUs, for 
example, may divert budget allocations away from other areas.
Additionally, some of these proposals could be politically difficult. For example, 
fines for non-compliance would go much further than the ‘soft’ enforcement 
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Committee. They would 
be unique as multilateral environmental agreements traditionally have weak 
compliance systems.
1   While emission allowances in the EU carbon market are already auctioned in part, allocation of AAUs to 
the countries under the Kyoto Protocol is free of charge. According to CAN-International, selling AAUs at a 
price of USD 30-40 a piece would raise USD 3.75 billion for every 1 % of AAUs sold. Selling a fraction of 
AAUs, e.g. 20-30 %, would result in a total of USD 75-112.5 billion a year which would then be available 
for adaptation, REDD and technology transfer (Scholz and Schmidt 2008).
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5.7  Addressing the financing gaps 
Exploiting the full potential of REDD requires funding at unprecedented 
levels and is among the main challenges in REDD. Financing shortfalls are 
likely in: (i) the demonstration period for the international REDD mechanism 
prior to 2012; and (ii) in countries where forest governance is weak and, thus, 
where the investment environment is high risk – as is the case in most tropical 
forestlands.
ODA could support countries with restricted access to the REDD market. This 
would improve international equity. By designing appropriate mechanisms, 
financing gaps may also be addressed. Good examples of appropriate mechanisms 
are rewarding early action (which will be crucial for attracting early and high-
risk private investment), and giving credit for REDD policies and measures 
(PAMs). These kinds of measures could reduce any perverse incentives that 
may encourage countries to step up deforestation before 2012. Market-linked 
mechanisms, such as including REDD credits in the carbon market, auctioning 
emission allowances and/or fees and taxes on carbon transactions, are the most 
promising avenues for addressing financing shortfalls.
Whatever the scenario, we need to find ways to make up the shortfall in 
financing from both public and private sources. Above all, a future REDD 
mechanism should be open to flexible and creative financing approaches, so it 
can adapt to countries’ changing needs and experiences.
Chapter 6
How do we set the reference levels for 
REDD payments? 
Arild Angelsen
6.1 The issue
Among the most critical elements of a new global ‘reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation’ (REDD) regime is how to set national 
baselines or reference lines/levels.1 Reference levels have profound implications 
for the environmental effectiveness, cost efficiency, and distribution of REDD 
funds among countries. Yet, there is no agreed-upon ‘formula’ for how to set 
them. Most REDD submissions to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) suggest using historical deforestation, but 
many countries do not have reliable data on that. Similarly, there is strong 
support for including ‘national circumstances’, but the practical implications 
of that are yet to be worked out. Some might, due to the problems involved, 
‘throw up their hands in despair at the idea of working out baselines’ (Pearce 
2007: 2). But there is no escape; the unavoidable question is when (and how) 
to start crediting emission reductions. 
1   In some instances ‘baseline’ is used to refer to the clean development mechanism (CDM), while ‘reference 
line/level’ refers to REDD, a distinction not used in this chapter. Rather we apply the distinction between 
Business as Usual (BAU) and crediting baselines outlined here, and use ‘baseline’ in both, while the term 
‘reference line/level’ is used in the meaning of  crediting baseline. 
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The debate is also obfuscated by terminology, as the terms ‘baseline’ and 
‘reference line/level’ refer to at least three different things. These are illustrated 
in Figure 6.1. First, baseline can refer to the historical baseline, that is, the 
rate of deforestation and degradation (DD) and the resulting CO2e emissions 
over the past x years. Second, baseline can refer to the projected business as 
usual (BAU) scenario: how would emissions from DD evolve without the 
REDD activity? Third, baseline can refer to the crediting baseline (i.e. like an 
emissions quota). A BAU baseline is the benchmark for judging the impact 
of the REDD measures implemented (and ensuring additionality), while the 
crediting baseline is the benchmark for rewarding the country (or project) if 
emissions are below that level or not giving any reward or possibly invoking 
debits if emissions are higher (see Chapter 8 on liability). 
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Figure 6.1.  BAU and crediting baselines
This chapter therefore makes a distinction between historical baseline, BAU 
baseline, and crediting baseline. Although a distinction between BAU and 
crediting baselines is not made explicitly in submissions, it is useful to assess 
the arguments from two different angles: (i) Are they good predictors of future 
deforestation and degradation (BAU)? This could, in principle, be answered 
by scientists based on current knowledge on causes of DD; and (ii) Are these 
acceptable reasons for setting the crediting baseline? The latter is largely a 
political question, going well beyond the technical issues.
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6.2 The business as usual (BAU) scenario
6.2.1 Historical national deforestation
The BAU scenario tries to answer the counterfactual and hypothetical question: 
what would deforestation be without REDD? Almost all submissions by the 
Parties, as well as the Bali Action Plan (COP 13), suggest that baselines should 
include historical national deforestation. The reference period is typically set 
to the average deforestation rate of the last 10 years, and updated every 3 years, 
as suggested in an early proposal by Santilli et al. (2005). The exact reference 
period may differ and some flexibility will be needed, for example, based on the 
availability of national forest inventories. But the choice of historical reference 
period can have dramatic impacts on the BAU scenario, and countries might 
strategically opt for reference periods that maximise REDD transfers. 
How good is past deforestation to predict the future one? First, due to poor 
time series data for most developing countries, we do not know as much as we 
would like to know. Second, what we know suggests that past deforestation 
is not a precise predictor of future deforestation (New Zealand submission, 
April 2008). Unlike emissions from fossil fuels, which are closely linked to 
one variable (gross domestic product, or GDP), deforestation is ‘multicausal’ 
and can be highly variable from year to year. It can also show systematic 
trends over longer periods (5-10 years) which depart from past deforestation. 
Annual fluctuations are of less concern and can be addressed by, for example, 
using running averages (e.g. last three years) or mechanisms to address non-
permanence and liability (see Chapter 8). 
The more serious issue is when historical deforestation systematically under- 
or overestimates the rate of deforestation in a BAU scenario. The forest area 
(change) may follow a pattern suggested by the forest transition (FT) theory 
(Mather 1992; Angelsen 2007): initially, the country is characterised by a high 
percentage of land under forest cover and a low rate of deforestation. Then 
deforestation accelerates, slows down, forest cover stabilises and eventually 
starts recovering. This pattern is illustrated in Figure 6.2. Some countries at 
early stages in this transition, such as Papua New Guinea and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, can be expected to have high forest area values and low, but 
accelerating, deforestation rates. Others in the middle of the transition, such 
as parts of Indonesia and Brazil, will have high rates, but these are expected 
to slow down as forest is getting scarcer. Finally, countries late in the forest 
transition, such as China and India (and a number of high-income countries), 
have increasing forest areas. 
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FT is not a ‘law of nature’, and the exact pattern is influenced by national 
context, global economic forces and government policies. Yet, it depicts a 
broad trend. Figure 6.2 illustrates the problem of setting baselines based on 
historical deforestation only. An extrapolation of historical rates underestimates 
future BAU deforestation for counties at the early stages in the transition, 
while it overestimates BAU deforestation for countries at the later stages.2
6.2.2 National circumstances
The second element of baseline-setting suggested in the Bali Action Plan (and 
several submissions) is to take ‘national circumstances’ into account. There is 
still a need to identify which factors constitute legitimate national circumstances 
(cf. Canada submission, March 2008). One prominent proposal in the 
debate (e.g. by Coalition for Rainforest Nations) is to include a development 
adjustment factor (DAF). A practical application of this might be that countries 
with low levels of GDP per capita will get more generous baselines, which may 
be justified by several arguments: (i) the poorest countries are presumably at 
an earlier stage in FT, and therefore deforestation (and degradation) is likely 
to accelerate rather than slow down in a BAU scenario; (ii) the capacity to 
implement REDD may be inversely related to GDP per capita, and larger 
transfers are needed; (iii) based on the UNFCCC principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ the REDD requirements should be lower for the 
poorest countries; and (iv) REDD should contribute to a transfer of resources 
to the very poorest countries (co-benefits). 
2   Note that the forest transition describes changes in forest area, while we are interested in changes in 
forest carbon stocks. At early stages carbon-rich forests tend to be lost, while the increase at later stages 
tends to have lower carbon densities (tons carbon per hectare).
Figure 6.2.  The forest transition and historical baselines
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An extension of the proposal to include national circumstances is to use more 
elaborate models to predict deforestation based on country-specific factors. 
The literature on cross-country deforestation regression models has included a 
number of variables, and some of these are potential candidates for inclusion 
in a formula for setting baselines (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 1999). These 
factors include population density and growth, forest area, economic growth, 
commodity prices, governance variables, and location (tropical and regional). 
One problem with the modelling approach is that it is based on predicted values 
of, for example, population and economics growth and commodity prices. An 
extension of this approach, suggested by Motel et al. (2008) is to estimate 
the impact of government policies ex-post, that is, at the end of the crediting 
period when that information is available. Countries then get rewarded for 
good policies and efforts (‘Compensated Successful Effort’). 
The modelling approach raises several issues. First, for most countries the time 
series data needed are poor or nonexistent. Second, deforestation modelling 
history suggests that cross-country models are not robust, i.e. no clear answer 
can be expected. Third, it is questionable whether a ‘black box’ baseline figure 
will be acceptable to the parties. 
6.2.3 Historical global deforestation
Another option, originally put forwards in the Joint Research Centre proposal 
of Achard et al. (2005), is to use historical global deforestation rates to set 
individual country baselines. They suggested that countries with a rate of 
deforestation lower than half the global average use that as a national baseline, 
while countries with a higher deforestation rates use a national historical 
baseline. Different scenarios can also be generated by differing the weights put on 
historical global deforestation and national deforestation (cf. Strassburg et al. 2008). 
The inclusion of global deforestation in setting national baselines is based 
on two critical assumptions. First, it is assumed that differences in rates of 
deforestation reflect differences in policies, and countries should not be 
rewarded (punished) for bad (good) policies by getting higher (lower) baselines. 
Indeed, a central element in many submissions is to ‘reward early action’. While 
policies are important, for most countries experiencing low deforestation this is 
primarily a result of other factors, for example, stage in FT driven by economic 
development and forest scarcity, rather than deliberate conservation policies 
(Rudel et al. 2005).  
Second, the proposal assumes some global convergence in deforestation rates, 
and that ‘over the long run all developing countries would deforest at the 
average global rate’ (Eliasch 2008: 136). This is equally problematic and lacks 
58
Moving Ahead with REDD  Issues, Options and Implications
empirical evidence to support it. On the contrary, the evidence tends to favour 
the theory of FT (Rudel et al. 2005; Chomitz et al. 2006), in which case there 
is no global convergence, but rather distinct phases of forest cover change and 
slowly increasing forest cover characterising the last stage. 
6.3 Crediting baselines
The BAU baseline is the benchmark to assess the impact of REDD policies and 
measures, while the crediting baseline is the benchmark to reward the country 
(or project) with REDD credits or other forms of payment. One might, of 
course, decide to set the crediting baseline equal to the BAU baseline, which is 
indeed the implicit assumption commonly made. But the distinction between 
the two is conceptually important, although by doing so one steps into one 
of the most contentious issues in climate negotiations: to what extent should 
developing countries bring an own, uncredited REDD contribution to a future 
climate agreement? 
There are three major reasons for not equating the BAU baseline and the 
crediting baseline. First, an overall aim of the UNFCCC process is to limit 
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared with a BAU scenario. 
The emissions reduction responsibility assigned to different countries (and 
reflected in their crediting baselines) must, unavoidably, add up to the global 
target. Second, there is a genuine fear that including REDD credits into the 
compliance (offset) market will flood that market, i.e. lower the carbon price 
and crowd out other mitigation activities (see Chapters 3 and 5 for a further 
discussion). Setting the crediting baseline tighter than the BAU baseline will 
reduce the number of credits brought to market. Third, some of the reductions 
might be achieved through policies and measures (PAM) and non-market 
approaches funded by ODA.
Some policy reports such as the Eliasch Review (2008) suggest a soft entry for 
REDD into a climate agreement, based on no-lose and limited liability, and 
then gradually increasing commitments. This is also reflected in a Greenpeace 
submission (March 2008), which suggests increasing responsibility of REDD 
countries to reduce emissions as their economic circumstances and the global 
climate regime evolve.
6.3.1 No-lose systems
One option to ensure REDD country participation is to initially develop 
crediting baselines around a ‘no-lose’ system, similar to the ‘sectoral no-lose 
targets’ proposed by Ward et al. (2008) and others. The no-lose assumption is 
underlying much of the current REDD negotiations (although rarely explicitly 
stated using that term). 
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Box 6.1.  ‘No-lose’ crediting baselines
The marginal costs of reducing deforestation and degradation starts at zero in the 
BAU scenario, and they increase as reductions become more costly (e.g. increasingly 
profitable agricultural land uses are being excluded). Given an international price for 
REDD credits, the country will reduce emissions up to the point where the marginal 
costs equal that price (realised REDD). The total cost of these reductions is equal to 
the area A + B. A crediting baseline is given, and the country receives revenue from 
selling REDD credits for reductions beyond the crediting baseline, i.e. equal to the 
area B + C. Thus, the country’s net gain equals C – A. If the crediting baseline is set 
equal to BAU, the country will gain the area C + D, which can be termed the REDD 
rent. 
A key question is how large the crediting baseline must be in order for the country 
to have a positive net gain. If the marginal cost curve is linear, the answer is that the 
crediting baseline must be more than one half realised REDD. But empirical studies 
show that the marginal cost curve for REDD is convex, as illustrated in the figure. 
Thus the crediting baseline can be set further to the right, i.e. it can be less than one 
half realised REDD, and the country still benefits. 
What does ‘no-lose’ mean in practical terms? Obviously, a crediting line 
set equal to the BAU scenario, and with no liability (‘baseline and credit’) 
would be ‘loss proof ’ for REDD countries. But this is just a sufficient and 
not a necessary condition. REDD countries may still have net benefits from 
participating in systems with crediting lines that are tighter than the BAU 
scenario, as explained in Box 6.1. The reason is as follows: REDD countries 
have an incentive to reduce deforestation up to the point where the marginal 
cost of reductions (i.e. the national supply curve of REDD) is equal to the 
international compensation, for example, the market price for REDD credits. 
Realised 
REDD
Price of 
REDD credits
Marginal cost 
of REDD
REDD
Crediting 
baseline
BAU
$
D
A
B
C
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But for the initial and cheapest emission reductions that price is higher than 
the costs, which generates what may be termed a REDD rent (area C + D in 
the figure). Because of this rent, a country can get a positive net benefit even if 
some of the initial reductions are not paid for, that is, the crediting line can be 
tighter than the BAU line. Thus ‘no-lose’ crediting baselines can imply some 
uncredited emissions reduction.
6.3.2 ‘Common but differentiated responsibilities’
The Bali Action Plan includes the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’, a long-standing UNFCCC principle also included in some 
REDD submissions (e.g. Papua New Guinea, August 2008). As noted before, 
the proposal of a DAF, where crediting baselines are set more favourably for 
the poorest countries, can be seen as a practical application of this principle 
to ‘allow for certain amounts of deforestation to occur for the purpose of a 
country’s socio-economic development’ (Alvardo and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 
2007: 15). 
The practical implications of this principle remain to be worked out. One 
possible inference of this principle is that every country has a responsibility, 
i.e. should bring some uncredited efforts to the negotiation table, while rich 
countries should bring more to the table. The exact implications will be the 
subject of intense late-night negotiations, and are not discussed further. 
6.3.3 Further refinements
Given the uncertainty of setting baselines, one practical approach suggested 
by Schlamadinger et al. (2005) is to use a corridor approach with an increasing 
percentage of the reductions being credited. For example, a reduction in 
deforestation and degradation from 0.8% to 0.7% per year (or the equivalent 
in GHG emissions) gives carbon credits worth only 20% of the estimated 
emissions reductions, while reductions from 0.7% to 0.6% give credits 
equivalent to 40% of the estimated reductions, and so on. 
Deforestation and degradation that occurs as a result of natural processes and 
events, e.g. hurricanes, should also be kept outside the crediting. This would 
be in line with the definition of deforestation as the direct, human-induced 
conversion of land from forest to non-forest (UNFCCC Decision 11/CP7). 
At the same time, an agreement should provide incentives for better managing 
‘seminatural’ risks such as fire. 
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Effectiveness/efficiency Equity (international 
distribution)
Historical national 
deforestation
Low-deforestation (and 
forest-rich) countries may 
opt out of an agreement
Poor and forest-rich 
countries to lose, others to 
gain
Historical global 
deforestation
Risk of hot air from low-
deforesting countries
High-deforesting countries 
to lose, low-deforestation 
countries to gain
National circumstances 
(country-specific factors)
May improve effectiveness 
if done well
Depends on which factors 
are considered
Risk of lower overall 
reductions
Some (poor?) countries 
unable to negotiate 
favourable baselines
Development adjustment 
factor (higher crediting 
lines for poor countries)
More attractive for poor 
country participation
Benefits poorest countries
Table 6.1.  Assessment of proposals based on effectiveness/efficiency and equity
6.4 Assessment based on the 3E criteria
The 3E criteria for assessing various proposals of REDD models include 
their carbon effectiveness, cost efficiency and equity and co-benefits (see 
Chapters 2 and 11). The effectiveness and efficiency arguments are mainly 
the same, thus these are collapsed in Table 6.1. 
The baselines have implications for effectiveness in a number of ways. If they 
are set too tight, a country may consider the net benefits too small and too 
uncertain to participate. For example, if countries at the early stages in FT (low 
deforestation and forest rich) are not given a crediting baseline above historical 
rates of emission, the incentive to participate will be smaller. More generally, 
giving out more generous baselines may be needed to buy broader participation, 
but also increases the risk of giving out ‘tropical hot air’ (below).
Another way in which crediting lines have effectiveness implications is through 
the impact on the global market of carbon credits (assuming REDD credits 
are allowed to enter that market). Many environmental nongovernmental 
organisations (e.g. Leach, 2008) point to the risk of ‘market flooding’ by 
supposedly cheap REDD credits. This is indeed a possible scenario, but the 
means for avoiding that are also readily available: (i) reduce supply of REDD 
credits by tightening baselines; (ii) increase demand by simultaneously 
introducing REDD credit and imposing tighter global targets for GHG 
emissions reductions (mainly demand from Annex I countries); and (iii) 
introduce managed (limited but gradually increasing) fungibility, e.g. a 
gradually expanding cap on REDD credits put on the market (Chapter 5). 
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The second option is indeed a major argument for including REDD in a new 
climate agreement: by introducing a low-cost mitigation option, global targets 
can become more ambitious. 
A related fear is for ‘tropical hot air’, that is, REDD credits that do not reflect 
any additional efforts being put on the market. One should note that ‘hot air’ 
is not created by inclusion of low-cost emissions reductions as such, but only 
to the extent that crediting baselines for emissions are inflated  and set above 
the BAU baselines (no additionality). The risk is real that a large number of 
criteria for setting baselines (e.g. various national circumstances) may result in 
such inflated baselines, undermining the effectiveness of the system as well as 
its long-term credibility. 
Similarly, using global deforestation rates to set national baselines entails a 
high risk of creating ‘hot air’ from low-deforesting countries. Many are likely 
to receive crediting baselines above their emissions in a BAU scenario, while 
REDD buyers expect to pay for real reductions.
The distributional implication of different criteria for setting baselines is large. 
Simple back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the difference for some 
of the largest tropical forests countries may be several billions of US dollars per 
year, which is also shown in scenarios for various methods of baseline setting 
(e.g. Strassburg et al. 2008). 
Allocating baselines based solely on historical national rates of deforestation 
may make income-poor and forest-rich countries (at the early stage in FT) lose 
out. Using global historical rates may make high-deforesting countries (in the 
intermediate stage in that transition) lose out. Including a DAF would benefit 
the poorest countries and make the REDD mechanism more pro-poor. 
6.5 Conclusion
Baselines are critical elements of a new REDD regime, for both overall 
effectiveness and international distribution and equity. There are clear conflicts 
of interest among (groups of ) countries, and (partly for that reason) the question 
is politically sensitive. Almost all submissions use historical deforestation as 
the point of departure, and most also suggest that ‘national circumstances’ 
and ‘rewarding early action’ be taken into account. These principles remain 
to be operationalised. One step forwards in the debate is to better distinguish 
between the two types of baselines discussed in this chapter: (i) the prediction 
of deforestation and degradation in a BAU scenario; and (ii) the crediting 
baseline, which will be based on the BAU plus a set of political considerations, 
as well as the country’s strength at the negotiation table. 
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A key dilemma facing negotiators is that generous baselines, based on 
‘country-by-country’ assessments to take national circumstances into account, 
may create ‘hot air’, which undermines the environmental integrity (overall 
reductions in GHG emissions) and the credibility of REDD. On the other 
hand, tight crediting baselines may make an agreement unacceptable for 
REDD countries. In short, the balancing act is between the risk of ‘tropical 
hot air’ and participation of REDD countries. 

Chapter 7
How do we deal with leakage?
Sven Wunder
7.1 Introduction
Imagine you live on a mountain lakeside. Recently, glacier melting from global 
warming has repeatedly caused severe flooding of your lands. You therefore 
decide to build a dike to protect the lowest-lying, most flood-prone lands. 
But since the lake is small, doing so will further raise the lake’s water level 
and lead to flooding of previously unaffected areas. If your overall objective 
was to protect lakeside land from flooding, the projected gains from the dike 
project need ‘leakage’ deduction, i.e. quantification of losses from shifting 
some flooding pressures elsewhere in space. 
 
In principle, carbon leakage is a similar off-site effect. While the 37 developed 
countries in Kyoto Protocol’s Annex I countries have agreed to cap their 
industrial emissions, increasing imports from non Annex I countries may 
cause emission ‘leaks’. Greenhouse gas (GHG) net emission reductions in 
one area are affected by project-attributable emissions outside of targeted 
mitigation areas. Leakage can occur whenever the spatial scale of intervention 
is inferior to the full scale of the targeted problem. Carbon mitigation is a 
global goal, so leakage can occur at various scales-farm-level, local/regional, 
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national, or international/global - and in many sectors, including energy and 
forestry mitigation projects. Carbon leakage is fundamentally an economic 
process, although other anthropic and biophysical processes may interfere. 
Unlike in the dike example of exclusively ‘crowding out’ pressures, mitigation 
leakage may sometimes work in the opposite direction as well, i.e. a mitigation 
activity may be ‘crowding in’ further emission reductions from areas outside 
the defined mitigation area (called ‘reversed leakage’). 
 
Taking a reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) 
example, a farm-level payment for environmental services (PES) programme 
may reward the landowner for not deforesting the PES-enrolled forest plot 
A during five years. However, if the owner shifted all planned deforestation 
from plot A to another, non PES-enrolled plot B, mitigation would be entirely 
offset by leakage or ‘displacement of emissions’, as the phenomenon is called 
in the Bali Action Plan (Thirteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties 
- COP 13). If the landowner further used all PES funds to buy chainsaws to 
enable additional clearing and cattle to graze on the land, medium-run leakage 
may well exceed 100 percent of mitigation - implying leakage also has a time 
dimension, depending on how quickly economic and biophysical processes 
work. Conversely, if the landowner invested the money in ecotourism or 
agroforestry and stopped all clearing, leakage would be reversed, crowding in 
off-site mitigation gains beyond target plot A. 
7.2  Dimensions of leakage
7.2.1  Leakage channels
Some analysts distinguish between primary (‘activity-shifting’) leakage caused 
by REDD stakeholders and secondary (‘market’ or ‘partial/general equilibrium’) 
leakage from third actors, e.g. in response to price changes (Aukland et al. 2003). 
Table 7.1 outlines broad differences in expected leakage across three mitigation 
project types. For REDD activities (last two columns), conservation set-asides 
are distinguished from sustainable forest management (SFM) projects.
Shifts in demand for land, whether through competitive land markets or other 
spatial substitution mechanisms, are the dominating leakage force for REDD 
(both conservation and SFM): since deforestation is primarily caused by land 
conversion to agriculture, closing the agricultural frontier will create land 
shortages, unless technologies allow for intensification, e.g. shortening fallows 
or intensifying pastures. Induced land shortages are more pronounced for 
REDD than for afforestation and reforestation (A/R), which is often carried 
out on degraded lands with low economic valuke.
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REDD conservation tends to be less labour-intensive per hectare than most 
converted land uses, which may lead to out-migration and possibly relocated 
GHG pressures; for A/R and SFM projects, employment impacts are time 
and context-specific. Capital markets are among the most fungible forces: like 
in the dike example where water flows smoothly into the remotest corners, 
financial capital normally flows smoothly towards high-return options. Capital 
may thus respond to all mitigation-induced constraints that lower returns by 
financing higher-return options elsewhere. SFM and A/R may sometimes offer 
attractive investment opportunities, thus ‘crowding in’ capital and causing 
reversed leakage.
Technological innovations in SFM (e.g. reduced-impact logging) may reduce 
forest degradation in neighbouring areas, but technological spread is usually 
negligible for conservation and A/R. For output markets, A/R will increase 
future timber supply (though likely reduce crop and livestock output). 
Project  types Afforestation and 
Reforestation
REDD – Set-aside 
Conservation
REDD – Sustainable 
Forest ManagementLeakage channels
A. Land markets Substituting crops/ 
livestock through 
plantations
Curbing planned 
agricultural land 
conversion
Curbing planned 
agricultural land 
conversion
B. Labour markets Labour-using 
initially; variable 
later 
Less employment 
may cause out-
migration 
Labour-saving, or 
Labour-using shift?
C. Capital markets Returns may attract 
capital
Crowding out 
effects from lower 
returns
Impact on returns 
disputed
D. Techno logical 
innovation
Variable None (unless 
combined with 
ecotourism, 
non-timber forest 
products)
Reduced impact 
logging, etc.
E. Output markets Planted forest 
products (medium 
run) reduce 
extraction pressures
No agricultural or 
timber supply from 
set-asides
Less timber (short to 
medium run)
F. Income 
generation
Variable Variable Variable
G. Ecological 
conditions
Plantations increase 
or decrease 
ecological integrity 
(pests, wind, 
biodiversity, etc.)
Increase in 
landscape integrity 
and adaptation, 
avoided  ‘edge 
effects’
Increase in landscape 
integrity and 
adaptation, avoided 
‘edge effects’
Table 7.1.  Likely leakage impacts of forestry mitigation actions and transmission forces
Note: Light grey cells indicate leakage (extra-site decrease in net mitigation effect), dark 
grey cells indicate reversed leakage (extra-site increase in net mitigation effect), and plain 
cells indicate ambiguous/context-dependent impacts.
68
Moving Ahead with REDD  Issues, Options and Implications
In contrast, REDD conservation will reduce both (short-run) timber and 
agricultural supplies, raise commodity prices, and thus possibly stimulate 
production elsewhere. Note that reduced deforestation may induce higher 
forest degradation elsewhere through timber markets. SFM also curbs crop 
and livestock expansion, but sustains timber supply over time.  
Income effects, backwards and forwards production linkages, and other changed 
development trajectories from mitigation projects are complex and difficult to 
determine a priori. But they can greatly influence leakage, and should thus be 
on the checklist. Finally, REDD may help keep landscapes ecologically healthy, 
including being more adaptable to climate change, avoiding ‘edge effects’ of 
forest degradation, and consequently reducing offsite GHG emissions. This 
reversed leakage under REDD is likely to be more important than for A/R 
projects, which are dominated by monocultures.
 
7.2.2  Size and importance 
Table 7.1 indicated that leakage forces (shaded cells) could potentially be more 
significant for REDD than for A/R, principally because REDD unambiguously 
tends to curb local land-based development. SFM probably causes less leakage 
pressures than set-aside conservation, but its disappointing adoption tropics-
wide indicates that it is also harder to implement. Does REDD generally 
leak more than energy and A/R projects? Energy-project leakage had in the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2nd Assessment Report 
been estimated at a wide 0-70% range, but was later reduced to 5-20%. There 
is little reason to believe that A/R projects should have higher leakage (Chomitz 
2000). Recent case studies confirm this view, e.g. slight reversed leakage found 
in the 10-year-old Scolel Té community tree-planting project in Chiapas, 
Mexico (de Jong et al. 2007). Sathaye and Andrasko (2007: 966) conclude 
that ‘[a]voided deforestation has a much wider range of leakage in analyses up 
to date (0-92%), and appears to increase as the region of analyses is expanded’. 
Wu (2000) finds leakage effects in the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program’s 
land-retirement programme around 20%. Only one REDD project in the 
tropics has been analysed thoroughly: the Noel Kempff project in Bolivia (Box 
7.1). The difficulties of setting REDD baselines, with two orders of magnitude 
of variation between three alternative model projections, illustrate the largest 
current problem: few real-life REDD projects and tentative quantification 
models leave enormous space for speculation. We thus do not really know how 
large REDD leakage is, let alone how it compares with other sectors (Schwarze 
et al. 2002).
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7.2.3  Determinants of leakage 
Few REDD schemes are currently in operation, so asking for credible leakage 
estimates or leakage-proof design recipes is premature. It is helpful to play 
around with the numbers, but prediction ranges remain unacceptably wide. 
Domestic leakage may significantly affect subnational REDD schemes. If a 
nation loses 1% of its forest cover annually, 99% is not currently threatened. 
Advocates of REDD’s cost efficiency, e.g. the Stern Report, assume this 1% can 
be exactly identified, an obviously unrealistic position. Indeed, deforestation 
in forwards-moving agricultural frontiers is highly concentrated, e.g. in the 
Brazilian Arc of Deforestation. Spatial modelling in Mexico now allows 
prediction of two thirds of deforestation, using variables such as closeness to 
roads and markets, soil quality, slopes, population growth, etc. Yet, in areas 
where gradual clearing of forest islands in agricultural landscapes prevails, 
spatial prediction of deforestation is much more challenging, and addressing 
leakage will be more complex. Hence, errors in spatial prediction, and higher 
spatial fungibility of economic pressures, imply that additional reserves beyond 
the initially threatened ones will have to be simultaneously protected. Such 
multisite leakage threats may increase REDD costs significantly.
Box 7.1. The Noel Kempff project: Carbon mitigation by curbing 
logging and deforestation
In 1997, three electricity companies interested in the voluntary carbon market 
joined forces with The Nature Conservancy and invested USD 9.5 million in the 
634,000 ha extension of the Noel Kempff National Park in eastern Bolivia. The 
money was used mainly to buy out timber concessions and large landowners, and 
to initiate integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) with three 
local communities. Focus was initially on avoided logging (forest degradation), but 
shifted over time towards avoided conversion to agricultural uses (deforestation). 
Primary leakage prevention was key in the contractual design, preventing in 
particular logging concessionaires from simply setting up shop elsewhere in Bolivia. 
Leakage for the stop-logging component was thoroughly screened and found to 
be in the 2-42% range, wood decomposition rates and timber-demand elasticities 
being most influential. Deforestation among local communities actually increased 
initially, which was hoped to be transitory, related to the creation of new land use 
systems. Setting baselines for deforestation and logging proved to be tricky. Three 
models for baseline carbon emissions over 20 years reached dramatically variable 
results: FAC=11.54 TgC, GEOMOD=1.05 TgC, and LUCS=0.18 TgC. For timber leakage, 
a dynamic optimisation model was constructed. For the spatial modelling of 
deforestation leakage, GEOMOD would be most appropriate, but short-run project-
internal deforestation had not been cut, and remoteness seemingly still limits 
dangers of increased land colonisation by squatters in buffer zones. 
Sources: Winrock (2002), Sohngen and Brown (2004), Brown et al. (2007) 
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Some common-sense leakage pre-assessment for different sites and scenarios 
may, however, help (see Figure 7.1). First, if labour and capital are highly mobile, 
then REDD-displaced activities and emissions will easily flow elsewhere (a). If 
adjacent forest areas with suitable soil conditions and weak protection status 
or low land price are available, then leakage into those areas is more likely 
than if the alternatives are remote, well-protected, expensive, and/or less apt 
for conversion (b). If demand for REDD-constrained products (timber, crops, 
livestock, etc.) is price-inelastic, i.e. the REDD-induced reduction in supply 
will not result in much reduced demand, then the activity is more likely to 
leak (c). Flexible production technologies can help absorb land scarcity from 
REDD set-asides at the local level (d), e.g. when land-extensive Amazon cattle 
ranching is intensified through pasture renovation or when slash-and-burn 
cycles are reduced through improved fertilisation. Conversely, if mechanised 
soy production depends on a technology package with fixed input coefficients, 
land-saving local adaptations are precluded and leakage becomes more likely. 
Figure 7.1.  Main likely explanatory factors behind high vs. low leakage scenarios
(a) Labour and capital mobility HighLow
Extent of leakage IncreasedReduced
(c) Output demand InelasticElastic
(b) Occupation of adjacent lands EasyConstrained
(d) Technology Fixed coefficientsFlexible input ratio
(e) Land market Competitive, cross-scaleSegmented, localized
(f ) Carbon density ratio: REDD lands/substitute lands LowHigh
(g) Returns from REDD-barred activities HighLow
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If land markets are competitive and integrated across regions and scales, then 
leakage is more probable (e). For instance, when in the 1980s Brazilian soy 
farmers expanded, they bought out small farms in the drier parts of central 
Brazil, pushing cattle production farther north, including into the Amazon. 
Conversely, in Papua New Guinea practically all land is owned by local 
communities, and large-scale market-led land reallocations of the Brazilian 
type would be unlikely. 
Leakage is also about how much carbon is stocked on the protected land, 
compared with the land REDD-restricted activities move to – including changes 
over time in comparative carbon stocks (f ). High-value activities, such as oil 
palm, soybeans, perennials, logging, or mining will – if effectively barred by 
REDD – more easily overcome the incremental transport and relocation costs 
of moving elsewhere than low-value production such as firewood, slash-and-
burn agriculture or land-extensive pastures (g). Pre-checking of considerations 
(a)–(g) may put in question some carbon-mitigation proposals from the outset, 
as in the Ecuadorian Yasuní case (Box 7.2): even without any measurement 
efforts, leakage problems appear overwhelming. 
Box 7.2.  The Yasuní proposal: Carbon mitigation by keeping oil 
underground
Yasuní National Park in Ecuador’s Amazon region has forests with extraordinary 
biodiversity, but also large oil reserves. President Correa announced in June 2007 the 
intention to extract oil from the 982,000 ha park unless the international community 
came up with annual compensations of USD 350 million over 20 years, representing 
about half the estimated oil revenues. Notwithstanding biodiversity-conservation 
gains, carbon benefits alone are argued to more than justify such payments: 111 
million tons of carbon otherwise exported would be kept underground and 
forest-degradation emissions from drilling and transport infrastructure avoided. 
Permanence after 20 years, and the moral hazard of threats to abolish a long-
established park, may render the proposal controversial. Yet, selected criteria from 
Figure 7.1 also reveal that, while the proposal’s REDD component may work, the 
leakage from keeping the oil underground would likely approach 100%: global 
energy demand is highly inelastic, while energy supply is elastic. Thus, barring Yasuní 
oil extraction would — through marginal price changes — move most oil production 
elsewhere (c). Little labour is required, oil-industry financial capital is highly mobile 
(a), and returns from extraction are very high (g), thus further facilitating spatial 
factor fungibility and high global leakage.
Source: Correa and Moreno (2002)
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Wood harvesting activities (driving forest degradation) and agricultural 
conversion (driving deforestation) are sometimes lumped together in REDD 
leakage overviews (Murray 2008), yet represent substantially divergent 
economic processes. Logging of high-value species is typically a rent-seeking 
activity requiring little spatially fixed investment; deforestation is normally an 
immobile investment in future land uses, has more variable returns, and is 
on average less export-orientated. According to Figure 7.1, high-value logging 
would normally have higher leakage than deforestation.
Finally, different leakage scales are important for different purposes. On-
farm leakage is key for PES scheme design, a vital on-the-ground REDD 
implementation tool. Project-level leakage is important for investors, though 
regional-level baselines are often more reliable (Sathaye and Andrasko 2007). 
Nested REDD approaches can help be a bridge to national-level goals (Chapter 
9). International REDD leakage into high-forest-cover, low-deforestation 
countries (e.g. Gabon, Suriname) may occur if these countries do not receive 
moderate preventive incentives to protect their large forest stocks (da Fonseca 
et al. 2007), linking leakage to both crediting baseline and stock-flow issues 
(Chapters 6 and 9). 
7.3 Options for dealing with leakage
7.3.1 Monitor
Leakage is doubtlessly a key ‘REDD flag’. Given its complexity, an overarching 
recommendation in many United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) submissions (e.g. Colombia, European Union, United 
States of America – see Appendix) is to better monitor its extent. For primary 
leakage, historical deforestation figures (preferably sectorally disaggregated) are 
vital. Careful selection of control areas can help monitoring impacts within 
and outside project boundaries. Local socioeconomic surveys and trend 
indicators (demographics, prices for land, crops, livestock, and timber) can 
provide further understanding and measurement of offsite project impacts 
(Aukland et al. 2003). The Voluntary Carbon Standard for land use projects 
and the BioCarbon Fund now recommend leakage-belt monitoring, e.g. areas 
five to seven times the size of project areas greater than 100,000 ha and 20 to 
40 times the size of smaller ones (<100,000 ha). Secondary and international-
level leakages need monitoring through better economy-wide or global trade 
models using improved data, thus hopefully reducing the currently huge 
predictive ranges and modelling sensitivities (section 7.2).
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7.3.2  Increase scale
Many UNFCCC submissions recommend higher accounting and crediting 
scales, i.e., moving from subnational to national levels, as the key to leakage 
control (see Chapter 4). International leakage through commodity markets is 
potentially high for REDD actions that significantly curb global commodity 
supply, as rising world market prices stimulate production elsewhere. Thus, 
the more deforesting countries participate in REDD, the less international 
deforestation leakage is likely to occur.
7.3.3 Discount
Some UNFCCC submissions (e.g. Colombia, World Bank – see Appendix) 
express doubts over how much increasing the REDD-scale will help leakage 
control in practice. As long as country participation remains below certain 
thresholds, one may need to discount REDD benefits not only for non-
permanence, but also for their estimated international leakage (Murray 2008). 
The various UNFCCC-proposed mechanisms, such as banking non-credited 
conservation reserves, insurances, discounted credits, or leakage-adjusted 
baselines and targets (Murray 2008), essentially have similar purposes of more 
conservative credit accounting. Improved monitoring is required to know 
just how large discount factors should be. This can also be a useful focus for 
learning in REDD demonstration projects.
7.3.4 Redesign
Less often featured in UNFCCC submissions, yet equally important are 
national and project-level design questions (section 7.2.3): how large are 
leakage risks for different on-the-ground REDD actions? Do focus, location, 
boundaries, and incentives of the proposed action make sense in a leakage 
control perspective? Given quite different effects originating from REDD 
conservation, SFM, and A/R projects (Table 7.1), can careful national/regional 
balances among them help control leakage by better absorbing crowded-out 
labour and capital (Schwarze et al. 2002)? Getting these balances right may 
substantially reduce subnational leakage.
7.3.5 Neutralise
Some ‘decision-tree’ stylisations (Aukland 2003:129) recommend addressing 
all primary leakage through neutralising ‘alternative livelihoods’ components. 
However, as we know from decades of Integrated Conservation and 
Development Project (ICDP) investments, shifting people into alternative 
livelihoods can be a daunting challenge. If the productive shift, for instance, 
requires Brazilian cattle ranchers to adopt more land-intensive pasture 
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management, then adding a targeted intensification training and incentive 
package may be advisable. If it entails turning logging workers and shifting 
cultivators into ecotourism operators and non-timber forest entrepreneurs – as 
in the Noel Kempff case – the task may become overly difficult, costly, and 
risky. Conversely, some ICDPs become economically over-successful, creating 
‘magnet effects’ that attract migrants and increase natural-resource pressures 
(Wittemyer et al. 2008). Some land-intensifying, high-yield technology 
diffusion, often recommended by leakage experts, can ultimately be adopted 
so widely that deforestation increases, causing so-called ‘super-acceptance 
effects’ (Aukland 2003). 
7.4 Assessment of options
If you strike your fist into a down pillow, you will compress some feathers, 
but others will inevitably bulge at other ends. Similarly, REDD leakage is 
impossible to eliminate completely unless all global forests and woodlands 
were to be REDD-enrolled simultaneously. But given its importance, how can 
leakage be addressed in ways that balance effectiveness, efficiency, and equity? 
Doubtlessly the most effective way is to increase REDD scales, both within 
and among countries. Under current climate policy, international leakage in 
particular is the rule, independent of the mitigation sector. Only broadened 
global participation can reduce it, and here REDD constitutes a strategic 
entry point. If leakage is safely quantifiable through monitoring (7.3.1), it is 
advisable to discount benefits or bank ‘reserve credits’ (7.3.3), ensuring that 
only net emission reductions are rewarded. Redesigning REDD interventions 
can effectively restrict in-country leakage (7.3.4). Leakage neutralisation (7.3.5) 
is only exceptionally recommendable; add-on ICDP projects risk becoming 
‘REDD and white elephants’. 
As to cost efficiency, there is probably an optimal monitoring level, beyond 
which measurement of particularly degradation leakage makes little sense. 
However, explicit monitoring boundaries have to be defined. Attempts at 
leakage neutralisation may often be more expensive than redesigning the 
scheme or discounting the credits. In spite of the complexities at hand, efficient 
and cost-effective leakage control seems an attainable goal; leakage risks should 
not lead us to abandon REDD. 
In terms of equity and development concerns, leakage may actually indicate 
a healthy economy: in response to REDD-induced barriers, production 
factors float fluidly to new opportunities, keeping welfare losses minimal. 
For instance, if a REDD set-aside impedes forest conversion for high-return 
soybean production, preventing this conversion from leaking may not be 
socially desirable if high foreign-exchange and multiplier benefits are foregone. 
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Even explicit primary leakage contracts, e.g. the deals in Bolivia impeding 
loggers from moving elsewhere, may be undesirable from a welfare perspective. 
Additionally, in a world of mobile financial capital, they may ultimately have 
only short-run effects. Redesigning REDD towards factors that are less mobile 
and leakage-producing (e.g. labour, marginal lands) may also improve equity 
by creating pro-poor REDD investments. Balancing activity-reducing REDD 
conservation with activity-expanding A/R and SFM interventions in the 
mitigation portfolio may impede impoverishing labour expulsion. Recognising 
trade-offs between carbon mitigation and broader development goals may 
thus lead us to deliberately accept some leakage and to reprioritise mitigation 
actions. 

Chapter 8
How do we ensure permanence and 
assign liability?
Michael Dutschke with Arild Angelsen
8.1 Introduction
One of the major concerns in the reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation (REDD)  debate is the permanence of emissions reductions. 
How can we make sure that a forest area saved today will not be destroyed 
tomorrow? Who should be held liable if that happened? How can REDD 
contracts and financial mechanisms be designed to ensure permanence? 
Compared with other climate change mitigation options, forestry is often 
considered special in two ways. First, it is more difficult to control the carbon 
storage. Even under the best management practices, an unexpected carbon 
release cannot be excluded. Droughts, pest, or fire have the potential to 
revert yearlong carbon uptake within weeks or months (Schlamadinger et al. 
2007). Second, the climate effect of a forest mitigation activity is linked to 
the continued existence of trees on the area once verified. An effective REDD 
mechanism must provide continuous incentives for landowners to monitor 
and maintain their forestlands.
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There are at least three counter-arguments against a categorical distinction 
between reduction of fossil emissions and carbon management in terrestrial 
systems: First, given the finiteness of fossil fuels, it is likely that they will 
anyway end up in the atmosphere over the long run. Reduced fossil fuel use 
today preserves  a part of the reservoirs of coal, oil and gas, and carries the risk 
of higher production and consumption of the share in preserved today in the 
future. The question of permanence is therefore not limited to REDD. 
Second, even if terrestrial carbon sequestration was in fact temporary, it will 
still have a positive climate effect (see the ‘ton-year approach’ discussed below). 
Related to that, REDD can produce large emissions reduction quickly, buying 
time for technological development and be a ‘wooden bridge to a clean energy 
future’ (Lecocq and Chomitz 2001). Without mitigation from forestry, the 
world is unlikely to get the quick emissions reductions needed to reach the 
maximum 2 degree Celsius target (e.g. Stern 2007). 
Third, in most of today’s developed countries, deforestation was a phase of 
development. Forest transitions tend to occur in phases: from slow to rapid 
deforestation to a phase of stabilisation and a later transition to a slow increase 
in forest cover (Rudel et al. 2005). Successful REDD will preserve forests during 
this risky development phase, and much of it will turn out to be permanent 
(Chomitz et al. 2006). 
Still and although not uniquely confined to REDD, permanence is a real 
issue that will have to be taken into account in the REDD negotiations. 
Once someone assumes liability for terrestrial carbon stocks, non-permanence 
may still be a threat, but its damaging effects to the atmosphere are being 
compensated for. This may be the case in the future, if developing countries 
assume proper emissions targets, for example, within a cap and trade (CAT) 
system (Eliasch 2008). Before this happens, we need to find intermediate 
solutions. This chapter looks at different permanence risks and how these can 
be managed, and provides a toolbox of different liability mechanisms needed 
for achieving fungibility of carbon credits from land use and other sectors.
8.2 Permanence risks and how to manage 
them
There are a number of direct risks that can jeopardise the permanence of the 
emissions reductions achieved. One layer of risk management is how the risk of 
re-emission can be managed by projects or countries. A second risk management 
layer is needed, however, if REDD mechanisms are to be credited and used 
for compliance in voluntary or formal (compliance or offset) greenhouse gas 
(GHG) markets. In this case, some system of commercial liability must be 
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in place. Both layers are necessarily overlapping. The main distinction is that 
permanence risks need to be managed anyway, independently from whether 
emissions reduction credits are being generated, while the second layer is a 
commercial necessity in case REDD credits are to be traded.
8.2.1 Risks and risk management
What are the risks that can jeopardise the permanence of carbon stored in 
forests? We distinguish between the following types of risk (Wong and 
Dutschke 2003):
1. Natural/ecological risk: Erratic variations in carbon stocks, caused by 
natural events such as storm, drought, pests, or fire. 
2. Climate change-related risk: Climate change may lead to systematic 
carbon losses in certain regions. This is distinct from other types of natural/
ecological risks in that it involves a new class of threats that may be more 
difficult to insure, as historical experience is lacking.
3. Demand-side risk: Where the demand for agricultural crops is the main 
driver of deforestation, an increase in prices on the national or world market 
may drive up opportunity costs to levels above the carbon prices agreed, 
making forest conversion profitable. 
4. Failure of project partners: Risk related to non-performance of the project 
can be due to, for example, ineffective project management, insecure tenure 
rights to the forest (encroachment), or bankruptcy of project partners.
5. Political risk: A change in government may lead to a change in or reversal 
of any prior approvals or commitments. The same may occur in the event of 
civil unrest. Depending on how the REDD mechanism will be ultimately 
designed a change in status from non-Annex I to Annex I country may also 
impact subnational activities.
In case of natural events (risk type 1), traditional forest insurance covers the 
difference between the salvage value of timber and the commercial value of 
the trees at maturity. Contracts are usually renewed on an annual basis, in 
order to reflect the actual risk profile. This coverage can be expanded to the 
carbon fixed in vegetation. This expansion would require insurance companies 
to participate in the emissions market. 
Long-term climate variations (type 2) will not uniformly lead to worldwide 
damages, but they can negatively impact large areas, while climate change 
may lead to increased biomass growth in other areas. In case indirect human 
interference can be factored out, these risks (and benefits) will not be attributed 
to the individual activities.
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The risk for a change in commodity prices (3) can be shared between funding 
agency and landowner by including an indexing clause in the contract that 
foresees additional payments during times when the prices of, say, soy or palm 
oil move outside a predetermined price corridor.
In case the project owners fail to meet the obligations or disappear (4) and 
permanent credits have been created, the ultimate liability will fall back to the 
government, most likely the one of the selling country. In order to be able to 
respond to this risk, the national REDD focal point may ask for an in-kind risk 
premium (e.g. a credit sharing clause), before approving a subnational activity. 
Political risks (5) can be minimised by broad participation in the climate 
regime and by international cooperation. Nevertheless, under an international 
agreement like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), the basic construct is that states are permanent and comply with 
treaties. Legal enforcement options against states are necessarily limited. 
8.2.2 Liability management
Permanence risks apply independently from any credit trading under a future 
REDD regime. Under a national approach, the concern is no longer the 
permanence of particular forest areas, but whether the country as a whole 
continues to maintain reductions below the reference level established, regardless 
of where the particular reductions are coming from. A critical question then 
arises: What happens if the country exceeds its reference level? One option is 
the requirement that the nation makes up the reductions or pay some other 
penalty. Under a ‘debit system’, for example, any emissions above the reference 
level will be deducted from a future account (perhaps plus interest or some 
additional penalty). The extra emissions must then be made up before any later 
reductions below reference level are credited (Schlamadinger and Johns 2006).
However, before REDD countries accept full liability for reductions achieved 
or if REDD credits from subnational activities are to be made fungible with 
other mitigation credits or allowance units, the resulting commercial risks need 
to be securitised. The following options exist:
1. Temporary crediting conditions the validity of carbon credits from land 
use to the continued existence of the carbon stocks (Blanco and Forner 
2000). This approach has been applied under the afforestation and 
reforestation (A/R) clean development mechanism (CDM). Depending on 
the modality, emissions reductions have to be either recertified or reverified 
after five years for the credit to remain valid. In the CDM, when the project 
lifetime (up to 60 years) ends or in case of premature losses, credits need 
to be replaced by other types of emissions allowances. Thus, under the 
current CDM rules, temporary crediting always creates a future debit, 
independently of the fate of the carbon stocks built up. 
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2. The so-called ‘ton-year approach’ was discussed in the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use 
Change and Forestry (Watson et al. 2000). It departed from the ideas that 
(i) the present value of mitigation is higher today than the same mitigation 
effect tomorrow, and that (ii) there is a limited residence time of CO2 in the 
atmosphere. The combination of human time preference and the natural 
decay period led various authors to the calculation of an ‘equivalence 
period’, after which forestry mitigation could be considered permanent. 
Authors proposed the length of this equivalence period to be between 
42 and 100 years (Fearnside et al. 2000; Moura Costa and Wilson 2000; 
Fearnside 2002). Consequently, with an equivalence period of 100 years, 
keeping 100 tons of CO2 out of the atmosphere over 1 year would be 
equivalent to 1 ton of CO2 permanently removed. This type of accounting 
has a big drawback in the cash flow: full payment for permanent reduction 
accrues after the end of the equivalence period, while the costs are mainly 
frontloaded. Nevertheless, the private sector might separately be willing to 
advance upfront loans based on the credit worthiness of the project and the 
expected future stream of payments. 
3. Project credit buffers are another option used in voluntary mitigation 
projects. Only a certain share (e.g. 50%) of the credits generated are sold, 
while the remainder is held in an escrow account for a predetermined period 
(e.g. 50 years). A proportion of these credits are liberated as the guarantee 
period ends if no losses have occurred.
4. Risk pooling is a variation of project credit buffers where several projects 
maintain a joint credit buffer, thus minimising the risk of damages occurring 
simultaneously. The individual project buffers can be smaller than non-
pooled project credit buffers. The same would be the case for a national-
level REDD program in which risks are spread across activities and regions 
across the country. 
5. Insurance is an advanced version of risk pooling. A third-party insurer 
selects a portfolio of insured projects in a way that several growth regions 
and ecosystems are covered, thereby limiting the risk of occurrence of 
massive simultaneous damages. The risk premium is paid in emission 
reduction units. In case of a damage event, the insurance company replaces 
credits lost by the ones held in stock. The residual risk is hedged by financial 
instruments and re-insurers (Subak 2003). This scheme can also lead to an 
improved cash flow for mitigation activities.
6. Shared liability or forest compliance partnership (FCP), is a proposal 
for managing national-level liability under a ‘bubble’ approach on land 
use accounting between two or more Annex I and non-Annex I countries 
(Dutschke and Wolf 2007). Under this construct, developed countries 
would bear a negotiated share of the liability for the permanence of 
REDD credits once they are certified. They could account for the land-
use sector under their sectoral target, stipulated under Kyoto Article 3, 
paragraphs 3 and 4 or any new agreement agreed upon. The FCP suggests 
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that a developed country receives preferential access to REDD credits for 
compliance if it shares the liability. The proposal assumes that for compliance 
with Annex I targets, certain restrictions apply with regard to the use of 
REDD credits. Aid donors would also become motivated to invest in 
forest governance. Bilateral funding will be directed into the most effective 
policies and measures to reduce emissions in the forestry sector. The special 
relationship between REDD countries and their Annex I stewards will have 
repercussions on the private sector too, because FCP limits the country risk 
for subnational activities with foreign participation. 
Several combinations of the above options are possible. For example, options 
1 and 2 can be combined with a sliding cancellation of debits incurred from 
temporary crediting over time (Dutschke 2002), thus improving the cash flow 
for mitigation activities. Temporary forestry credits have to be replaced in the 
future, but each year until the equivalence period a prorated percentage of this 
future debit is forgiven, in case no damage occurs.
All except option 1 limit the liability over a predetermined timeframe. The 
ton/year approach considers forestry mitigation effects permanent after the 
equivalence period. Credit buffers and insurances release credits from the 
escrow account, as no damages occur for a certain number of years. For A/ R 
CDM projects in the first commitment period, no temporal horizon of the 
risks for sequestered carbon could be agreed upon. Therefore temporary 
crediting was chosen that assumes all mitigation to be lost after project 
termination. Nevertheless, this assumption has stifled the market’s appetite 
for temporary and long-term certified emission reduction. As the price of 
temporary credits point to the future value of replacement units, these credits 
are highly speculative and lose their value if more stringent targets are expected 
for subsequent commitment periods. With stable market signals in place 
and banking of credits being allowed, this situation may change in future 
commitment periods. 
With the 2 degree Celsius target to be reached until the middle of this century, 
the timeframe for mitigation action is much clearer now than it was when rules 
and modalities were discussed for A/R CDM. Thus, all the options dismissed at 
that time can come back into consideration for REDD liability management. 
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8.3 Evaluation of liability management
Assigning liability is a precondition for credit fungibility. Independently 
from the mode of financing proposed under a REDD system options, the 
criterion of environmental effectiveness requires that the overall effect is a 
lasting reduction of GHG levels in the atmosphere. Table 8.1 lists options that 
have been proposed for safeguarding permanence of emissions reductions and 
carbon uptakes in terrestrial systems, and each of them is assessed in terms of 
the 3E criteria used in this book (effectiveness, efficiency and equity). Options 
1 and 2 avoid a clear allocation of liability and consequently are suboptimal in 
terms of all three criteria. In the start-up phase of a nested approach (chapter 
4), temporary crediting may be a useful fix, before national REDD targets are 
set and the ultimate country liability is determined. After that, credits may 
be converted from temporary to permanent. Once there is ultimate country 
liability, like in the case of Annex I parties, any re-emission is captured in 
the national inventory and is taken into account when meeting emissions 
reduction commitments. 
The options listed are non-exclusive; they may be seen as a logical succession, 
once the activities reach a certain volume. In options 4 and 5, there may occur 
‘cherry-picking’ of ‘good risks’ by pool operators. Annex I countries should 
consider providing international start-up finance to organise larger pools, 
make these accessible to countries perceived as ‘high risk’, or work with these 
countries to reduce their risk profile. Option 6 is only related to national-
level REDD, and it is complementary to all other options. It offers potential 
investors and insurers higher confidence that ultimate liability for credits is 
backed by Annex I support, and thus political risks are minimised. It has the 
potential to increase the effectiveness of policies and measures in the land-
use sector and bolster private investment in REDD. It is equitable in that it 
can contribute to the attractiveness of countries that would otherwise have 
difficulty attracting REDD investment because of their political risk. 
Effectiveness Efficiency Equity
1 Temporary 
crediting 
LOW
Start-up option for 
small overall carbon 
volumes and isolated 
activities
LOW
Complex accounting, 
high transaction 
costs and low-value 
credits result in 
minimal use 
LOW
High transaction costs 
benefit large projects 
Table 8.1.  Options for securitising permanence in terrestrial carbon management
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8.4 Conclusion
Building up, managing and conserving carbon pools, whether in forests or 
elsewhere, entails the risk of non-permanence. This risk needs to be addressed 
for any climate change mitigation. Further, in order to make credits resulting 
from forestry mitigation fungible with other credits and emission allowances, 
liability mechanisms are needed. The risks for forest carbon stocks can be 
mitigated in a staggered approach, with different mechanisms covering 
different risk layers. The most efficient mechanism for risk pooling is national 
liability of REDD countries in case risk mitigation strategies should fail. As 
REDD governments do not (yet) have GHG targets for the whole economy, 
they are not in the position to cross-compensate underachievement in forestry 
Effectiveness Efficiency Equity
2 Ton-year 
accounting
LOW
Low upfront pay 
and low net present 
value (which 
depends on discount 
rate), limited 
incentives
LOW
Leads to heavy 
discounts in credits, 
which causes cash-
flow problems 
LOW
High financing costs 
exclude poorer 
participants 
3 Project 
credit 
buffers
MEDIUM
Effectiveness depends 
on project credibility 
and maintenance of 
buffer 
LOW
High unaccounted 
share of credits, late 
cash-flow 
HIGH
Easy and transparent 
implementation 
4 Risk 
pooling 
MEDIUM-HIGH
Effective instrument, 
depending on pool’s 
size and distribution
MEDIUM-HIGH
Smaller relative 
buffer size 
MEDIUM
Organisational 
capacities required, 
risk of free-riding, but 
fairly equitable
5 Commercial 
insurance
HIGH
Outsourced liability, 
instrument for 
mature markets, low 
hurdles
HIGH 
Low transaction 
costs through 
outsourced risk 
assessment and 
management 
MEDIUM
May be equitable if 
socially desirable ‘bad 
risks’ are subsidised
6 Shared 
liability
HIGH 
Will give additional 
incentives to 
readiness and 
capacity building, 
thus preparing the 
ground for effective 
REDD
HIGH
Will make REDD 
insurable, as country 
risk is minimised 
HIGH
Depending on the 
motivation of Annex I 
parties involved, 
may contribute to 
fostering investment 
in high-risk countries
Table 8.1.  (continued)
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with overcompliance in another sector. A shared sectoral liability (‘emissions 
bubble’) between developed and developing countries may thus add to the 
REDD system’s stability. For the respective developed country partner, the 
benefit could be preferential access to the partner’s REDD credits. 
The chapter has offered a summary of tools proposed for reducing carbon 
risks in forestry and for securitising carbon contracts from forest mitigation 
activities. This toolbox is the result of pilot project development and a vivid 
methodological debate at the UNFCCC level over the last decade. Permanence 
and liability under a REDD mechanism can be realised by combining a variety 
of complementing approaches. The REDD decision expected in Copenhagen 
2009 should offer a menu of choices based on what best serves different country 
circumstances.

9.1 Introduction
In 2001, at the seventh Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Marrakech, 
policy makers decided to exclude carbon offsets from most land use, land-
use change and forestry (LULUCF) carbon sinks in developing countries for 
a number of reasons, including the difficulties in measuring, reporting and 
verifying (MRV) the actual reductions. Since then, considerable progress has 
been made in technology development and assessment protocols to allay many 
of the methodological concerns expressed during the negotiations. There have 
been two revisions to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
Greenhouse Gas Accounting Guidelines (Penman et al. 2003; IPCC 2006), 
which include project-level accounting guidelines. Several other research and 
development groups have also been working on the problems and moved 
forwards with pilot and demonstration projects. These groups have made 
important advances in the application of remote sensing technologies.
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This chapter addresses the issue of MRV for reducing emissions from 
deforestation and degradation in developing countries (REDD) activities. We 
provide a summary of the state of the art and science of carbon MRV. Our aim 
is to show that many of the methodological concerns expressed in 2001 no 
longer constrain these types of projects. We believe that with the progress that 
has been made in the past seven years, a new policy environment that is more 
favourable to REDD projects will promote further innovation to increase the 
feasibility of projects that reduce a significant source of greenhouse gases to the 
atmosphere. 
9.2 Trade-off between costs and accuracy
Different methods are available and suitable for monitoring deforestation, forest 
degradation and carbon stocks. Deforestation monitoring can rely on remote 
sensing technology with ground measurements for verification. Monitoring 
forest degradation and carbon stocks is more challenging, and largely relies on 
ground measurements, complemented by remote sensing. 
Still, there is a trade-off between costs and accuracy of measurements. 
Measurement accuracy is crucial to ensure that emissions reductions are not 
over- or underestimated and payments for the reduction efforts are made 
appropriately. In some country contexts high accuracy levels require the use 
of fine-resolution imagery (e.g. to detect forest degradation or small-scale 
deforestation), imagery repeated over time (e.g. to overcome cloud cover 
limitations) or imagery that requires higher expertise to process (e.g. radar 
image analysis)  –  all of which come at a cost. Similarly, ground measurements, 
crucial for verification and carbon stock measurement, are time consuming 
and relatively expensive for large-scale applications such as a national-level 
inventory (Korhonen et al. 2006).
The cost vs. accuracy trade-off is all the more important as countries that need 
costly monitoring methods (due to clouds, hilly terrain or their drivers of 
deforestation or degradation) tend to correlate with those currently having 
low capacity to meet these needs. The recognition of this trade-off has led 
most parties to the UNFCCC to call for guidance from the international 
community on cost-effective methods to monitor, report and verify emission 
reductions from deforestation and forest degradation. 
Official guidelines for REDD MRV are yet to be established. The 2003 
Good Practice Guidelines for Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
(GPG-LULUCF) activities and 2006 Guidelines for National Greenhouse 
Gas Inventories for Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (GL-AFOLU) 
– both developed by the IPCC – are important first steps, but need further 
elaboration on methods to estimate emissions from forestry, notably regarding 
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sampling design and determining carbon densities in forests affected by 
degradation (UNFCCC 2008b). The adhoc REDD working group called the 
Global Observation of Forest and Land Cover Dynamics (GOFC-GOLD) 
undertook a first step to fill this vacuum. They are developing a sourcebook 
providing a consensus perspective from the global earth observation community 
and carbon experts on methodological issues relating to national-level REDD 
activities (GOFC-GOLD 2008).
9.3 Elements of a measurement and 
monitoring system
Due to the trade-off between costs and accuracy, the quest for cost-effective 
solutions is at the centre of the MRV debate. A cost-effective monitoring and 
evaluation system for REDD requires a balanced approach of remote sensing 
and ground measurements. The imagery aids in the design of efficient ground 
sampling schemes (e.g. in areas with high variability), assessment of area change 
(with ground truthing) and extrapolation of plot measurements to the regional 
or national level. Ground measurements are required for carbon measurements 
and to verify desktop forest mapping from satellite images.
Carbon emissions from deforestation and degradation are estimated from 
changes in two important variables: (i) area of deforestation and degradation; 
and (ii) carbon stock densities per unit area. Remote sensing technologies 
combined with ground measurements play a key role in monitoring these 
variables. 
9.3.1 Monitoring deforestation areas
Remote sensing is the only practical method for national-level deforestation 
monitoring (DeFries et al. 2006). Since the early 1990s, changes in forest area 
have been monitored from space with confidence (Achard et al. 2008). Some 
countries (e.g. Brazil and India) have had well-established operational systems 
for over a decade; others are developing these capabilities or have successfully 
monitored forests with aerial photographs that do not require sophisticated 
data analysis or computer resources (DeFries et al. 2006). 
The two most common approaches are wall-to-wall mapping and sampling. 
Wall-to-wall mapping, whereby the entire country or forest area is monitored, 
is a common approach and is conducted in both Brazil and India. Sampling 
approaches are useful to reduce the costs of data and analysis, and are 
especially suitable when deforestation is concentrated in discreet areas of a 
country or region. Recommended sampling approaches include systematic 
sampling, whereby samples are taken at regular intervals (e.g. every 10 km), 
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and stratified sampling, whereby samples are determined by known proxy 
variables (e.g. deforestation hotspots) (Achard et al. 2008). Expert knowledge 
can also help determine sample priorities (DeFries et al. 2006). A stratified 
sampling approach, used for example in the Brazilian Project to Monitor 
the Brazilian Amazonian Rainforest (Projeto Monitoramento da Floresta 
Amazônica Brasileira por Satélite - PRODES) identifies ‘critical areas’ based 
on the previous year’s monitoring to prioritise analysis for the following year 
(INPE 2004). 
One approach does not exclude the other: a sampling approach in one reporting 
period may be extended to wall-to-wall coverage in the subsequent period. 
Likewise, wall-to-wall mapping in one reporting period may be followed by 
hotspot analysis (stratified sampling) in the subsequent period. 
One way to reduce costs is through a stepwise approach. In a first step, coarse 
resolution data (e.g. MODIS) is analysed to identify locations with high rates 
of land use change (deforestation hotspots). In a second step, more costly 
medium-fine resolution data (e.g. Landsat, SPOT, SAR) is used to conduct 
detailed analysis of these hotspots. This approach reduces the need to analyse 
the entire forested area within a country. Hansen et al. (2008) for example 
employed this methodology at global level to compute rates of humid tropical 
forest clearings between 2000 and 2005. 
Reporting accuracy and verification of results are essential components of a 
monitoring system. Accuracies of 80-95% are achievable for monitoring with 
medium-resolution imagery (e.g. Landsat) to discriminate between forests and 
non-forests. Accuracy can be assessed through ground observations or analysis 
of fine resolution aircraft or satellite imaging. Aerial photography presents 
a good tool for verification as fine-resolution imagery remains expensive. 
Another source of free viewable data can be the fine-resolution imagery (up 
to 50 cm resolution) from Google Earth, which – where available – provides 
continuously updated data (Olander et al. 2008).1 
9.3.2  Monitoring forest degradation areas
Forest degradation is caused by a variety of factors that affect monitoring 
requirements (Table 9.1; also see Chapter 10 on degradation). Repeated 
monitoring is needed to ensure all forest changes are accounted for and 
attributable to a particular time period. Requiring the use of remote sensing 
to stratify the land area in order to select the area for ground measurement has 
been proposed to overcome the challenges associated with the lack of a clear 
definition for forest degradation. 
1   Although the imagery cannot be fully imported into image processing packages, it has great potential 
for map validation in some areas by combining visual interpretation with Geographic Information Systems 
polygon and point files that can be imported and overlain in Google Earth (Olander et al. 2008).
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Source: Adapted from GOFC-GOLD (2008)
Table 9.1.  Causes of degradation and impact on monitoring
Causes of forest 
degradation
Monitoring feasibility
Selective logging •	 Remote	sensing	methods	using	medium	resolution	im-
agery can detect gaps in the forest canopy caused by roads 
and log decks
•	 Reduction	in	carbon	stocks	can	also	be	estimated	with-
out satellite imagery using methods from the 2006 IPCC 
GL-AFOLU, although it likely is more difficult to estimate 
emissions from logging
Forest fires •	 More	difficult	to	monitor	with	existing	satellite	imagery,	
but possible to build on existing fire information for REDD 
uses
Over-exploitation of 
fuel wood and other 
non-timber forest 
products
•	 Likely	to	be	undetectable	from	satellite	image	interpreta-
tion unless the rate of degradation is intensive, causing 
larger changes in the canopy
•	 Inventory-based	approaches	(field	surveys)	may	be	more	
appropriate
Mining •	 Difficult	to	monitor	as	forest	openings	are	often	too	small	
to be detected
Monitoring methods based on remote sensing may be appropriate when 
degradation leads to detectable gaps in the forest canopy such as is typically 
the case for selective logging or fire. Neverthless, ground measurements are 
important complements especially when degradation does not create gaps in 
the canopy such as in the case of collection of deadwood and understorey 
vegetation (Hardcastle et al. 2008). 
Two main remote sensing approaches to monitor forest degradation are 
currently distinguished (Achard et al. 2008): a direct approach that detects 
gaps in forest canopies and an indirect approach that detects road networks 
and log decks. 
•	 Direct approach to monitor selective logging and fire: Methods based 
on this approach monitor forest canopy for any gaps or pattern of gaps to 
identify degradation activity.2 For example, Asner et al. (2005) developed 
automated algorithms to identify logging activity using Landsat data. Roy 
et al. (2005) developed a methodology to map fire-affected areas using 
MODIS data. An accuracy of 86-95% has been shown to be achievable 
in the interpretation of selectively logged and burned areas (Achard et al. 
2008). 
2   See Achard et al. (2008) for a more detailed description of methods in this category.
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•	 Indirect approach to monitor forest degradation: This approach classifies 
forest land into ‘intact forest’ (fully stocked, undisturbed forest) and ‘non-
intact forest’ (not fully stocked, disturbed forests due to timber exploitation 
or canopy degradation) based on a combination of canopy cover and human 
impact criteria that can be defined depending on national circumstances 
(Mollicone et al. 2007; Achard et al. 2008).3 Forest degradation is defined 
as conversion of intact to non-intact forest.
9.3.3 Estimating forest carbon stocks 
Carbon stock estimates are necessary to determine net forest emissions, and 
are derived by combining the area extent of deforestation or forest degradation 
with carbon density measurements. Approaches to estimate forest carbon 
stocks in tropical countries can be grouped into biome averages, ground-based 
measurements and remote sensing measurements (Gibbs et al. 2007). Table 
9.2 summarises the benefits and limitations for each method.
Converting forest inventory and remotely sensed data into carbon measures 
requires the development of allometric relationships. Several global relationships 
exist (e.g. Chave 2008), but it is better to develop country-specific equations. 
As most countries with high forest cover have forestry research services, and 
the generation of allometric equations is straightforward, they should be able 
to develop appropriate equations.
Using data from forest inventories is often tempting because many countries 
have already conducted at least one inventory. But few developing countries 
have comprehensive national inventories, and the data often refer to forests 
with commercial value only (DeFries et al. 2006). 
9.4 Estimating emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation
Combining measurements of changes in forest area with carbon density values 
enables estimation of net emissions from forest changes. The level of emissions 
released as a result of land use change depends not only on the forest type, but 
also on the specific type of change. For example, converting tropical forest 
to soybean, maize or rice potentially produces 60% more emissions than 
conversion to oil palm (Miles et al. 2008).
3   Achard et al. (2008) suggest that ‘intact forest’ be defined based on six criteria: 1)  located in forestland 
according to current UNFCCC definition,  with a 1 km buffer zone inside the forest area, 2) larger than 
1000 ha with a smallest width of 1 km, 3) containing a contiguous mosaic of natural ecosystems, 4) not 
fragmented by infrastructure, 5) without signs of significant human transformation, and 6) without burnt 
lands and young tree sites adjacent to infrastructure projects.
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Table 9.2.  Benefits and limitations of available methods to estimate national-level forest carbon stocks
Method Description Benefits Limitations Un certainty
Biome averages Estimates of average 
forest carbon stocks 
for broad forest 
categories, based on 
a variety of input data 
sources
•	 immediately	available	
•	 data	refinements	may	
increase accuracy
•	 globally	consistent
•	 fairly	generalised
•	 data	sources	
improperly sampled 
to describe large 
areas
High
Forest inventories Relates ground-based 
measurements of tree 
diameters or volume 
to forest carbon stocks 
using allometric 
relationships
•	 generic	relation	ships	
readily available
•	 low-tech	method	
widely understood
•	 can	be	relatively	
inexpensive as field-
labour is largest cost
•	 generic	
relationships not 
appropriate for all 
regions
•	 can	be	slow
•	 challenging	to	
produce globally 
consistent results
Low
Re
m
ot
e 
se
ns
in
g
Optical remote 
sensors
Uses visible and 
infrared wavelengths 
to measure spectral 
indices and correlates 
to ground-based forest 
carbon measurements 
(e.g. Landsat, MODIS)
•	 satellite	data	routinely	
collected and freely 
available at global 
scale
•	 globally	consistent
•	 limited	ability	to	
develop good 
models for tropical 
forests
•	 spectral	indices	
saturate at rather 
low C stocks
•	 can	be	technically	
demanding
High
Fine reso lution 
air-borne 
optical remote 
sensors
Uses fine resolution (~ 
10-20 cm) images to 
measure tree height 
and crown area and 
allometry to estimate 
carbon stocks (e.g. 
aerial photos, 3-D 
digital aerial imagery)
•	 reduces	time	and	cost	
of collecting forest 
inventory data
•	 reasonable	accuracy
•	 excellent	ground	
verification for 
deforestation baseline
•	 covers	only	small	
areas (10,000 ha)
•	 can	be	expensive	
and technically 
demanding
•	 allometric	relations	
based on crown 
area are unavailable
Low-
medium
Radar remote 
sensors
Uses microwaves 
or radar signal to 
measure forest vertical 
structure (e.g. ALOS 
PALSAR, ERS-1, JERS-1, 
Envisat)
•	 satellite	data	are	
generally free
•	 new	systems	launched	
in 2005 expected to 
provide improved 
data
•	 can	be	accurate	for	
young or sparse forest
•	 less	accurate	in	
complex canopies 
of mature forests 
because signal 
saturates
•	 mountainous	terrain	
also increases errors
•	 can	be	expensive	
and technically 
demanding
Medium
Laser remote 
sensors (e.g. 
Lidar)
Lidar uses laser light 
to estimate forest 
height and vertical 
structure (e.g. Carbon 
3-D satellite system 
combines Vegetation 
canopy Lidar (VCL) 
with horizontal 
imager)
•	 accurately	estimates	
full spatial variability 
of forest carbon stocks
•	 potential	for	satellite-
based system to 
estimate global forest 
carbon stocks
•	 airplane-mounted	
sensors only option
•	 satellite	system	yet	
unfunded
•	 requires	extensive	
field data for 
calibration
•	 can	be	expensive	
and technically 
demanding
Low-
medium
Source:  Gibbs et al. 2007
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9.4.1 Inventory approaches
The updated IPCC greenhouse gas (GHG) accounting method (IPCC 2006) 
includes two approaches to estimating carbon stock changes (Brown and Braatz 
2008; Figure 9.1): (i) the stock-based or stock-difference approach; and (ii) the 
process-based or gain-loss approach. 
Figure 9.1.  Estimating carbon stock changes (Wertz-Kanounnikof 2008, adapted from 
Eggleston 2008, and Brown and Braatz 2008)
1) Stock-dierence approach 2) Gain-loss approach
 C = (Ct2 - Ct1) / (t2 - t1)  C =   Cgain -  Closs
 C    = Anual carbon stock change in 
               pool (tC/yr)
 Ct1 = Carbon stock in pool at time  t1 (tC)  
 Ct2 = Carbon stock in pool at time  t2 (tC) 
 C         = Anual carbon stock change in 
                    pool (tC/yr)
 Cgain = Anual gain in carbon (tC/yr)
 Closs  = Anual loss in carbon (tC/yr)
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•	 Stock-difference approach: This method estimates the difference in carbon 
stocks in a particular pool at two moments in time. It can be used when 
carbon stocks in relevant pools have been measured and estimated over 
time, such as in national forest inventories. This approach is suitable for 
estimating emissions caused by both deforestation and degradation, and it 
can be applied to all carbon pools. 
•	 Gain-loss approach: This approach estimates the net balance of additions 
to and removals from a carbon pool. In the REDD context, depending 
on how ecosystem rehabilitation is treated, gains result from growth and 
carbon transfer between pools (e.g. biomass pool to a dead organic matter 
pool due to disturbance). Hence, losses result from carbon transfer to 
another pool and emissions due to harvesting, decomposition or burning.4 
4   When trees are cut down, there are three destinations for the stored carbon: dead wood, wood products 
and the atmosphere (Pearson et al. 2008).
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This method is used when annual data on information such as growth rates 
and wood harvest are available. In reality, a mix of the stock-difference and 
gain-loss approach can also be used. 
9.4.2 Inventory complexity 
IPCC methods allow for inventories with different levels of complexity, called 
Tiers. In general, inventories using higher tiers have improved accuracy and 
reduced uncertainty. There is a trade-off, however, as the complexity and 
resources required for conducting inventories also increase for higher tiers. A 
combination of tiers can be used, e.g. Tier 2 can be used for biomass and Tier 1 
for soil carbon, depending on data availability and the magnitude of expected 
changes in the pool.
Tier 1 methods are designed to be simple to use. The IPCC guideline provides 
equations and default parameter values (e.g. emission and stock change factors), 
so the inventory compiler does not need specific data for these elements of the 
equations. Country-specific land use and management data are needed, but 
for Tier 1 there are often globally available sources for these estimates (e.g. 
deforestation rates, agricultural production statistics, global land cover maps, 
fertiliser use, livestock population data). The Tier 1 method alone, however, is 
unlikely to be sufficient for crediting under REDD.
Tier 2 uses the same methodological approach as Tier 1, but the emission and 
stock change factors are based on country or region-specific data. Country-
defined emission factors are more appropriate for the climatic regions and land 
use systems in the country or region. Higher temporal and spatial resolution, 
and more disaggregated land use and management categories are used in Tier 
2 to correspond with country-defined coefficients for specific regions and 
specialised land use categories.   
For Tier 3, higher order methods are used, including models and inventory 
measurement systems tailored to address unique national circumstances. 
Assessments are repeated over time and employ high-resolution land use and 
management data, which are generally disaggregated at subnational level. These 
inventories use advanced measurements and/or modelling systems to improve 
the estimation of GHG emissions and removals beyond what is possible with 
Tier 1 or 2 approaches. 
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9.5 Integration of MRV methods into a REDD 
mechanism
While there has been significant progress on the technical aspects of carbon 
accounting, many developing countries lack access to data, as well as the 
technical infrastructure and capacity for consistent, transparent data analysis and 
management. In addition, MRV for REDD requires forest inventory institutions 
for ground-based measurements, quality control and external verification.
In the early stages of any REDD scheme, most countries will likely use a 
stock-difference method. As capacity is built, however, greater efficiency may 
come from emission-based (gain-loss) approaches since they allow for direct 
measurement of net changes in emissions. It is also highly likely that many 
countries can only implement a Tier 1 accounting scheme in the early stages. 
In these cases, conservative estimates of emissions reductions may be used for 
crediting (Eliasch 2008).
At COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, the global community may only agree on 
a first round REDD scheme and set developing country responsibilities (Stern 
2008). A build up period of, say, 10 years may be needed to build effective and 
cooperative institutions, technology, and national capacity for cost-efficient 
monitoring and measuring at various scales (local to national). During this 
phase, countries that have limited abilities to implement higher Tier accounting 
could participate using Tier 1 approaches coupled with conservative estimates 
for crediting. Capacity building programmes by countries who can implement 
Tier 2 and 3 inventories are needed to raise the technical level of other 
participants. The ultimate trajectory of a REDD scheme, and how it will be 
integrated into any future climate regimes, remains unclear. If REDD becomes 
integrated into carbon markets, higher levels of accounting accuracy will be 
required because international buyers will want assurance that real emissions 
reductions have actually occurred. From a policy standpoint, one objective may 
be to create a favourable environment that promotes evolution towards higher 
Tier accounting approaches with greater accuracy and lower uncertainty. Such 
a transition phase is crucial for countries with currently weak MRV structures 
to avoid the risk of being excluded from a high standard mechanism, while 
giving them opportunity to improve their MRV methods and structures. 
Establishing an independent international forest carbon monitoring institution 
for REDD or developing this capacity in an existing institution may be another 
way to overcome capacity shortcomings. This institution is not meant to replace 
the UNFCCC’s framework for MRV, but to build synergies in addressing 
REDD monitoring requirements. Central African Forest Commission 
countries, for example, are establishing a regional institution called the Central 
African Forest Watchdog. Monitoring for carbon crediting purposes needs to 
be accurate, objective and reliable. Leaving this task to each REDD supplier 
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country may create an incentive for biased monitoring (e.g. exaggerated 
emission reductions) to reap carbon benefits. This system of external validation 
provides a level of control against abuses, but it adds transaction costs as well. 
Independent third party monitoring and certification, in the form of an 
international forest carbon monitoring institution, may therefore be a better 
alternative. Centralising this task at the global level can enhance economies 
of scale and improve monitoring cost-effectiveness – compared with trying to 
ensure coherent monitoring by each country – and provide more coherent time-
series of deforestation data for baseline purposes. It has been estimated that a 
regional monitoring partnership among Cameroon, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon in Central 
Africa could save more than USD 2.2 million in setup costs in the first year, and 
more than USD 0.5 million in annual running costs (Hardcastle et al. 2008). 
Capacity consists not only of the availability of technical equipment or costly 
satellite imagery, but also – and often more importantly – of know-how. This 
refers to the expertise in data cleaning, processing and analysis, and the use of 
data in the political process. The latter implies that capacity building needs to 
occur not only at the technical level (i.e. in the forest monitoring agency), but 
also at the political and institutional levels. For example, policy-makers need to 
have at least a minimum understanding of how changes in forest carbon affect the 
national REDD arrangements, and how this will relate to other sectoral policies. 
Another constraint to monitoring emissions from deforestation and 
degradation is the limited knowledge of carbon stocks contained in alternative 
forest types and forest uses. To address this, Costa Rica, for example, advocates 
the introduction of a ‘conservativeness principle’ to reduce the risk of 
overestimation (see Appendix). This might take the form of countries being 
paid at the lower end of the 95% confidence interval. Although default data 
and IPCC guidelines exist to ensure the use of ‘conservative’ estimates, further 
effort is needed in spatially explicit forest carbon stock inventories. Lidar sensors 
are particularly promising for future forest carbon stock measurements. Given 
the rising monitoring needs for REDD and the huge potential of Lidar sensors 
to improve biomass estimates, the Earth Observation community should 
consider deploying such a platform in the near future. New investments could 
also focus on promoting operational research for future Lidar-based biomass 
monitoring at the global level.
Because of limited availability of large-scale Lidar imagery until at least 
2015-2017, efforts need to be dedicated to making maximum use of 
currently available alternatives (e.g. ground-based measurements, Geographic 
Information Systems models to extrapolate sample data). Priority activities 
should include the establishment of allometric relationships for different forest 
types and management regimes. The conclusions from a recent UNFCCC 
expert meeting on MRV for degradation recognised that important data and 
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knowledge gaps exist. The experts recommended getting on with the job of 
making MRV schemes workable and cost effective using existing technology, 
rather than delaying actions waiting for improved technology (UNFCCC 
2008b).
9.6 Conclusion 
We set out to demonstrate that the state of the art and science of carbon 
accounting should not be a constraint on incorporating REDD into future 
climate change regimes. We have presented a summary of recent advances in 
IPCC GHG accounting methods and new technological advances to improve 
the quality of data used in these methods. We have also pointed out remaining 
limitations and opportunities for overcoming them.
Given the recent advances outlined in this paper, we believe that viable REDD 
measurement and validation systems can be implemented. We realise that the 
capacity to implement these systems across major forested countries is uneven. 
A policy environment that encourages innovation to improve efficiency 
and provides capacity building support will contribute to making REDD 
an important element in combating climate change. A phased approach to 
allow for capacity building and to let countries gain experience, with eventual 
integration of the REDD mechanism into credit trading schemes or other 
elements of a future climate regime, will ensure sustainability of the reduced 
emissions.
For the debate on REDD MRV to move forward, the UNFCCC COP-14 in 
Poznan will need to clarify (i) how forest degradation will be integrated into a 
future REDD scheme; (ii) who will monitor national and subnational REDD 
activity (whether this is a national or international responsibility); and (iii) 
what will be the base period or year for determining historic trends. In the 
preparation of a future REDD scheme, countries could further benefit from 
clear rules and guidelines, such as official ‘good practice guidelines for REDD’.
How do we measure and monitor 
forest degradation?
Daniel Murdiyarso, Margaret Skutsch, Manuel Guariguata,  
Markku Kanninen, Cecilia Luttrell, Pita Verweij and Osvaldo Stella Martins
Chapter 10
10.1  Why REDD has two D’s
Forest degradation is a major source of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs). 
In the Brazilian Amazon forest, degradation is responsible for 20% of total 
emissions (Asner et al. 2005). In Indonesia, the forest stock is decreasing by 
6% a year and forest degradation is responsible for two thirds of this, whereas 
deforestation is responsible for only a third (Marklund and Schoene 2006). In 
Africa the annual rate of forest degradation is almost 50% of the annual rate of 
deforestation (Lambin et al. 2003).
In 2007, the Thirteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 13) to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
acknowledged the importance of forest degradation by making it part of the 
proposed mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD). Addressing degradation has other important benefits. 
Less degradation will mean that forests will have higher capacity to adapt 
to climate change and to provide more and better ecosystem and livelihood 
services.
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Often, the driving forces for forest degradation and deforestation are different. 
Also, degradation is not necessarily a precursor to deforestation. Forests can 
remain degraded for a long time and never become completely deforested. 
So, addressing deforestation does not automatically reduce rates of forest 
degradation. In addition, failing to include degradation in a REDD agreement 
would mean that considerable amounts of forest-based emissions would not be 
accounted for. For example, if a healthy primary forest with a crown cover of 
70% degraded to a state where it only had a crown cover of 15%, it would still 
be classified as ‘forest’ and the increase in emissions from degradation would 
not be accounted for.
This chapter focuses on the methods used to measure and monitor forest 
degradation. It complements and elaborates on Chapter 9, which focuses on 
both Ds – deforestation and forest degradation. The methods to measure and 
monitor forest degradation are discussed in terms of effectiveness in accounting 
for emissions, cost efficiency, and international equity issues. The discussion 
takes account of differing country circumstances.
10.2  Definition and causes of forest 
degradation
As adopted at COP 9 in 2003, forest degradation is defined as ‘direct human-
induced long-term loss (persisting for X years or more) of at least Y% of 
forest carbon stocks (and forest values) since time (T) and not qualifying as 
deforestation’ (IPCC 2003a). However, reaching agreement on an operational 
procedure for monitoring, reporting and verifying (MRV) forest degradation 
has been problematic (Penman 2008). This is because X (human-induced 
long-term loss), Y (% of forest carbon stocks) and the minimum area of forest 
to be measured are difficult to define. Each factor is influenced by the activities 
causing degradation and the ecology of the particular forest.
Common activities causing forest degradation in the tropics include (GOFC-
GOLD, 2008):
•	 Selective logging
•	 Large-scale and open forest fires
•	 Collecting non-timber forest products and wood for fuel
•	 Producing charcoal, grazing, subcanopy fires and shifting cultivation
Apart from selective logging, there have been few analyses of the impacts of these 
activities on the loss of forest biomass and how long forests need to regenerate. 
Further, almost all studies have focused on humid tropical forests. However, 
extracting fuelwood from dry forests often causes more degradation than 
commercial timber harvesting (Skutsch and Trines 2008). This is important 
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since dry forests are generally more heavily populated than rainforests. While 
the carbon content of dry forests is much lower than that of humid forests, dry 
forests account for 42% of tropical forests (Murphy and Lugo 1986).
10.3  Methods for estimating emissions from 
forest degradation 
The IPCC (2003b) identifies five carbon pools that should be monitored to 
estimate emissions from deforestation and forest degradation: aboveground 
biomass, belowground biomass, litter, dead wood and soil organic carbon. The 
most practical method of estimating emissions is to monitor only aboveground 
biomass. However, degradation processes such as logging and burning can 
significantly influence emissions from other carbon pools such as dead wood 
and litter.
The IPCC (2003b) also provides three tiers for carbon accounting. Each 
tier requires more data and more complex analyses and, therefore, is more 
accurate:
•	 Tier 1 applies default emission factors (indirectly estimates emissions based 
on the loss of canopy cover) to data on forest activities (‘activity data’) that 
are collected nationally or globally
•	 Tier 2 applies country specific emission factors and activity data
•	 Tier 3 applies methods, models and inventory measurement systems 
that are repeated over time, driven by high resolution activity data and 
disaggregated subnationally at a fine scale
Monitoring, reporting and verifying (MRV) deforestation and degradation has 
two components: (i) monitoring changes in forest area by forest type; and 
(ii) monitoring average carbon stocks per unit area and forest type (carbon 
densities) (IPCC 2003b). Thus, the simplest approach (Tier 1) keeps track of 
changes in the area of each category of forest, and calculates carbon stocks in 
each forest category using global default values for carbon densities. In Tier 2, 
the accuracy improves because carbon densities are estimated using country 
specific data instead of global default values. In Tier 3, models and inventories 
are tailored to the particular country and repeated over time. Thus Tier 3 also 
measures changes in carbon densities within the accounting period.
Changes in forest area can be monitored by remote sensing, at least in part, or 
by systematic forest inventories. Inventories need to be based on a sample large 
enough to detect significant changes in forest area by forest type. Monitoring 
forest degradation (i.e. the change from intact forest to disturbed forest) by 
remote sensing is much more challenging than monitoring deforestation. 
Deforestation is easily detected by remote sensing, particularly when it occurs 
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on a large scale. However, it is much more difficult to detect degradation 
because remote sensing does not clearly show, for example, the removal of a 
few trees (selective logging) or loss of undergrowth (by fire) or disappearance of 
branches and small trees (for fuelwood). These activities have little effect on the 
canopy cover but can affect the forest stock significantly (DeFries et al. 2007). 
Even with high resolution optical imagery it is hard to detect changes under 
the canopy: advanced methods such as radar, which do have this potential, are 
currently only available in small areas.
One way of dealing with this problem is to use a probabilistic approach. This 
involves stratifying forest by risk of degradation, based on past trends and proxy 
variables such as accessibility (e.g. density of roads, distance from settlements) 
(Schelhas and Sanchez-Azofeifa 2006). The parameters in the models would 
be different for different types of degradation activities (e.g. selective logging, 
collecting fuelwood) (Iskandar et al. 2006).
Changes in average carbon stocks per unit area per forest type can be monitored 
by various methods. These include making use of secondary datasets and 
estimates from IPCC (2003b), as well as carrying out in situ forest inventories 
and monitoring sample plots. To measure changes in carbon stocks caused 
by forest degradation, IPCC (2006) recommends two methods: the stock-
difference method and the gain-loss method (see Figure 9.1).
The stock-difference method builds on traditional forest inventories to estimate 
sequestration or emissions. The gain-loss method builds on an understanding 
of the ecology of forests: how forests grow, and how natural or anthropogenic 
processes produce carbon losses. The stock-difference method measures 
the actual stock of biomass in each carbon pool at the beginning and end 
of the accounting period. The gain-loss method estimates biomass gains as 
mean annual increment (MAI) in biomass minus estimated biomass losses 
from activities such as timber harvesting, logging, collecting fuelwood and 
overgrazing, as well as from fire. If the forest is stratified into areas subject 
to different kinds of degradation, and these are well understood, it may be 
possible, for example, to estimate the quantity of wood products extracted in 
a given period quite accurately.
Table 10.1 compares the stock-difference method with the gain-loss method. 
Both methods could be used for assessing forest degradation in IPCC Tiers 2 
and 3. The choice of method will depend largely on what data are available and 
what resources are needed to collect additional data (GOFC-GOLD 2008). 
Countries experiencing significant forest degradation may wish to develop 
their own national and local databases and models in order to use the gain-loss 
method to estimate changes in different carbon pools. Estimates by Hardcastle 
and Baird (2008) suggest that adding degradation to the Tier 3 reporting set-
up would cost the Democratic Republic of the Congo an additional 10%, 
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Indonesia an additional 11% and Brazil an additional 13%. The percentage 
increases in recurrent costs would be similar. However, these calculations 
assume that these countries are already reporting in Tier 3 and will therefore 
have robust sampling systems (covering a minimum of 3% of land surface and 
6 strata) in place.
Table 10.1. Comparison of stock-difference and gain-loss methods for estimating 
emissions from different types of degradation
Type of 
degradation Stock-difference method Gain-loss method
Selective 
logging 
•	 Legal harvesting usually requires 
measurement of biomass after 
harvesting, thus necessary data 
should be available
•	 Illegal harvesting would require 
additional data collection
•	 Data on undisturbed forest can be 
used as a proxy if pre-harvesting 
data for particular sites is not 
available
• Uses estimates of MAI and 
centralised records on 
timber extraction activities 
•  Reliability depends 
on honesty of timber 
companies in reporting rates 
of extraction
Large-scale 
forest fires 
•	 Reference data from undisturbed 
forest can be used for pre-fire 
biomass, but forest inventory 
would be needed to measure post-
fire biomass
•	 Losses due to fire can be 
estimated from the area 
burned. Emission factors 
can be used to estimate 
emissions based on the 
biomass lost
Harvesting of 
fuel wood and 
non-timber 
forest products
•	 Pre-harvesting biomass levels 
could be estimated from typical 
levels in undisturbed forest. But, 
in practice, much of the forest 
subject to these uses will already 
be partially degraded at the start 
of the accounting period
•	 In areas already under individual 
or community management, pre- 
and post-period forest inventories 
can be carried out by forest users
•	 Data on losses, e.g. registers 
of commercial wood-
based products, estimates 
of fuelwood use, may be 
available
•	 Fuelwood off-take could 
also be calculated using 
population and data 
on average household 
fuelwood consumption
•	 Data on gains are available 
from standard MAI statistics
Subcanopy 
fire, grazing 
and shifting 
cultivation 
(using forest 
for agricultural 
production)
•	 Pre-harvesting biomass levels 
could be estimated from typical 
levels in undisturbed forest. But, 
most forest subject to these 
changes will already be partially 
degraded at the start of the 
accounting period
•	 Communities can measure 
changes. This can help establish 
local ‘ownership’ of the process
•	 Data on gains are available 
from standard MAI statistics
•	 Data on losses are rarely 
available in national 
statistics
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10.4  Cost implications for countries
The cost of measuring and monitoring forest degradation depends on the 
circumstances in each country, such as:
•	 The extent of forest cover
•	 The level of forest stratification (for example, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo has only one major forest type whereas Indonesia and Mexico 
have four or more forest ecotypes)
•	 The tier of carbon accounting applied
Countries’ forests are at different points on the forest transition curve (Figure 
10.1), reflecting the changes in agriculture and forest rents over time (Angelsen 
2007). As a result, degradation is a more critical issue in some countries than 
in others. For example, some countries may have halted deforestation but may 
still be losing biomass from the forests that remain. Thus, the state of a country’s 
forests will influence to what extent it invests in forest degradation accounting 
systems and which measurement and monitoring option it chooses.
Figure 10.1.  Stages in forest transition (adapted from Angelsen 2007)
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Undisturbed/
little 
disturbed 
forests
Stage 2:
Forests frontiers
(high deforestation)
Stage 3:
Forest mosaics with 
stabilised cover
(low or zero 
deforestation)
Stage 4:
Increasing forest cover 
through afforestation 
and reforestation
Forest transition theory identifies four stages in the transition of forests. 
Countries can be grouped into four categories according to the stage their 
forests fall in:
1.  Countries and regions with low deforestation and high forest cover such 
as the Congo Basin and Guyana – Here, forests are relatively undisturbed, 
but may be subject to increasing deforestation and degradation in the 
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future. These countries and regions are likely to be the most interested 
in accounting for forest degradation because they are less likely to benefit 
from ‘avoiding deforestation’, at least if reference levels are based on 
historical deforestation. In these countries with intact forests, the stock-
difference method with stratified sampling would be the most cost-efficient 
way of carbon accounting. Proxies could be used if there is no data from 
before logging or other human interventions (Table 10.1). Countries with 
large logging concessions could use the gain-loss method cost effectively 
because the basic data for Tier 2 type of reporting would be available. These 
countries could be motivated to account for degradation by the expectation 
that they could obtain financial support to do so.
2.  Countries with high deforestation such as (parts of ) Brazil, Indonesia, 
and Ghana that have large tracts of forest with high deforestation rates 
(forest frontiers) – These countries have a strong incentive to engage 
in deforestation accounting. Unless it requires little additional effort, 
they are less likely to have a significant interest in accounting for forest 
degradation. However, excluding forest degradation from national REDD 
schemes (especially where selective logging predominates) might lead to 
considerable leakage. These countries would most likely prefer to use the 
gain-loss method for the same reasons as countries in Category 1 with large 
logging concessions.
3.  Countries with low deforestation and low forest cover characterised by 
forest mosaics and stable forest areas – In these countries, deforestation rates 
have levelled off, either because forests have already been largely cleared or 
because they have strong forest protection policies. India may fall in this 
category and, as indicated in their 2008 submission to the UNFCC, they 
may be interested in reducing degradation, probably in combination with 
forest conservation, afforestation and reforestation, and other schemes to 
enhance forest carbon stocks. These countries could use the stock-difference 
method in Tier 2. As site-specific data becomes more widely available and 
cost effective they could progress to Tier 3.
4. Countries with increasing forest cover such as China and Vietnam – These 
countries may not be very interested in accounting for forest degradation 
unless a REDD agreement includes ‘enhancing’ carbon stocks (Chapter 2). 
However, even though new plantations may increase the forest area in these 
countries, the existing forests may be simultaneously degrading. Countries 
may prefer to present their success in increasing the area of forest plantations 
as afforestation/reforestation (A/R) under the Clean Development 
Mechanism. Whether or not this happens depends on whether or not 
A/ R is integrated into a REDD agreement. Because they may have records 
of forest management going back some time, these countries may have 
databases that can provide historical reference scenarios, enabling them to 
adopt the stock-difference method in Tier 3.
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10.5  Conclusion
Forest degradation is more complicated to define, monitor, report and verify 
(MRV) than deforestation (IPCC 2003a). More proxy factors need to be used. 
But IPCC stock-difference and gain-loss methodologies (IPCC 2006) and 
tiers (IPCC 2003b) are useful for carbon accounting in forest degradation. 
Where data is limited, simple methods, default values (Tier 1), and proxies 
can be used to account for emissions from different kinds of degradation. The 
uncertainties inherent in simpler approaches mean that credits would need to 
be ‘discounted’. This would be a direct incentive for countries to upgrade their 
measuring and monitoring methods.
Overcoming the challenges posed by carbon accounting in forest degradation 
by using the IPCC stock-difference and gain-loss methodologies, and tiers, 
means that forest degradation could realistically be included in a REDD 
agreement. This would make REDD more effective because it would account 
for a wider range of forest greenhouse gas emissions. The international equity of 
the REDD mechanism would also improve because a wider range of countries, 
many of them in Africa, would be encouraged to participate. It is, therefore, 
important that decisions on the MRV framework for degradation allow for a 
diversity of circumstances. This can be done by allowing countries flexibility 
in designing, developing and applying carbon accounting methods for forest 
degradation.
How do we achieve REDD co-benefits 
and avoid doing harm?
Chapter 11
David Brown, Frances Seymour and Leo Peskett1
11.1 Introduction
Global climate change negotiations concern more than just the reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions. Article Two of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFFCC) states that the ultimate objective 
of the convention is to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations while also 
ensuring food production is not threatened and economic development 
proceeds in a sustainable manner. The Thirteenth Session of the Conference 
of Parties in Bali in December 2007 (Decision 2/CP.13) recognised that 
reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) ‘can 
promote co-benefits and may complement the aims and objectives of other 
relevant international conventions and agreements’ and that ‘the needs of local 
and indigenous communities should be addressed when action is taken’ to 
implement REDD.
1   The chapter draws on Brown and Peskett (2008), Peskett et al. (2008) and Seymour (forthcoming).
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Parties to the UNFCCC have thus recognised that REDD will have implications 
beyond mitigation of carbon emissions. This chapter deals with these broader 
dimensions or ‘co-benefits’ of REDD, focusing on:
•	 social	co-benefits	associated	with	pro-poor	development;
•	 protection	of	human	rights	and	improvement	in	forest	governance;	and
•	 environmental	 co-benefits,	 particularly	 enhanced	 biodiversity	 protection	
and soil and water quality and availability. 
The chapter considers the extent to which the various REDD design options 
discussed in previous chapters can be made compatible with desired co-benefits, 
and avoid doing harm. Accordingly, for each of the three sets of co-benefits, 
this chapter will briefly summarise:
•	 opportunities and challenges of direct relevance to negotiations on the 
global architecture of an agreement on REDD; and
•	 implications for REDD implementation at the national level and below.
REDD is being negotiated in the context of a number of international 
agreements and allied instruments that recognise the importance of social co-
benefits in the management of forest resources. The ‘Bali Road Map’ refers 
to such instruments in the ‘Indicative Guidance’ for demonstration activities, 
which ‘should be consistent with sustainable forest management, noting, inter 
alia, the relevant provisions of the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF), 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and the Convention 
on Biological Diversity’ (Decision 2/CP.13 – Annex). For example, Article 20 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity asserts that economic and social 
development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities 
of the developing country partners, and international support needs to be 
tailored accordingly. The UNFF non-legally binding instrument includes 
in its purposes to ‘enhance the contribution of forests to the achievement 
of the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium 
Development Goals, with respect to poverty eradication and environmental 
sustainability...’ (Paragraph II, Principle 1). Such agreements – as well as such 
instruments as the safeguard policies of multilateral development banks – 
provide an emerging body of international norms relevant to REDD. 
At the same time, there are strong arguments for keeping REDD simple, in 
that an overemphasis on co-benefit and safeguard requirements could overload 
the agenda and discourage investment. Thus, as with other REDD design 
elements discussed in this volume, potential trade-offs among effectiveness, 
efficiency, and equity must be taken into account.
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11.2 Co-benefits for poverty reduction and 
enhanced equity
The questions of whether and how social co-benefits should be factored into 
REDD design and delivery are hotly debated. There are two positions among 
those who favour inclusion of REDD in a climate change regime. Some argue 
that because the main aim of REDD is to tackle climate change, not poverty, 
the appropriate stance should be that of ‘do no harm’ to the poor.2 Others 
favouring a ‘pro-poor’ approach argue that REDD will not succeed unless 
co-benefits are delivered. This group views REDD as deriving much of its 
legitimacy and potential effectiveness from its ability to improve the welfare 
of the forest-dependent poor and foster development in some of the poorest 
regions of the world. The arguments in favour of a pro-poor approach are 
diverse and compelling (see Box 11.1). 
2   For example, a 2007 submission to the UNFCCC by the Government of Tuvalu states that ‘...co-benefits 
may be possible but these should not outweigh the key principle of reducing emissions at the global level.’ 
(UNFCCC 2007).
Box 11.1.  Why should REDD be pro-poor?
Moral arguments concern the need not only to ensure that any major international 
initiative aims at improving welfare and equity, but also to address the interests of 
those with legitimate rights to use the forest who might be adversely affected by 
internationally supported interventions. 
Practical considerations relate to the fact that the immediate forest managers, who 
are often the forest-dependent poor, will need appropriate incentives to ensure the 
effectiveness of REDD.
Risk reduction arguments address the risk of local rejection, even social conflict, 
which could be a major disincentive to external investment, particularly given 
forestry’s record as a highly charged policy arena.
Attractiveness of REDD investments will be greater for those investors whose 
motivations are related to corporate social responsibility if REDD delivers pro-poor 
benefits. 
Political considerations: Much REDD investment is likely to come from international 
donors and development agencies for which social development is an underlying 
rationale.
Procedural matters: The UNFCCC recognises the importance of social issues, 
including poverty, as global priorities (Decision 2/CP.13). 
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REDD could well prove high-risk for the forest-dependent poor. Reasons 
include the multiplicity of interests and the polarisation of wealth and power 
of different stakeholders in the forest sector. However, REDD also provides 
important opportunities to reduce poverty and enhance equity by delivering 
significant financial flows to rural areas, which are among the most depressed 
and underfunded parts of most developing economies. 
11.2.1 Relevance to REDD architecture at the global Level
Previous chapters of this volume have assessed the equity implications of 
various REDD design elements, and potential trade-offs with effectiveness and 
efficiency. Some of these are briefly summarised below.
Market vs. fund-based finance (Chapter 5): The design of REDD finance 
mechanisms will have important implications for poverty and equity. The most 
obvious differences are likely to be in the overall volume of finance delivered, 
with compliance markets likely to deliver streams of finance that are an order of 
magnitude greater than concessional funding. However, market-based systems 
have two major limitations. First, markets are unlikely to fund the major public 
goods aspects of REDD delivery, particularly REDD preparedness. There is the 
risk that financing of REDD preparedness will be confined to the politically less 
challenging aspects (for example, developing technical monitoring capacity), 
to the detriment of major policy and institutional reforms that could help 
REDD realise its development potential (for example, forest tenure reforms).
Second, market finance is likely to be unevenly distributed between emerging 
economies (which tend to have quite well-elaborated legal frameworks and 
financial markets, conducive to private sector confidence) and less developed 
countries (which tend to be marked by ‘poor governance’). Investors are 
unlikely to invest in countries where governance is problematic, thus 
concentrating investments in emerging economies, as has occurred with the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Ebeling and Yasue 2008). The poorer 
the country, and the poorer the potential beneficiary groups within it, the smaller 
the likelihood of effective pre-financing of REDD-related activities by them. 
In the short to medium term, governance considerations suggest that most 
REDD funding to less developed countries will come from discretionary aid 
donor and voluntary sources, not from compliance markets, although under 
some nested project arrangements, there may be potential for investment 
even in unfavourable national environments. In principle, donor financing 
should be more ‘pro-poor’ than compliance market finance, particularly as the 
lead agencies are mandated to promote development agendas. An alternative 
approach would involve use of a levy mechanism (for example, levying a fixed 
percentage from auctioning European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
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(ETS) revenues). This scheme could combine the benefits of market finance 
(it is estimated that a 5% levy could generate EUR 2.5 billion by 2020) with 
the delivery of co-benefits, and thus has some attractions (Euractiv 2008). 
Despite its advantages, fund-based finance (whether development assistance 
or levy-based) weakens the link between payment and performance, and risks 
repeating the poor record of traditional aid to the forestry sector.
Scope and forest definitions (Chapter 2): The scope of REDD and the definitions 
of ‘forest’ have important implications on which countries and groups may 
benefit from REDD financial flows. The inclusion of degradation, for example, 
has different effects in countries where deforestation is mostly through industrial 
land conversion (e.g. Brazil) from countries where deforestation is driven more 
gradually by smallholder agriculture and demand for fuelwood and charcoal 
(e.g. many countries in Africa). Thus, accepting a definition that includes 
degradation as well as deforestation potentially widens the scope to reward the 
carbon conserving activities of the poor. A potential negative impact is that 
activities viewed as carbon degrading (swidden cultivation, for example) might 
be treated oppressively. On the other hand, narrow definitions3 could soak up 
most of the available finance at the expense of pro-poor interventions.
Risk and liability (Chapter 8): Issues of risk and liability are central concerns 
of compliance markets. Many international buyers will be motivated by the 
desire to transact high volumes at minimum risk, and pro-poor activities may 
be discounted on both fronts. Making national authorities bear all the delivery 
risk could severely reduce their willingness to invest in pro-poor activities. 
National authorities are also less likely to pass on any pre-financing they receive 
to rural communities.  Downstream liability (should the scheme in question 
fail to deliver the promised emissions reductions) could be problematic for 
poor actors and communities if their governments, on behalf of investors, were 
to transfer liability to them. 
Scale (Chapter 4): The architecture developed to nurture REDD activities will 
also affect the quality of pro-poor reforms, and there are some important effects 
of the scale chosen. For example, a nested approach in which liability initially 
accrues at project level will favour project interventions, with the strengths 
and weaknesses typical of this modality. If payments are being received and 
accounted for at project level, this may facilitate tight management, but it 
may be difficult to inform or influence the wider policy milieu which has 
the greatest impact on drivers of deforestation. An approach that focuses 
on national-level actions and encourages financial flows to be aligned with 
national budgetary processes and harmonised with national poverty strategies 
will have greater potential to influence the policy environment, although it will 
be more vulnerable to governance failures and corruption. 
3   For example, definitions that view ‘forests’ as coterminous with production and protection forests, and 
focus attention on rewarding industrial logging companies for enhancing their carbon retention.
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11.2.2 Opportunities and challenges at the national level
Though the international architecture will set the framework for REDD 
implementation, the realisation of co-benefits for poverty and equity will largely 
depend on the ways in which REDD incentive payments are translated into 
strategies for emissions reductions at the national level. Policies and measures 
could range from national-level policies (for example, removing subsidies 
that encourage deforestation and degradation, taxing land clearance, strategic 
planning of road systems) through improved industrial practices (such as 
support for timber certification and reduced impact logging), to initiatives that 
directly involve and affect the livelihoods of the poor (alternative livelihoods 
programmes, fire prevention strategies, agricultural intensification schemes 
aimed at reducing forest destruction, and improved off-farm employment).  
While few REDD projects have so far been implemented – and those were only 
in the voluntary sector – there is nevertheless much relevant evidence from a 
generation of ‘conservation and development’ projects with essentially similar 
aims. There are various reasons why these projects have met with only limited 
success, which includes the failure of project proponents to articulate clear 
strategies linking project interventions to expected changes in conservation 
and development outcomes (Hughes and Flintan 2001). A key constraint to 
increasing rural incomes through sustainable forestry has been the insecurity 
of property rights of many of the forest dependent poor. 
For REDD to be effective in reducing carbon emissions and generating 
significant co-benefits related to poverty reduction and equity, it will need 
to be integrated and aligned with broader economic development strategies. 
These include strategies designed to decrease dependence on forests and other 
natural resources, such as industrial growth and more effective educational 
and social service delivery (Byron and Arnold 1999). Governments will need 
to coordinate REDD with national poverty reduction strategies and associated 
support from international donors. 
Finally, there is a case for using REDD-related financial resources to support 
local government reform processes and social capital development, not only to 
help channel financial flows to the actual forest managers, but also to improve 
broader forest governance. Through the vehicle of local government reform, 
REDD would have great potential to improve timber revenue capture and 
management, and to help local communities manage the local component of 
those revenues and deploy them for community benefit (cf. Larson and Ribot 
2006). 
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11.3 Co-benefits for human rights and 
governance
Much of the opposition against the inclusion of REDD in the global climate 
protection regime is based on concerns that REDD could have negative 
consequences for the protection of human rights and could slow or reverse 
nascent improvements in forest governance at the national level. By conferring 
new value on forest lands, REDD could create incentives for government 
and commercial interests to actively deny or passively ignore the rights of 
indigenous and other forest-dependent communities to access and control 
forest resources. Large new financial flows would likely fuel conflict and create 
new opportunities for corruption. 
On the other hand, if REDD payments are contingent on performance, data 
on forest status and trends will have to be made publicly available, government 
and commercial interests will have to negotiate with people in a position 
to exercise effective stewardship over forest resources, and mechanisms for 
transparent and accountable financial transfers will need to be established. 
More generally, the heightened international scrutiny of forest management 
that will accompany REDD finance could strengthen the implementation of 
existing safeguards. All this could also have positive implications for human 
rights and governance. 
11.3.1 Relevance to REDD architecture at the global level
A consideration that applies to decision-making at all levels is respect for 
procedural rights – access to information, participation in decision-making, 
and access to justice – as articulated in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration 
(1992). The UN Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation 
in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the 
so-called ‘Aarhus Convention’) provides important guidance for citizen 
involvement in decision-making relevant to REDD implementation. It also 
requires signatories to promote its principles in international negotiations on 
the environment. 
In the context of REDD negotiations, respect for procedural rights implies an 
obligation for governments to proactively provide their citizens with timely 
and relevant information and opportunities for meaningful participation 
in the design of REDD. Indigenous peoples advocates have decried the 
marginalisation of their voices in REDD debates. Other groups have proposed 
the establishment of formal advisory groups composed of indigenous peoples 
and civil society representatives to advise the various bodies of the UNFCCC on 
REDD design and implementation (Rights and Resources Initiative 2008). 
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Independent monitoring and assessment mechanisms will be an important 
component of REDD architecture at the global level to mitigate the risk of 
‘disbenefits’ related to human rights and governance. Such mechanisms could 
be mandated to assess the impacts of REDD interventions on human rights 
and governance, and thus serve as an early warning system to enable prompt 
course correction.
Certain REDD design elements to be agreed at the global level may risk 
increasing human rights and governance problems in the context of national-
level implementation, or conversely, could enhance opportunities for positive 
co-benefits. For example, subnational approaches to REDD implementation 
would be more compatible with application of safeguards and other instruments 
for monitoring and verification of impacts on human rights. Conversely, 
national approaches offer greater upside potential to using REDD to improve 
forest governance, for example, through broad-based tenure reform. A 
combination of elements of centralised and decentralised approaches to forest 
governance may be needed to optimise the advantages and disadvantages of 
each (Colfer and Capistrano 2005).
REDD can also be linked to various international agreements that articulate the 
obligations of parties to protect human rights. For example, Colchester (2008: 5) 
sums up a number of international legal instruments related to the rights of 
indigenous peoples as asserting forest peoples’ right to ‘own, control, use and 
peacefully enjoy their lands, territories and other resources, and be secure in 
their means of subsistence’. An illustrative summary of these instruments is 
provided in Box 11.2.
In addition to rights and obligations articulated in international agreements, 
there is an emerging body of ‘soft law’ and international norms of relevance to 
REDD. Especially important for human rights and governance are procedural 
standards. The principle of ‘free, prior and informed consent’ (FPIC) on the 
part of affected communities affected by external development interventions 
is increasingly recognised as a standard to be achieved by governments and 
private corporations prior to infrastructure or extractive industry projects 
(Colchester and Ferrari 2007). Establishing FPIC standards in the context 
of REDD implementation could ensure greater procedural rights for affected 
communities. 
11.3.2 Opportunities and challenges at the national level
Any REDD-induced changes in national-level forest governance are likely 
to have major effects on the well-being of forest-dependent populations, 
including indigenous peoples. Many poor communities have progressively lost 
their rights since colonial times, and have been effectively reduced to the status 
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of squatters on public lands. Pursuit of livelihoods in such situations often 
involves behaviour that, however legitimate and necessary, is formally ‘illegal’, 
and this contributes to vulnerability. If poor people lack rights, it limits their 
power to negotiate for outcomes suitable to their interests, and they also suffer 
from their inability to defend the rights they do have (Khan 2006). 
While there has been a recent modest increase in the proportion of forest lands 
designated for use or ownership by communities and indigenous peoples, most 
of the forests in countries likely to participate in a global REDD regime remain 
in the hands of governments (Sunderlin et al. 2008). Revaluation of forest 
resources through the establishment of carbon rights could discourage cash-
strapped governments from conceding forest carbon rights to communities. 
Should REDD payments be contingent on performance, the tendency for 
governments to withhold rights would be countered.
Although REDD may also provide an opportunity for further progress in 
reformist legislation, special attention to safeguards is needed to ensure that 
the interests of national elites and international commercial interests do 
not override the rights of forest communities. Accordingly, international 
Box 11.2.  Illustrative international human rights instruments 
relevant to REDD
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights asserts 
that ‘In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence’ (Article 
1), suggesting an imperative that REDD not result in the denial of access to forest-
based livelihoods.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides guidance to 
ensure that human rights violations – such as arbitrary arrest and detention (Article 
9) – do not result from repressive law enforcement-orientated approaches to achieve 
REDD objectives.
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples proclaims 
that ‘States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples 
concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving 
due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure 
systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining 
to their lands, territories and resources’ (Article 27), a process that would need to 
precede REDD implementation.
The Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
affirms that development plans must take into account  ‘the particular problems faced 
by rural women and the significant roles which rural women play in the economic 
survival of their families, including their work in the non-monetized sectors of the 
economy’ (Article 14), which is particularly significant in the case of forest resource use. 
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investments in REDD capacity building efforts should enhance the ability 
of duty bearers (including government agencies, corporations, and non-
governmental organisations) to guard against human rights violations in 
REDD implementation, and should promote the ability of rights holders to 
claim their rights.
11.4 Co-benefits for biodiversity and other 
ecosystem services
REDD has a large potential to generate co-benefits for biodiversity conservation 
and other ecosystem services (beyond carbon sequestration). Tropical forest 
conservation is widely viewed to have been significantly underfunded in recent 
decades, in terms of both scale and length of funding cycle (Balmford and 
Whitten 2003), and the financial flows associated with REDD offer radical 
new possibilities on both fronts.
With respect to biodiversity, REDD avoids many of the pitfalls of Afforestation/
Reforestation (A/R) schemes, which tend to favour monocultures of exotic 
species. Plantation monocultures are not without biodiversity value, but in 
general support only a small proportion of the biodiversity of typical natural 
forest ecosystems (Kanowski et al. 2005). Compared with A/R schemes, REDD 
probably also has the advantage of not requiring over-demanding biodiversity 
standards, given that much forest conservation is likely to be inherently good 
for biodiversity. 
REDD can also be expected to provide co-benefits in terms of hydrological 
and soil conservation services. REDD could also help control soil erosion, 
and this affects both water and soil quality. Globally, three quarters of usable 
freshwater supplies come from forested catchments (Fischlin et al. 2007). 
Bundling carbon conservation with other ecosystem services such as water 
catchment could provide win-win scenarios. 
More broadly, the large-scale forest conservation that REDD could bring 
about could also have positive impacts on the climate beyond provision of 
carbon sequestration services. Bruijnzeel (2004), for example, predicts that 
large-scale conversion of forests to pastureland in Amazonia might result in a 
seven percent reduction in annual rainfall. Avoiding such impacts could have 
wider environmental benefits and help avoid the major changes in climate that 
are anticipated as likely to occur (Nepstad 2007). 
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11.4.1 Relevance to REDD architecture at the global level
To some extent, REDD at any scale is likely to have positive impacts on 
biodiversity, although the various design options may have differing impacts. 
REDD funding, particularly if funds come from markets, is likely to be 
directed towards areas of high carbon emissions. This will ensure high carbon 
effectiveness, but these areas are not necessarily the areas of highest biodiversity. 
Already protected areas such as the indigenous reserves which cover 22 percent 
of the Brazilian Amazon, and other biodiversity hotspots such as the Guiana 
Shield, would be unlikely to benefit, at least initially (da Fonseca et al. 2007). By 
contrast, voluntary stock maintenance and fund-based REDD schemes could 
potentially capture a larger set of co-benefits for biodiversity through broader 
geographic targeting, but the levels of funding would likely be significantly 
lower. Thus, although carbon and biodiversity aims are largely compatible, 
there could be trade-offs in the geographical targeting of funds. 
From a biodiversity perspective, national systems are preferable to project-
based approaches, in that they are likely to promote a more rational approach 
to landscape planning. The economies of scale in national-level measurement 
and monitoring systems will also facilitate planning at the landscape level. 
Project approaches, although prone to leakage (Chapter 7) may be ‘good for 
biodiversity’ by allowing investors to target specific areas with high biodiversity 
value. For example, the Noel Kempff Mercado Park in Bolivia, which is one 
of the few examples of a voluntary REDD scheme, has consolidated forest 
fragments into more ecologically coherent units despite concerns about leakage 
beyond its boundaries (Robertson and Wunder 2005). 
The extent to which REDD finance flows to dry forests will be influenced 
by a number of global design elements, including reference levels, financing 
mechanisms, and whether the scope includes avoided degradation. Should 
REDD design facilitate targeting of forestlands covered under the UN 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), this could have particularly 
important co-benefits in terms of combating soil erosion in those areas. 
However, such targeting would imply trade-offs in overall effectiveness and 
efficiency of the REDD mechanism, due to the significantly lower aboveground 
carbon stock of such areas compared to moist tropical forests. 
Maintenance of major ecosystem functions suggests the need for coordinated 
landscape planning on an international scale, which is likely beyond the 
scope of an agreement focused on mitigation of carbon emissions. However, 
a number of international agreements are relevant to REDD delivery and 
encourage harmonisation with wider environmental objectives at national and 
regional scales.  These include the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, the 
UNCCD, and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands.
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11.4.2 Opportunities and challenges at the national level
The extent to which REDD policies and measures implemented at the 
national level will affect biodiversity and other ecosystem services will depend 
on existing land use options and strategies, the types of activities incentivised 
or prohibited, as well as their geographic targeting. Much will depend on the 
underlying drivers of deforestation, and the overall environmental impacts of 
alternative uses of forest lands.
For example, in areas of forest that would otherwise be subjected to conventional 
logging practices, REDD funds could contribute to biodiversity conservation 
if effectively deployed to incentivise Reduced Impact Logging (RIL) (Meijaard 
et al. 2005). Co-benefits would be even greater if logged-over forests would 
otherwise be at risk of conversion to agricultural production in the absence of 
REDD finance.
 
REDD strategies intended to wean farmers away from destructive cyclical 
cultivation practices may appear positive for biodiversity, but the impact 
would need to be established for each situation. Farm bush biomes typical 
of shifting cultivation may have high biodiversity, for example (Tutin and 
Fernandez 1985), compared to permanent agriculture alternatives. Improving 
the productivity of cyclical practices and/or agroforestry systems may be better 
for biodiversity.  Beverage crops such as coffee may allow for the connectivity, 
which is conducive to maintaining ecosystem effects particularly where shade 
tolerant or dependent tree varieties are employed, but may require heavy 
chemical treatments to suppress fungal and pest attacks. Optimising REDD 
carbon sequestration objectives with other environmental co-benefits will thus 
need to take into account inputs and outputs over the whole agricultural cycle. 
11.5 Conclusion
The challenge for the international community is to ensure that the global 
architecture that is put in place by the UNFCCC provides – and does not 
foreclose – opportunities for developing countries to implement REDD 
in ways that deliver co-benefits related to poverty reduction, human rights 
protection, and non-carbon ecosystem services, and that avoid doing harm. 
Benefits are likely to be greatest, and risks minimised, if REDD financial 
flows and national-level implementation are harmonised with other pre-
existing international commitments and emerging norms, as well as national 
development strategies.
A key challenge will be designing appropriate procedural standards – including 
assessment,  monitoring and verification mechanisms – to ensure that due attention 
is paid to risks and opportunities without imposing excessive transaction costs 
that work to the detriment of achieving REDD objectives and co-benefits alike.
Overview of REDD proposals submitted to the 
UNFCCC1
Philippe Guizol and Stibniati Atmadja
1 Submissions can be found in: http://unfccc.int. This appendix was updated 19 November 2008.
 
Appendix
Issues Opinions Supported by
Key design issues
Guiding principles Common, but differentiated, 
responsibilities: Different national 
circumstances across countries 
will determine different levels of 
participation and will require targeted, 
positive incentives.
Costa Rica (Apr. 08); 
PNG - GRULAC - Costa 
Rica (Mar. 07); Mexico 
(Apr. 08); EU (Jul. 08)
Emphasis on sovereignty or a nation’s 
right to self-determination and 
economic development. Participation 
in any future mechanism should be 
voluntary, taking into account national 
circumstances and existing policies 
and initiatives.
Costa Rica (Apr. 08); 
PNG (Apr. 08); ACCRA 
Working Group (Aug. 
08); Mexico (Apr. 08)
Equity within countries: Participation 
of stakeholders, local communities 
and indigenous peoples should be 
secured. Distribution of REDD benefits 
to local actors should be transparent.
ACCRA Working Group 
(Aug. 08); Japan (Aug. 
08); PNG (Apr. 08)
Equity across countries. Early action to 
reduce DD should be rewarded.
Costa Rica (Apr. 08); 
CfRN (Sept. 07); Mexico 
(Apr. 08)
REDD complementary actions (Green 
Fund) should involve all countries.
Mexico (June 08)
 REDD should also include low 
deforestation countries.
Greenpeace (Mar. 08)
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Issues Opinions Supported by
Key design issues (continued)
Guiding principles
(continued)
The current knowledge of 
methodological issues is sufficient 
to initiate discussions on policy 
approaches and positive incentives.
ACCRA Working Group 
(Aug. 08)
The need for immediate support 
to host countries for governance 
and capacity building at all levels in 
developing countries. This includes 
the need to promote both North-
South and South-South technology 
transfer and technical cooperation.
ACCRA Working Group 
(Aug. 08); Brazil (Mar. 
07); COMIFAC (Apr. 08); 
Costa Rica (Apr. 08); 
CfRN (Sept. 07); Mexico 
(Aug. 08); PNG (Apr. 08)
Period up to 2012 should be devoted 
to ‘demonstration activities’ and 
‘national forest carbon inventory’ 
to facilitate integration of policy 
approaches and design REDD 
incentives at COP 15. Period after 2012 
should focus on policies and positive 
incentives for REDD.
EU (Jul. 08)
Global institutional 
setup
Separate REDD treaty, with respect to 
the Kyoto Protocol.
Brazil (Mar. 07); CCAP 
(Aug. 07); New Zealand 
– separate but still 
linked with Kyoto (Apr. 
08)
REDD should be under UNFCCC and 
integrated in a post-2012 agreement.
Mexico (Aug. 08); CfRN 
(Sept. 07); Greenpeace 
(Mar. 08); Norway (Sept. 
08)
Under a preexisting institution (non-
UNFCCC), e.g. FCPF, UN-REDD.
FAO, UNDP, UNEP (Apr. 
08); PNG (Apr. 08)
Scope of REDD Afforestation/reforestation activities 
could be included in a REDD scheme.
India (Apr. 08); Japan 
(Aug. 08)
A REDD scheme should include carbon 
stock enhancement and sustainable 
forest management.
Argentina, Honduras, 
Panama, Paraguay and 
Peru (Apr. 08); Costa 
Rica (Apr. 08); India 
(Apr. 08); Japan (Aug. 
08); Nepal (Apr. 08); 
Indonesia (Apr. 08); 
Norway (Sept. 08)
Sustainable forest management, 
carbon stock enhancement and forest 
conservation are not, by themselves, 
directly in line with avoiding emissions 
from deforestation.
Colombia (Apr. 08)
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Issues Opinions Supported by
Key design issues (continued)
Scope of REDD
(continued)
Additional actions should 
complement REDD: as forest 
management, carbon conservation, 
combating fires and carbon 
sequestration actions that result in 
local and global co-benefits.
Mexico (Aug. 08); Japan 
(Apr. 08); EU (Jul. 08); 
Indonesia (Apr. 08); 
India (Apr. 08); Nepal 
(Apr. 08); COMIFAC (Apr. 
08)
Activities credited 
under REDD
Input-based: Payments are made 
conditional on the inputs made to 
produce a desired outcome, even if 
the outcome cannot be measured 
directly, e.g. participatory forest 
management, prevention of forest 
fires and combatting illegal logging.
Japan (Aug. 08)
Output-based: Credit for enhanced 
carbon stocks and maintaining 
baseline stocks.
India (Apr. 08)
Mixed crediting approaches: (i) 
unplanned deforestation and forest 
degradation (DD) activities: credit 
based on level of emission reduction 
from activities compared to historical 
emissions from such activities (as 
forest management); and (ii) planned 
DD activities: the carbon stock 
saved by not implementing planned 
conversion of natural forest. 
Indonesia (Apr. 08)
Cost, potential and risk
Cost Importance of adopting fair and cost-
effective means to reduce emissions 
from DD in developing countries.
ACCRA Working Group 
(Aug. 08); COMIFAC 
(Apr. 08)
Transaction costs related to readiness 
activities (e.g. capacity building).
Congo Basin (Mar. 
07); CfRN (Sept. 07); 
Indonesia (Aug. 08)
Costs associated with meeting 
international standards (e.g. 
monitoring).
PNG (Apr. 08); 
BioCarbon (World 
Bank) (Aug. 08)
Risks REDD market may jeopardise the 
integrity of existing carbon market 
and efforts to reduce fossil fuel use.
CCAP (Aug. 07); New 
Zealand (Apr. 08)
The supply and demand for REDD 
credits is unknown, leading to risk 
aversion among buyers and sellers.
CCAP (Aug. 07); CISDL 
and GPPI (Feb. 07); FAO, 
UNDP, UNEP (Apr. 08); 
New Zealand (Apr. 08)
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Issues Opinions Supported by
Cost, potential and risk (continued)
Risks 
(continued)
Land tenure issues should be 
addressed by encouraging 
institutional reforms and community 
engagement as a way to mitigate the 
risk of conflict.
FAO, UNDP, UNEP 
(Apr. 08)
National REDD strategy should be 
integrated into existing national 
development planning as a way to 
mitigate delivery risks.
FAO, UNDP, UNEP 
(Apr. 08)
‘Hot air’ risks can be mitigated by 
storing credits issued during one 
period for use during another period.
CISDL and GPPI (Feb. 
07); Costa Rica (Apr. 08)
Scale
Subnational/
Project approaches
Project approaches should be allowed 
for early startup, broad participation 
and where they are attractive 
to private investors. But project 
approaches suffer from domestic 
leakage and cover limited forest areas.
BioCarbon (World 
Bank) (Aug. 08)
Subnational approaches help 
garner the experience necessary to 
implement national approaches.
COMIFAC (Apr. 08)
National 
approaches
National approaches allow for a broad 
set of policies to be pursued, capture 
domestic leakage and create country 
ownership, but will only be feasible 
for a small number of countries in the 
short to medium term. Subnational 
approaches may be appropriate in 
some national circumstances as a step 
towards the development of national 
approaches, reference levels and 
estimates.
Brazil (Mar. 07); CCAP 
(Aug. 07); CfRN (Sept. 
07); CISDL and GPPI 
(Feb. 07); Colombia 
(Apr. 08); COMIFAC 
(Apr. 08); EU (Apr. 08); 
FAO, UNDP, UNEP (Apr. 
08); Greenpeace (Mar. 
08); India (Apr. 08); 
Indonesia (Apr. 0 8); 
New Zealand (Apr. 08); 
Norway (Sept. 08)
Nested approach A nested approach offers a flexible 
mechanism, allows for early startup 
and supports projects. It supports 
moves either towards a national 
approach or towards coexistence of 
project and national approaches in a 
system where REDD credits are shared 
between projects and governments.
Costa Rica (Apr. 08); 
Colombia (Apr. 08); 
Paraguay, Argentina, 
Honduras, Panama, 
Peru (Apr. 08); PNG (Apr. 
08); Nepal (Apr. 08)
From global to 
local approach
Sharing tasks between global, 
national, subnational and local actors.
Switzerland (Apr. 08)
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Issues Opinions Supported by
Funding
Sources of funding. 
Non-market, dual 
(both market 
and non-market), 
market based
Prefer non-market based funding for 
emission reduction incentives, new 
and additional sources of funding 
(from Annex I countries), public 
funds (ODA), donations, financial 
mechanisms under UNFCCC.
Brazil (Mar. 07)
Dual, with main funding mechanism 
through trust fund - Multi-Donor Trust 
Fund (MDTF).
FAO, UNDP, UNEP (Apr. 
08)
Dual. Additional funds for early action 
or multiple funding sources. Funding 
sources could be differentiated over 
time. Short- and medium-term non-
market funds for capacity building and 
other transaction costs, and long-term 
market solutions for actual carbon 
emission reductions.
COMIFAC (Apr. 08); 
CCAP (Aug. 07); EU (Apr. 
08, Jul. 08); CfRN (Sept. 
07); New Zealand (Apr. 
08); PNG (Mar. 07); PNG 
(Apr. 08); Greenpeace 
(Dec. 07); Norway (Sept. 
08)
Dual. Non-market financing also 
used to support new funds, such as 
Community Forest Retention Trust 
Fund, International Forest Retention 
Fund, Compensated Conservation and 
World Climate Change Fund.
PNG (Mar. 07); Mexico 
(Jun. 08)
Preference for market-based rather 
than funds-based, but open to explore 
both options.
New Zealand (Apr. 08)
Prefer market-based financing from 
sale of emission reduction credits.
Australia (Apr. 08); 
Colombia (Apr. 08); 
Costa Rica (Apr. 08); 
CfRN (Sept. 07); PNG 
(Mar. 07); CISDL and 
GPPI (Feb. 07)
Include funding from auctioning 
carbon emissions allowances.
Norway (Sept. 08)
Recipients of 
funding
Should not be limited to countries 
where reductions in deforestation 
emissions are cheapest, nor countries 
with greater monitoring capacities 
and associated lower risks of 
impermanence.
Greenpeace (Mar. 08)
Special funds targeted for capacity 
building in developing countries.
Mexico (Aug. 08)
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Issues Opinions Supported by
Funding (continued)
Source of funding: 
Annex I vs. Not 
only Annex I
Source of financial resources for REDD 
from Annex I countries.
Brazil (Mar. 07)
No presumption that the source of 
financial resources to address REDD is 
limited to Annex 1 countries.
New Zealand (Apr. 08); 
Mexico (Jun. 08)
Fungibility of 
emission reduction 
credits
Fungibility. REDD produces tradable 
credits for Annex 1 country reductions. 
Fungibility advocates want REDD 
supported by a large market and fear 
that REDD funding would fall short, 
as with CDM, if REDD credits are not 
tradable in the main carbon markets.
Chile (Aug. 07), 
Paraguay, Argentina, 
Honduras, Panama, 
Peru (Apr. o8); 
Colombia (Apr. 08); 
CfRN (Sept. 07, Apr. 08); 
CISDL and GPPI (Feb. 
07); Mexico (aug. 08)
Not fungible. Non-fungibility 
proponents fear large volumes of 
cheap credits would destabilise 
the carbon compliance market and 
would reduce prices, and/or industrial 
countries would take fewer actions to 
reduce their emissions from fossil fuels 
and industries.
Brazil (Mar. 07); 
Greenpeace (Dec. 07)
Limited fungibility. For instance, to 
prevent any risk of flooding markets, 
specific limits or caps could be 
imposed on the volume of eligible 
credits.
BioCarbon (World 
Bank) (Aug. 08)
Not fungible in the short- and 
medium-term (before 2012 or 2020). 
Future fungibility is conditional on 
Annex I countries committing to 
higher reduction targets.
CCAP (Aug. 07) not 
fungible until 2012; 
EU (Apr. 08); EU ( Jul. 
08); EU (Oct. 08) not 
fungible until 2020
Baseline/reference level
Basis for funding Funding based on the specific 
financial needs of REDD countries 
and/or national circumstances.
PNG (Apr. 08); EU 
(Jul. 08); Paraguay, 
Argentina, Honduras, 
Panama, Peru (Apr. 08)
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Baseline/reference level (continued)
Method to set the 
baseline
Recommend using historical 
deforestation data.
Bali Action Plan (Dec. 
07); Costa Rica (Apr. 
08); FAO, UNDP, UNEP 
(Apr. 08); CCAP (Aug. 
07); Brazil (Mar. 07); 
Indonesia (Apr. 08); 
India (Apr. 08); New 
Zealand (Apr. 08); 
PNG (Apr. 08); EU 
(Apr. 08); Greenpeace 
(Mar. 08); CfRN 
(Sept. 07); Paraguay, 
Argentina, Honduras, 
Panama, Peru (Apr. 08) 
(continuation of their 
nested approach put 
forward by Paraguay 
et al. 07); EU (Jul. 08); 
Norway (Sept. 08)
Separate baselines for deforestation 
(hectares forest lost/year), and forest 
degradation (tonnes carbon/ha/year).
Nepal (Apr. 08)
Set aside forest to serve as baseline in 
stock-based approach.
CISDL and GPPI (Feb. 
07)
Recommend using projected trends/
extrapolation of historical trends into 
the future.
Indonesia (Apr. 08); 
CISDL and GPPI (Feb. 
07); COMIFAC (Apr. 08); 
Colombia (Apr. 08)
National mechanisms will allow more 
accurate baseline development.
New Zealand (Apr. 08)
Develop a system of nested baselines 
for different areas within a country, 
where the total emissions and sinks 
sum up to the national baseline level.
Nepal (Apr. 08)
Further studies are needed to make 
recommendations.
USA (Apr. 08)
Historical baselines are not an accurate 
indication of future deforestation 
pressures for countries that currently 
have low deforestation rates.
Norway (Sept. 08)
Use a discount factor to resolve 
baseline uncertainties or take national 
circumstances into account.
Greenpeace (Mar. 08); 
PNG (Apr. 08)
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Issues Opinions Supported by
Leakage
Dealing with 
leakage
Suggest using national approach to 
account for leakage.
CISDL and GPPI (Feb. 
07); CfRN (Sept. 07); 
CCAP (Aug. 07); New 
Zealand (Apr. 08); FAO, 
UNDP, UNEP (Apr. 08); 
Indonesia (Apr. 08); USA 
(Apr. 08)
Suggest other technical mechanisms 
to address leakage, e.g. reserve 
accounts, insurance, leakage belt.
Costa Rica (Apr. 08); 
Greenpeace (Mar. 08); 
Colombia (Apr. 08)
Suggest regulatory mechanisms, such 
as removing institutional barriers.
Indonesia (Apr. 08)
Routine monitoring to check for 
degradation leakage.
Nepal (Apr 08)
Acknowledge importance of 
addressing leakage, but no specific 
recommendations.
Bali Action Plan (Dec. 
07); CBD (May 08); USA 
(Apr. 08); Colombia 
(Apr. 08)
Need to address international leakage 
since, even with national accounting, 
the problem still exists.
Colombia (Apr. 08); 
CCAP (Aug. 07); USA 
(Apr. 08); Norway (Sept. 
08)
Use of adjustment 
factors 
Use adjustment factors to take leakage 
into account.
Greenpeace (Mar. 08); 
BioCarbon (World 
Bank) (Aug. 08)
Should not use adjustment factors to 
take leakage into account.
New Zealand (Apr. 08)
Permanence and liability
Recommendations 
for non-
permanence 
Use reserve accounts to address 
permanence. A proportion of the 
projected emission reductions are 
kept in reserve to cover this risk of 
non-permanence.
Costa Rica (Apr. 08); 
CISDL and GPPI 
(Feb. 07); Paraguay, 
Argentina, Honduras, 
Panama, Peru (Apr. 08)
If emissions occur in the current 
period, carbon credits can be taken 
out in a future period.
Brazil (Mar. 07); PNG 
(Apr. 08)
Creation of protected areas as a way to 
ensure permanence.
CBD (May 08); Costa 
Rica (Apr. 08)
Use discount factor to take into 
account non-permanence of REDD 
credits.
Greenpeace (Mar. 08)
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Permanence and liability (continued)
Recommendations 
for non-
permanence
(continued)
Use temporary credits that are 
renewable.
CISDL and GPPI (Feb. 
07); BioCarbon (World 
Bank) (Aug. 08)
Set up an insurance scheme to 
manage risk of carbon emissions.
BioCarbon (World 
Bank) (Aug. 08); CfRN 
(Sept. 07)
Countries should not be penalised 
if deforestation is caused by natural 
disasters.
Costa Rica (Apr. 08)
Issue of liability Developing countries should not 
be penalised if they do not meet 
emissions reductions targets, but 
receive incentives if they do.
CCAP (Aug. 07)
Countries are liable for compliance 
failure.
CfRN (Sept. 07)
Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)
Monitoring DD 
emissions
Carbon stocks estimated for each 
biome associated with remote sensing 
measurements.
Brazil (Mar. 07)
Remote sensing with ground truthing. EU (Apr. 08); Nepal (Apr. 
08)
Need more accurate measurement 
methods and research. Carbon stocks 
in different ecosystems are poorly 
known. Inventory tools and methods 
need a lot of investment. Need 
ecosystem specific models.
Chile (Aug. 07), 
Paraguay, Argentina, 
Honduras, Panama, 
Peru (Apr. 08); USA (Apr. 
08)
Carbon stock approach offers 
opportunities for countries with low 
deforestation rates. 1) A country 
estimates its aboveground carbon 
stock; 2) Non-tradable ‘Carbon Stock 
Units’ are issued equal to (1); 3) A 
protected reserve is established, 
covering all forest that is not at threat 
from deforestation; 4) A conservation 
project for a forest area outside 
the reserve produces credits; 5) On 
approval of such a project, a ‘Carbon 
Stock Mechanism’ allows trading of 
credits produced by this project; and 
6) Credits are temporary to address 
the permanence issue.
CISDL and GPPI (Feb. 
07); Sri Lanka (Apr. 08); 
COMIFAC (Mar. 07)
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Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) (continued)
Incentives for MRV Recognise the need for up-front 
funding and incentives for MRV and 
capacity building.
Brazil (Mar. 07); 
COMIFAC (Apr. 08); 
Costa Rica (Apr. 08); 
CfRN (Sep. 07); PNG 
(Apr. 08); Norway (Sept. 
08)
Monitoring 
approaches
Full vs. partial 
accounting
Full accounting: The entire country 
forest area is monitored - ‘wall-to-wall 
mapping’.
Brazil (Mar. 07); New 
Zealand (Apr. 08)
Partial accounting. Sampling 
monitoring (systematic or stratified 
sampling) or project level sampling.
Indonesia (Apr. 
08); Colombia (Apr. 
08); COMIFAC (Apr. 
08); Chile (Aug. 07), 
Paraguay, Argentina, 
Honduras, Panama, 
Peru (Apr. 08)
Estimating 
effectiveness in 
terms of emission 
reductions
The effectiveness of the adopted 
REDD activities should be assessed 
in terms of the amount of emissions 
reductions obtained by the host 
country, in order to avoid any perverse 
incentives.
Costa Rica (Apr. 08)
Effectiveness should take into account 
the effects on communities and 
biodiversity.
EU (Apr. 08)
MRV transparency 
and role of related 
institutions
Data should be public, for instance 
they could be published for COPs and 
on the web.
Brazil (Feb. 07); 
Colombia (Apr. 08); 
Chile (Aug. 07); 
Paraguay, Argentina, 
Honduras, Panama, 
Peru (Apr. 08)
Annual report on inventories. Brazil (Mar. 07); CCAP 
(Aug. 07)
International bodies within IPPCC/
UNFCCC define the MRV methods.
Chile (Aug. 07); 
Paraguay, Argentina, 
Honduras, Panama, 
Peru (Apr. 08); Brazil 
(Feb. 07); Canada (Apr. 
08); Colombia (Apr. 08); 
Costa Rica (Apr. 08); 
CfRN (Sept. 07); SBSTA 
for FAO, UNDP, UNEP 
(Apr. 08); Indonesia 
(Apr. 08); PNG (Apr. 08); 
Norway (Sept. 08)
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Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) (continued)
MRV transparency 
and role of related 
institutions
(continued)
Independent and accredited 
verification system is needed to 
determine reference emission levels, 
actual emission reductions and 
leakage
Colombia (Apr. 08); 
Chile (Aug. 07); 
Paraguay, Argentina, 
Honduras, Panama, 
Peru (Apr. 08); Norway 
(Sept. 08)
Carbon monitoring results should not 
need to be verified by institutions or 
experts outside the country because 
they should be supported by national 
institutional mechanisms that are 
appropriate to national and local 
government systems.
Indonesia (Apr. 08)
MRV mechanism
Risks regarding 
MRV
To avoid risks, emission reductions 
should be discounted as a proxy for 
managing uncertainties on estimating 
emissions, baselines and permanence.
Greenpeace (Mar. 08)
Degradation
Include or exclude 
REDD
Include both deforestation and forest 
degradation.
Bali Action Plan (Dec. 
07); Norway (Sept. 
08); Australia (Apr. 08); 
CCAP (Aug. 07); CISDL 
and GPPI (Feb. 07); 
Costa Rica (Apr. 08); 
CfRN (Sept. 07); EU (Apr. 
08); Japan (Aug. 08); 
Nepal (Apr. 08); USA 
(Apr. 08)
Support inclusion of degradation, 
but not systematically. Each activity 
should decide if it is cost effective to 
include forest degradation.
Colombia (Apr. 08)
Should include forest degradation, but 
be wary of the methodological issues.
Greenpeace (Mar. 08)
Against including forest degradation, 
as it risks jeopardising the REDD 
process. Some methodological 
issues for measuring degradation are 
unsolved.
Brazil (Mar. 07)
REDD first, REDD where ever we can, 
or later if feasible. Countries which are 
not ready to meet methodological 
requirements for measuring forest 
degradation should be allowed 
to receive incentives for reducing 
deforestation.
Canada (Apr. 08); EU 
(Apr. 08); Greenpeace 
(Mar. 08)
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Degradation (continued)
REDD or RED 
(include or exclude 
degradation)
(continued)
The methodological requirements 
for measuring degradation can be 
overcome and we should include 
forest degradation without delay.
Costa Rica (Apr. 08)
Monitoring 
degradation
There are still a number of monitoring 
issues. Research has not shown that 
incremental changes associated with 
forest degradation can be captured 
accurately solely through remote 
sensing. In order to capture the net 
flux of such activities repeated survey 
sampling is required.
USA (Apr. 08)
Suggest indirect approach to monitor 
forest degradation (areas of intact 
and non-intact forests between two 
observations periods). Estimation 
and demonstration of reduction 
in emissions from degradation by 
methods such as inventories or 
assessing canopy openness by remote 
sensing with ground truthing.
EU (Apr. 08); Colombia 
(Apr. 08); Nepal (Apr. 
08)
Implications 
of including 
degradation
Measuring degradation requires 
additional sampling and monitoring 
on the ground, and more funding for 
capacity building and implementation.
CCAP (Aug. 07); Norway 
(Sept. 08)
Reducing degradation will provide 
a number of co-benefits, such as 
biodiversity.
CISDL and GPPI (Feb. 
07)
Deforestation and forest degradation 
definitions need to be tackled.
Colombia (Apr. 08); 
COMIFAC (Apr. 08)
Integrated management of 
peatlands is required. The large-
scale degradation of peatlands, 
including forested peatlands, has 
major implications for climate change, 
biodiversity and people.
CBD (May 08)
REDD co-benefits
Various positions 
on REDD co-
benefits
Environmental conservation and 
biodiversity co-benefits are essential 
for effectiveness.
Bali Action Plan (Dec. 
07); CBD (May 08); 
FAO-UNDP-UNEP, 
Greenpeace (Mar. 08); 
BioCarbon (World 
Bank) (Aug. 08); Mexico 
(Aug. 08); EU (Jul. 08)
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REDD co-benefits (continued)
Various positions 
on REDD co-
benefits
(continued)
Poverty alleviation/sustainable 
development goals should be 
included in a REDD scheme.
FAO-UNDP-UNEP, 
BioCarbon (World 
Bank) (Aug. 08); Mexico 
(Aug. 08)
Rights of minority groups, forest-
dependent peoples, and indigenous 
groups should be protected.
FAO-UNDP-UNEP, 
Greenpeace (Mar. 08); 
EU (Jul. 08); Norway 
(Sept. 08)
Co-benefits should not influence 
REDD implementation.
PNG (Apr. 08)

Abbreviations
3E Effective, Efficient, and Equitable
A/R Afforestation/Reforestation
AAU Assigned Amount Unit
AD Avoided Deforestation
AFOLU Agriculture, Forestry and other Land Use
ARD Afforestation, Reforestation, and Deforestation
BAU Business as Usual
CAT Cap and Trade
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity
CCAP Center for Clean Air Policy
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CER Certified Emission Reductions
CfRN Coalition for Rainforest Nations
CIFOR Center for International Forestry Research
CISDL Centre for International Sustainable Development Law
CO2e Carbon Dioxide Equivalent
COP Conference of the Parties
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
DD Deforestation and Forest Degradation
DNA Designated National Authority
ETS Emissions Trading Scheme
EU European Union
FPIC Free, Prior, and Informed Consent
GEF Global Environmental Facility
GHG Green House Gas
GOFC - GOLD Global Observation of Forest  and Land Cover Dynamics
GPG Good Practice Guide
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GPPI Global Public Policy Institute
ha hectare
HWP Harvested Wood Products
ICDP Integrated Conservation and Development Project
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JI Joint Implementation
LDC Less Developed Countries
LULUCF Land Use, Land Use Change, Forestry
MAI Mean annual increment
MRV Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification
ODA Official Development Assistance
PAM Policies and Measures
PES Payments for Environmental Services
PNG Papua New Guinea
REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
RIL Reduced Impact Logging
SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
TDERM Tropical Deforestation Emission Reduction Mechanism
tC Metric tonnes of carbon
TgC Teragrams of carbon = Million metric tonnes of carbon
UNCCD United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNFF United Nations Forum on Forests
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
VER Verified Emission Reduction
Glossary
3E Criteria
The 3E criteria (Effectiveness, Efficiency and Equity) were first used 
in the Stern Report (see Stern Report entry below) to evaluate global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions schemes. These criteria are used in 
this book to evaluate different options for a REDD global architecture 
(see end of Chapter 2 for further explanation).
Additionality
Refers to the nature of projects under the Kyoto Protocol. Projects must 
demonstrate ‘additionality’ – real, measurable and long-term benefits 
in reducing or preventing carbon emissions that would have occurred 
without the project. Alternatively, additionality in crediting systems 
means payments for reducing emissions to a level below the business-
as-usual scenario (see entry).
Afforestation
Afforestation is defined under the Kyoto Protocol as the direct human-
induced conversion of non-forest land to permanent forested land (for 
a period of at least 50 years).
AFOLU
Acronym for Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Uses. Recommended 
by IPCC Guidelines (2006) as a new term covering LULUCF (Land 
Use, Land Use Change and Forestry) and agriculture.
Annex I and Non-Annex I Countries
Under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
nations fall into two categories: developed countries (referred to as 
Annex I countries) and developing countries (referred to as Non-
Annex I countries). In accordance with the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities, Annex I countries have higher levels of 
commitments related to policy enactment and reporting, and most of 
them have emissions reductions commitments in the Kyoto Protocol. 
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Bali Action Plan
The Bali Action Plan refers to Decision 1/CP.13 that sets out the 
framework for international negotiations on a ‘...comprehensive 
process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of 
the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and 
beyond 2012’. The Action Plan includes provisions for ‘Policy approaches 
and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role 
of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of 
forest carbon stocks in developing countries’.
Baseline
Baseline or reference line can refer to three concepts (see Chapter 6): 
(i) the historical baseline, that is, the rate of deforestation and forest 
degradation (DD) and the resulting CO2 emissions over the past x 
years; (ii) the projected DD under a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. 
A BAU baseline is the benchmark for judging the impact of the REDD 
measures and ensuring additionality; and (iii) the crediting baseline, or 
reference level, is a benchmark for rewarding the country (or project) if 
emissions are below that level.
BioCarbon Fund
A public/private fund administered by the World Bank to 
demonstrate projects that sequester or conserve carbon in forest and 
agroecosystems.
Biomass
The total dry mass of living organic matter.
Business-as-Usual (BAU)
A policy neutral reference to future emissions, that is, projections of 
future emission levels without the REDD activity.
Canopy cover
See ‘crown cover’.
Carbon Markets
Any market in which carbon emissions trading, usually in the form of 
carbon credits, takes place. Markets consist of voluntary markets (where 
emissions reductions targets are not regulated) and compliance markets 
(where carbon credits are traded to meet regulated emissions reductions 
targets). The largest carbon market at the moment is the EU’s Emissions 
Trading System (ETS).
Carbon pool
A reservoir or stock which has the capacity to accumulate or release 
carbon. In forests there are five main carbon pools aboveground biomass, 
belowground biomass, dead wood, litter and soil organic matter.
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Carbon rights
Carbon rights refer to the claims on the benefit streams from carbon 
pools, for example, the benefit from a specific parcel of forest. Where 
a market exists for GHG emissions reductions carbon rights may have 
a financial value. Carbon rights may also define the management 
responsibilities associated with a specific area of forest. Issues concerning 
carbon rights include how the rights are defined, how they work in 
places where land ownership is unclear, and whether legal institutions 
are strong enough to protect the rights.
Carbon sequestration
The removal of carbon from the atmosphere and long-term storage 
in sinks, such as ocean or terrestrial ecosystems, through physical or 
biological processes, such as photosynthesis.
Carbon sink
A pool (reservoir) that absorbs or takes up carbon released from other 
components of the carbon cycle.
Carbon stocks
The quantity of carbon contained in a carbon pool (see ‘carbon pool’).
Certified Emission Reduction (CER)
The technical term for the output of CDM projects. A CER is a unit 
of GHG reductions that has been generated and certified under the 
provisions of Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development 
Mechanism. One CER equals one tonne of carbon. Two special types 
of CERs can be issued for net emission removals from afforestation and 
reforestation CDM projects: (i) temporary certified emission reduction 
(tCERs); and (ii) long-term certified emission reductions (lCERs)
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
A mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol designed to help developed 
(Annex I) countries to meet their emissions reduction targets. The 
mechanism allows for Annex I countries that finance and implement 
projects that reduce emissions in developing (Non-Annex I) countries 
to get credits that can be used to fulfill their own  emissions reduction 
targets. The CDM aims not only to reduce emissions or increase 
sinks, but also to contribute to sustainable development in developing 
countries.
Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN)
A collaboration between developing nations with rainforests to reconcile 
forest stewardship with economic development. As of November 2008, 
participants included 41 countries in Asia, Africa, the Americas and 
Oceania. Sometimes the Coalition acts as a single group in UNFCCC 
negotiations. It is behind a number of REDD submissions.
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Co-benefits
Benefits arising from REDD schemes (other than reducing GHG 
emissions), such as alleviating poverty, protecting the environment, 
enhancing biodiversity, improving forest governance and protecting 
human rights.
Conference of the Parties (COP)
The governing body of the UNFCCC, which meets once a year.
Crown cover
The percentage of the surface of an ecosystem that is under the tree 
canopy. Also referred to as ‘canopy cover’ or just ‘tree cover’.
Deforestation
Most definitions describe deforestation as the long-term or permanent 
conversion of land from forest to non-forest. In an annex to a decision 
made by the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP), which serves 
as a meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, deforestation is 
defined as ‘the direct human-induced conversion of forested land to 
non-forested land’. The FAO defines deforestation as ‘the conversion 
of forest to another land use or the long-term reduction of the tree 
canopy cover below the minimum 10% threshold’. Definitions also 
stipulate minimum tree heights (FAO: 5 m in situ) and minimum areas 
(FAO: 0.5 ha), and that agriculture must not be the dominant use. But 
the definitions of minimum canopy cover, height and area vary from 
country to country.
Degradation
Changes within the forest which negatively affect the structure or 
function of the forest stand or site, and thereby lower the capacity of 
the forest to supply products and/or services. In the context of a REDD 
mechanism, forest degradation results in the net loss of carbon from the 
ecosystem. One way to measure degradation is to measure the decrease 
in the carbon stock per area unit (e.g. hectare).
Forest rent
Forest rent can be defined as the net profit from a parcel of forest 
land, that is, the difference between the gross income derived from the 
products and services generated and the opportunity costs of the inputs 
used.
Forest transition
Describes the changes in forest cover over time as a sequence of four 
stages. These are (i) initially high forest cover and low deforestation; 
(ii) accelerating and high deforestation; (iii) slow-down of deforestation 
and stabilisation of forest cover; and (vi) a period of reforestation.
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Fungibility (of REDD credits)
The degree of exchangeability between REDD credits and carbon credits 
in carbon markets. When REDD credits are fully fungible, they can be 
sold without restriction and used for purposes such as meeting emission 
reductions targets in countries that have committed to such targets.
Hot air
Emissions reductions that are not truly additional (see ‘additionality’). 
To illustrate, consider the situation  in former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. Economic decline in the 1990s led to a sharp decrease in GHG 
emissions. Levels were lower than those in 1990, which was the crediting 
baseline level. Under the rules of the Kyoto Protocol, these countries 
were eligible to sell the difference as credits, despite the fact that credits 
came from emissions reductions that would have occurred anyway (i.e. 
not additional).
Input-based payments
Payments that are made conditional on inputs which are assumed 
to produce emissions reductions, but where the outcome cannot be 
measured directly (or is very costly to measure). Input-based payment 
schemes are often referred to as ‘policies and measures’ (PAMs).
Joint Implementation (JI)
A mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol (alongside CDM) designed 
to help Annex I countries to meet their emission reduction targets by 
investing in emissions reduction projects in other Developed countries 
as an alternative to reducing emissions domestically. Unlike the CDM, 
JI emissions reductions take place in countries that have GHG emission 
targets.
Kyoto Protocol
An agreement made in 1997 under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Annex I countries 
that ratify this Protocol (categorized as Annex I countries) commit to 
reducing their emissions of carbon dioxide and five other GHGs. The 
Kyoto Protocol now covers more than 170 countries globally, but only 
60% in terms of global GHG emissions. As of December 2007, the 
US and Kazakhstan are the only signatory nations not to have ratified 
the Protocol. The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
ends in 2012, and international talks began in May 2007 on the next 
commitment period.
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Leakage
In the context of climate change, carbon leakage is the result of 
interventions to reduce emissions in one geographical area (subnational 
or national) that lead to an increase in emissions in another area. For 
example, if curbing the encroachment of agriculture into forests in one 
region results in conversion of forests to agriculture in another region 
this is considered to be ‘leakage’. In the context of REDD, leakage is 
also referred to as ‘emissions displacement’.
Liability
It is the obligation of the REDD implementing project or country 
to ensure that the emission reductions that have been credited are 
permanent. This terms is mainly used in relation to the permanence of 
REDD (Mainly used in relation to the permanence of REDD).
LULUCF
Acronym for Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry. See also 
AFOLU.
Mitigation
Actions to prevent further accumulation of GHG in the atmosphere by 
reducing the amounts emitted, or by increasing the storage of carbon 
in sinks.
Nested approach
A hybrid approach that includes elements of both subnational and 
national approaches to REDD. See Chapter 4 for further description.
Output-based payments
Output-based payments are payments directly conditional on outcomes. 
Two types of output-based measures are being discussed in the REDD 
debate: emissions-based and stock-based. The emissions-based (or flow-
based) approach, measures and credits only the net changes in carbon 
stocks over time (emissions). The stock-based approach makes payments 
a function of the total carbon stock in the forest at any one time (i.e., 
absolute levels, and not changes).
Payments for environmental (ecosystem) services (PES)
Voluntary payment by a (minimum one) buyer to a (minimum one) 
provider to ‘buy’ an environmental service (or a land use likely to secure 
that service), if, and only if the provider secures the environmental 
service.
Peatlands
Wetlands where the soil is highly organic because it is formed mostly 
from partly decomposed plants.
Permanence
The duration and non-reversibility of a reduction in GHG emissions. 
Non-permanence can be seen as a form of intertemporal leakage.
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Reduced impact logging (RIL)
Intensively planned and carefully controlled harvesting to minimise the 
impact of logging on residual forest stands and soils, usually by selecting 
individual trees for felling.
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD)
REDD refers to mechanisms currently being negotiated under the 
UNFCCC process to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation. REDD may refer to a broad set of approaches and actions 
that will achieve this, but the core idea is to create performance-based 
mechanisms that reward projects or countries that produce emission 
reductions.
Reference level/line
Commonly used in the sense of crediting baseline (See ‘baseline’).
Reforestation
Reforestation is ‘the direct human-induced conversion of non-forested 
land to forested land through planting, seeding and/or the human-
induced promotion of natural seed sources, on land that was forested, but 
that has been converted to non-forested land’. In the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol, reforestation activities have been defined 
as reforestation of lands that were not forested on 31 December 1989, 
but have had forest cover at some point during the past 50 years.
Remote sensing
A method of measuring deforestation and/or forest degradation by a 
recording device that is not in physical contact with the forest, such as 
a satellite.
Revegetation
The growth of new vegetation on an area that has previously been 
cleared.
Reverse leakage
A mitigation activity that results in emissions reductions in areas outside 
the original mitigation area. Also referred to as ‘positive leakage’.
Stern Report/Review
The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change is a 700-page 
report commissioned by the British government. The Review, by the 
economist Lord Stern of Brentford, was released on 30 October 2006 
and discusses the effect of climate change and global warming on the 
world economy. The review concludes that 1% of global gross domestic 
product (GDP) per annum needs to be invested in order to avoid the 
worst effects of climate change. Failure to do so could risk lowering 
global GDP by 20%.
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Verification
Independent third party assessment of the expected or actual emission 
reductions of a particular mitigation activity.
Voluntary Carbon Standards
Certification schemes for emission credits not regulated under the 
Kyoto Protocol.
Wetlands
Lands at the interface between terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. They 
are characterised by standing water for at least part of the year.
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